

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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HANDBOOK OF HILOSOPHY OF RELIGION



by

SUBODH KUMAR GHOSH, M.A., LL.B.,

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Scottish Church College, Calcutta.*

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My Mother



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FOREWORD

That a second edition of this **Text-Book on Philosophy Religion** has been called for within a short time is the proof of positive, if proofs at all were needed, of the intrinsic excellence of the book, which has been still ruling over the field with a compelling authority. So far as I have been able to scrutinize, I find that the book has been thoroughly revised, with some paragraphs considerably enlarged and certain valuations re-made in the light of newly discovered materials as also of steadily growing experience on all fronts in the world of to-day. It is thus that the book has been brought up-to-date ; and what is specially to be prized is the incorporation of some new sections on 'Mysticism', 'Metaphysics of Reality' etc. which have served to enhance its academic value and importance. Remaining basically the same, the second edition of the book has attained unto the first mile-stone of progress and with its acquired momentum of success it is sure to cover many more, to the satisfaction of its beneficiaries. I have no doubt whatever that it will be able to maintain its position as a standard reference work on the subject.

Pitambar Bhattacharjee Lane,
Kolkata-9
8, 1967

S. K. Das.



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

should humbly submit that this has long been regarded standard work, and may be warmly commended to all wish to understand the problems of Philosophy of

ion. Although remaining basically the same, this book has completely remodelled. Some paragraphs have been considerably enlarged, and some judgments have been revised in the light of new knowledge, more modern basis, and the growing experience of our times. The book has also been brought up-to-date with the views of some Indian thinkers and some new topics are also added in this edition.

I am grateful to my teacher Dr. S. K. Das, M.A., P.R.S., D. (Lond), for taking pains in scrutinizing and helping in enlarging the book, and for kindly writing the 'word' for this edition. I am thankful to my colleagues Professors of different Colleges, of different Universities in India, for their encouragement in different ways. My acknowledgements are also due to Sri Sunil Kumar Ghosh, Hena Ghosh, Sri Sudhir Saha, Sm. Minati Sengupta and Sri Subhas Chakravarty. I recognise humbly the services rendered by Sri Amal Kumar Sarkar of Indian Book Distributing Company for his active help in getting the book published and Sri Ajit Kumar Samai for printing the book with special interest.

Subodh Ghosh

Manindra Chandra College

Dispur-3

8. 1967

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Books on 'Philosophy of Religion' by eminent authors are available, but it appears there is hardly a single book that covers the entire syllabus of the Honours Course (both two-year and three-year). Naturally, students find it really difficult to grasp this particular subject. A feeling of helplessness has inspired me to undertake this venture.

In preparing this book I have kept in view the needs of Honours students of the leading Universities. My chief concern has all the time been about how abstract topics connected with the subject can be made easily intelligible to those for whom they are meant. At the same time I have also had to include such material as is expected from Honours students. At places I have drawn upon things even from the M. A. syllabus to do justice to my task for the simple reason that the Honours and Post-graduate studies are in some sense concurrent.

The two-fold problem of making the subject understandable to freshers from the University and Higher-Secondary stage, and of treating it on the appropriate level with sufficient clarity and precision is formidable indeed. I have tried my best to tackle it, but still I sincerely feel that suggestions from experienced teachers and learned Professors of Philosophy will be of great help to make this book better; with befitting humility I seek their valuable help.

In preparing this book I have consulted standard texts on Philosophy of Religion, which are rarely available. I do not lay any claim to originality, but have simply tried to make it comprehensive within a small compass. It is called a 'Handbook', for it has been intended to serve as a constant companion to Honours students.

I owe deep gratitude to my revered teachers the late Professor S. P. Biswas, Head of the Department of Philosophy of the Scottish Church College and the late Professor Pravas Jivan Chowdhury, Head of the department of Philosophy of the Presidency College, Calcutta for their valuable suggestions. I acknowledge gratefully the inspiration received from my father, Sri M. M. Ghosh and my teachers Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, Dr. S. K. Das and Dr. A. C. Das in writing the book. I am deeply indebted to my friends Professors Kantimoy Kumar and Bireswar Bhattacharya for their active help in having the book published. I am also thankful to Professors Nandalal Banerjee, Satindra Nath Chakravorty, Siva Prasad Sinha, Akari Prasad Banerjee, Satyabrata DasGupta and many others for their encouragement in different ways. Sincere thanks of my beloved pupils particularly of Sanjib Ghosh and Krishna Pada Saha are also acknowledged. My obligations are also due to my elder brother Sri Sunil Kumar Ghosh for the keen interest he has taken in my work. I should fail in my duty if I do not recognise the service rendered by my wife Sm. Hena Ghosh in reading the proof of the book. I am very much helped by Kalu and Daku because I could find time because of their silent support. I should also thank Sri Nepal Basak, Proprietor of the Sunshine Press for having taken special interest in printing this book.


Subodh Ghosh

Bharaja Manindra Chandra College,
Calcutta—3.

January 10th, 1963.

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HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Religion is one of the most important aspects of human life. In some form or other it functions in every society, its symbols and activities exist through the whole length and breadth of the world. It is something more complex and diverse than it is difficult to describe, still its essential traits may be indicated. Firstly, it should be noted that the motives and the driving forces in religion are the basic human wants and desires—viz., survival, growth, well-being, self-realisation etc. Secondly, and more distinctively, religion involves belief in a supreme power or powers on whom human beings depend for their well-being. Thirdly, religion involves rituals which are believed to be ways of winning the favour of gods or God. Finally, it should be noted that religion like all other major human activities, assumes a social and institutional form.

Such a rich and varied aspect of human life may be approached in different ways. Firstly, there is the historical approach, dealing with the origin and growth of religion. Secondly, there is the psychological approach dealing with the mental or emotional basis of religion. And a third approach to religion is sociological, which deals with religion as a social institution. All the three of these approaches are necessary for a full understanding of religion.

Yet there remains another approach to religion, which is sometimes called "the philosophy of religion". This

expression, however, is rather ambiguous, having at least two different meanings. Either, it may refer to the beliefs which a religious person or group entertains; or it may refer to the critical examination of these beliefs. Here 'Philosophy of Religion' will be used in the latter sense.

Various aspects of religion are materials for philosophical reflection; but the one aspect of religion that is of crucial importance is the idea of God. It is on this issue that the most severe and fundamental conflicts have occurred in the field of theology and in the philosophy of religion.

Some conceive of God as a transcendent, supernatural being. And this supernatural being is also believed to be a personal God. In the great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity,—the idea of the supernatural God is central. This view is usually called Theism. In Theism God is the creator and the sustainer of the world. There are, however, differences among the theists. Some are absolute theists, who maintain that God is all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful. Others advocate belief in a finite God. According to them, as with James, God is all-wise but not all-powerful. What, one may ask, is the basis of a belief in the theistic God, be he infinite or finite?

To validate belief in a supernatural, personal God, the method of authority has sometimes been relied upon. There is more than one authority, and different authorities conflict. Christians have their Bible, Jews their Talmud, Hindus their Upanisads and Gita, Mohammedans their Koran, and so on. The question is which should be taken as the authority? But this is an even graver difficulty confronts the authoritarians; how should one justify rationally the claim of authority? Philosophically inclined, tend to distrust authority, and they are committed to thinking for themselves and are reluctant to forego independence of judgment.

seen through the "proofs" of the existence of God. There are three in number (1) The cosmological argument which affirms that the existence of nature demands a "First" cause, while this in turn is identified with God, (2) The teleological argument which affirms that the designful structure and activities of nature prove the existence of supreme designer, (3) The ontological argument, which affirms that the idea of perfection that is attributed to God implies His existence, hence a being that possessed all the elements of perfection but lacked existence would not be perfect.

A third way of determining the truth of theism has been suggested through moral and practical considerations. Kant and James are important representatives of this approach. According to Kant, man must act in accordance with moral law; therefore he must be free to do so. Faith in freedom, therefore, is a necessary correlate of the existence of a moral law. According to James, the practical argument for God's existence arises from the possibility of choice between two alternative conceptions that are equally logical. Kant's and James' approach to religion has appealed to many, especially to liberal theists.

Recently, a fourth way of determining the truth of theism has been suggested. Freshblood infused into the study, gives a clear account of this approach. According to this view, the ultimate appeal of theism is not to argument but to actual religious experience.

But there are others, for whom God is not a separate supernatural being but is, "Reality" in its complete unity. This view is called pantheism. In pantheism God is conceived as the whole of reality in its meaningful unity. Everything is believed to have its logical and purposeful place in the scheme of things.

Mystics usually emphasize the oneness of all things and the union of the finite self with the infinite God. In the mystic-vision there are not two things—God and the

A second means of determining the truth of theism

individual, but one ; the finite individual is mingled with Divine. Yet mystical pantheism on the whole tends to that God is all, rather than that all is God. For the material objects in space, as well as events in time are tative. The mystical vision leaves behind perceptual "The soul to find God must go out from all things, and things must be to it as if they existed not". Finally, and ugliness do not come within the range of mystical temptation. God is absolutely good, and there can be evil in His world. What seems evil is only an appearance in the deluded mortal mind. Evil is mere negation and lies entirely outside the knowledge of It (evil) has existence only in the sphere of time.

Mystics are convinced that in their mystical experience they have direct contact and union with Divine Reality that this Divine Reality or God is all. This claim, however, cannot be so easily settled. Some regard the mystical experience as giving direct knowledge of supernatural being ; others consider it as a union with an all-inclusive Reality, still others interpret it as an expression of abnormal pathological state.

Sometimes, rationalistic philosophers are led to the theistic belief. Most rationalists take the function of philosophy to be "the quest for the world's unity". The foremost of such a quest. In this respect Spinoza is uniquely significant. Spinoza has a mystical aspect, but for the present are primarily concerned with his more rigorous, rational philosophy and its bearing on religion. Spinoza uses terms Substance, Nature and God to denote the ultimate reality. God, Nature, Universe, or Substance is the inclusive unity. He is self-caused, self-sufficient, self-determined, infinite and eternal. God or the all-inclusive reality is not a mere undifferentiated unity. God has cer-

tributes, such as thought and extension. But Spinoza's superlative God is something different from the theist's God. Spinoza's God, for example, is not the creator of the world. God did not design or make the world ; He is the world. He is the immanent cause of the world. He has no aims or desires to attain. Good, evil, beauty are merely human values and not the characteristics of God. He who becomes one with God's infinite and eternal nature attains freedom from all the vicissitudes of finite human life.

There is still a third view of religion and of its basic belief in God. This view insists that religion should be concerned neither with belief in a supernatural God nor with belief related to alleged perfection of reality as a whole. The claim is that religion should limit itself to human hopes in the context of natural existence ; should the word "God" be retained, it should be applied to some ideal phase of human experience, such as the hope for a better world, the aspiration for a happier society, the ideal of a nobler individual life. This philosophy of religion, which is sometimes called the naturalistic-humanistic view of religion starts with the basic belief that it is only through science that questions of fact can be determined. Durkheim

says, "That which science refuses to grant to religion is not its right to exist". Though there are many types of naturalistic-humanistic philosophies of religion, they all agree in the denial of supernaturalistic God ; they differ only in their specific formulation of religion and their idea of God.

Ludwig Feuerbach gave a naturalistic interpretation of religion by emphasizing the strictly human or psychological aspect of religion. For him, religion is man's earliest and direct form of self-knowledge. According to him, 'consciousness of God is self-consciousness ; knowledge of God is self-knowledge'. Freud gives a psychiatric description of religion. For the child, Freud argues, the mother is the first "love-object", she was the first to satisfy its hunger.

But the mother is soon superseded by the stronger father. And God, for Freud, is exalted Father.

Santayana and Dewey have given interpretations of religion more strictly in terms of ideal human aspirations. For Santayana, Science and Religion have different functions. For Santayana religion is poetry or mythology. According to Santayana, "God" is not the name for a transcendent, super-naturalistic being but rather the poetic symbol for human ideals of truth, beauty and goodness.

Dewey, like Santayana, feels the necessity of giving a naturalistic account of religion which will preserve the validity of science and the ideal values of religion. According to Dewey, the religious attitude signifies a general attitude that guides our action, a fundamental perspective that gives direction to life.

Naturalistic-humanistic forms of religion lack the traditions and symbolism of the older forms of religion. They also fail to give the same degree of guarantee that theism does for the final triumph of man's deep desires. Whether naturalistic forms of religion will ever become a significant factor in our civilization has yet to be determined.

The central problem of religion is the nature and existence of God. Most of the readings on religion are concerned with this issue. Yet a belief in God, especially belief in personal God, is not an isolated, abstract problem; it has its vital relation to human destiny. The relation becomes obvious in considering the problem of evil and the hope of immortality.

Let us first consider the problem of evil. That the evil in our world, pain, suffering, defeat, injustice, and inevitable death,—hardly demands argument. Even should it be illusion, as some argue, there would still be the evil illusion. The theological issue that has been a source of endless controversy through the ages is: How can

reconcile the existence of evil with a God that is perfect in power as well as in goodness?

The usual answer to this question has been that evil is in some sense less real than good is and that evil is ultimately a means for the fruition of good. Some, for example, consider evil as necessary to "the good of the whole." There are many variations of this view: evil as good "in disguise," evil as "something torn out of its context", evil as "illusory". Others think of evil as a means for the growth and strengthening of character. Hardship, sorrow, defeat have, it is claimed, their salutary effects. They are the means for "soul-making." Still others justify 'evil' as something that heightens the danger and excitement of life, without evil life would be insipid; there would be no drama, no high tragedy of existence. All these theories in some way consider evil as a means for good.

Sheldon says that the existence of evil and perfection of God are not contradictory. 'Evil', for Sheldon, is real and he is not concerned with the question as to why evil is permitted. Sheldon's interest is not primarily a negative one. As he puts it, "we have only a negative task, to show that the contradiction alleged is not necessary". 'Evil' being actual need not imply any lack of perfection in the Divine nature.

Yet there are philosophers who reject Sheldon's formulation of the problem. William James and contemporary personal idealists like Brightman and Hartshorne try to ease the problem by claiming that God is all good but not all-powerful. Brightman finds God's limitation in His own internal constitution, while Hartshorne finds it in the powers of His creatures, who try to thwart His purposes. Dewey takes a more radical step. He limits the problem of evil to practical action. As he puts it: "The position of a natural intelligence is that there exists a mixture of good and evil, and that reconstruction in the direction of

the good which is indicated by ideal ends, must take place if at all, through continued co-operative effort". There is no logical implication that God's power will be limited by the presence of evil.

Now, hope of immortality is also vitally related to belief in God and is a central dogma of the Christian religion. Of all evils, death is the supreme evil; for it brings individual life to final, inevitable shipwreck. Religion with its ultimate optimism holds to the faith that no final disaster can destroy man.

Mackintosh, a great theologian, presents some of the weightiest arguments for immortality. Starting with the premise that conservation of spiritual values involves the conservation of persons, he first argues that mind is independent of body. And if mind is independent of body, it is plausible that it may exist and act when set free from the body at death. Mind for Mackintosh is an agent and not a mere phenomenon. He finds assurance for immortality in the belief in God, that is, in a Power great enough to be good enough to conserve the human individual in spite of bodily death. Hocking, a leading contemporary idealist, argues that immortality is not something assured, but conditional on the type of life we live. Centuries ago the great Hindu materialist Carvaka expressed this view: "There is no other world, death is the end of all." It is quite clear that one's belief in immortality is primarily determined by one's metaphysics and theory of evidence.

Religion is not merely a matter of intellectual belief; it is a practical thing. Spinoza, Santayana and Dewey, in different ways, emphasize the practical aspect of religion. There are three fundamental functions of religion. One such function is the integration of the individual life. An individual, as James defined him, "is a fighter for ends". Devotion to God or to a supreme ideal unifies and therefore integrates conflicting desires. The religious experience called "Salvation

is primarily this process of unification of the self in the light of some inclusive and worthy object. Another function of religion is to idealize and sanctify morals or customs. Religion sanctifies birth and death, marriage and celibacy, peace and war. Finally, religion has the function of lending cosmic support to human aspirations. Life is full of inscrutable evils and crushing tragedies that many find it almost impossible to face without belief in a power that will ultimately bring triumph. Passively hoping that good must triumph over evil, human beings have failed to apply their intelligence to strengthen the good. Religion, to be satisfactory, must be intellectually acceptable and morally conducive to a worthy life.

When all is said and done, we can do no better than to close the "Introduction" with the time-honoured, almost classical, definition of Religion placed on record in the eighties of the last century by James Martineau in his 'Study Of Religion': "Understanding by 'Religion' belief in an Ever living God, that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind", he takes it finally to mean the believer's worship of Supreme Mind and Will, directing the universe and holding moral relations with human life". Coupled with this as 'its essence' is the happy discovery that "in the soul of Religion, the apprehension of truth and the enthusiasm of devotion inseparably blend." Viewed thus Religion appears as "at once a mode of thought and a mode of feeling"—the question of priority of the one in relation to the other being immaterial here. It is immaterial, "whether you trust first the instinct of intuitive reverence and see the reality of God emerge as its postulate; or whether, having intellectually judged that He is there, you surrender yourself to the awe and love of that infinite presence. These intense affections, which in elements of wonder, admiration reverence culminate in worship...It is only our artificial analysis that separates the two, and insists on calling the intellectual side of the object a theology, the affectional a religion" (A Study Of Religion Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 3 & 13).

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

"Religion is man's total attitude of response to a quality or spirit in the universe which evokes his reverence because it is felt at once to transcend his own finite nature and yet to be akin to him at the same time to be supremely real and precious. It is beyond his grasp but not beyond his reach and nothing is felt to be so worth reaching and he can give it no lesser name than the Divine. To this divine quality in life, religion is the natural and necessary reaction of mind, will and heart".

It is very difficult to discover a satisfactory definition of religion. A definition should include all the varieties of religion and should indicate that the relation between man and God includes all the aspects of human nature. Most of the definitions err by being too narrow or by emphasizing one aspect of a man's nature at the expense of other aspects.

Martineau defines religion as "a belief in an ever-living God that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind." This definition can be suitably applied only to the higher forms of religion. Perhaps, a more comprehensive definition is that religion is "a worship of higher powers from a sense of need." F. C. Sabatier defines religion as "man's belief in a Being or Beings mightier than himself but not indifferent to his sentiments and actions, with the feelings and practices which follow from such a belief." Sabatier lays great stress upon the sense of need in which religion begins. He points out that all our life-experiences involve a double kind of movement. External things are always acting upon us and we strive to react upon them. Our whole life is a mixture of the active and the passive. We have constantly to adjust ourselves to the environment which is playing upon

because the active and the passive are not in harmony with each other, they have to be brought into harmony.

We are often impressed by the magnitude and overwhelming forces of the world. We feel that we are under the contrast of forces, which we ourselves cannot regulate. Every new discovery in science seems to add another to the physical forces in the universe and the multitude of them produces in us a sense of our own insignificance. When any great disaster takes place (e.g. an earthquake), we are oppressed by a sense, of our weakness. At the same time we do not feel inclined simply to submit to forces that are in the external world. We are conscious of our active powers as well as the powers which are working upon us. We wish to come to some kind of agreement with the forces of the universe which are working round about us and upon us. We wish to reach the faith that behind these forces there is a Being with whom it is possible to come into harmonious relationship. We try to believe that behind the immensity of the universe there is a God, between whom and us certain relations may be established.

In accordance with this idea, religion has been defined as the prolongation of the natural instinct of self-preservation. We may define religion as an endeavour to secure the conservation of socially recognised values. Another definition of religion is "what a man does with his solitariness" (Whitehead).

Psychology teaches us that a human being may be considered under three aspects of knowing, feeling and willing. We shall, therefore, expect to find that religion will satisfy a man in each of these three aspects. And we shall consider that religion to be the highest which will satisfy a man most completely. The best religion will be one in which we find it possible to believe in a God, more or less like ourselves and according to the teaching of which nature is the expression of a Divine mind, some what similar to our minds and of a

Divine heart which is in sympathy with our aspirations and a Divine will which expresses an ideal towards which our will may aspire.

Martineau's definition of Religion is comprehensive enough to include all these aspects and therefore may be taken as a description of the highest ideal of religion.

Flint says religion belongs exclusively to no one part of the soul, but embraces the whole mind and the whole man. Its seat is the concrete human nature and its circumference the limit of all energies and capacities of that ideal-religious being.

At its lowest, it is something made up of intellect, affection and practical obedience in it. At its best, it should include all the highest exercises of reason, all the purest and deepest emotions and affections and the noblest kind of conduct. It responds to its own true nature only in the measure it feels the whole interest of life, satisfies the reverence and love of the heart and provides an ideal and law for practical life in all its breadth.

Thus we may see that it is a defect in any religion, if it emphasises any one element at the expense of the others. Hegel, for example, over-emphasises the intellectual element and for him religion becomes a matter of knowledge only. Another theologian (Schleiermacher) again emphasises the emotional side of religion and with Kant, again religion comes almost altogether an affair of the will.

Thouless says, "Religion is a felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman being or beings."

We cannot find adequate satisfaction of our whole being merely in human beings, because there are defects even in the best man that we know. For this reason, the worship of 'heroes' in this respect must give place to the worship of God. Further we are conscious of our own weakness and wish to be in the universe which will deliver us from sin and temptation, and enable us to strive more earnestly for the realisation of the righteousness, which is the character of God.

SOME DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

Religion, in history, has various meanings, sometimes contradictory, and philosophers have experienced great difficulty in defining its essential character. Secondly, Religion is a growing and dynamic subject and therefore it is very difficult to define it. Yet Religion must have some peculiar characteristics which are universal. In dealing with the varieties of religious experience, we are still dealing with religious experience, something specific and definite. Of course, the attempts to define Religion are many and they more or less seem to contain some element of truth and thus a critical appreciation of these definitions may enable us to arrive at the universal and characteristic marks of Religion.

Hegel's definition :

To Hegel Religion is a kind of popular philosophy, it is truth conceived in concrete pictorial forms, while philosophy proper is the same truth stripped of its sensuous pictorial forms and interpreted in terms of pure thought. Religion "is the divine spirit's knowledge of itself through the mediation of the finite spirit." It is thus a form of knowledge, the knowledge of the Absolute Idea involving the ultimate unity of the finite and the Infinite.

It is evident that Hegel's definition of Religion is too much intellectualistic. He emphasises the logical character of the absolute in complete disregard of its conative and volitional aspect. In Religion however, we not only have knowledge of God but also try to enter into moral and spiritual relationship with certain superhuman power or Reality, whom we believe as our life and master of our destiny. Religion, divested of feeling or devotion or worship and religious practices, seems to be nothing more than a barren abstraction.

Schleiermacher's definition :

There are other theologians who try to define Religion in terms of feelings. The most important definition given by Schleiermacher. He says, "the essence of Religion consists in a feeling of absolute dependence on God." According to him, pure Religion is pure feeling, i.e., feeling completely disconnected from thought on the one hand and from volition on the other. 'Religion has nothing to do with knowledge; quite apart from it, its nature cannot be known. "It matters not what conception a man adheres to, he can still be pious. Ideas and principles are all foreign (unknown, or of no use) to Religion. Religion is equally distinct from morality. Morality depends entirely on the consciousness of freedom. Religiosity, on the contrary, moves in the opposite sphere of necessity. Religion means complete self-surrender, whereas morality implies responsibility and freedom. Religion is thus a warm, intimate, immediate feeling of the Infinite in the finite, the Eternal in the temporal, a sense of dependence on the whole.

Schleiermacher has done a great service to Religion by rescuing it from barren intellectualism on the one hand and from moralism on the other. Indeed, the essence of Religion consists in its mystic inwardness, as immediate awareness of God. It cannot be denied when he says, "Quantity of knowledge is not quantity of piety." Thus far Schleiermacher was true. It may be pointed out here that the element of feeling in religion can never be mere feeling. The feeling element must have some ideal content. The feeling cannot be so divorced from the idea as to make the former essential and the latter non-essential. Feeling naturally and inevitably develops itself into thought and action. They form a whole or unity or one indivisible moment. Religion is essentially the whole man's reaction

to the ultimate Reality. Feeling has always an objective reference and religious feeling cannot be separated from this objective reference or intellectual content and a means of procuring it." Thus in its innermost essence Religion is concerned not with the comprehension but with the valuation of existence.

Hoffding's definition :

The core of religion consists in the belief that no value perishes out of existence. He defines Religion as "faith in the conservation of values." "The opposite of Religion," says Hoffding, "is neutralism," i.e., the conviction that the world is infinitely and cruelly indifferent to everything which we call 'human value'. He has no doubt pointed out the most important element in Religion. Man's Religious consciousness certainly implies a faith in the highest value of life, faith in a good and sympathetic universe which will somehow back him up in his struggle to realize them and to conserve them. Man in his religiosity realizes that his own powers are not sufficient enough for the task of realizing and conserving human good, that he has not got the complete mastery over the resources of the universe of which he is but an insignificant person and that he needs help from some one who is more than human power, if his highest values are to be conserved and sustained. And this religious faith reaches out to an omnipotent, omniscient Power working for righteousness. The essence of his Religion must thus consist in the faith that "there shall never be one lost good" and that God's power can fill the heart with an overflowing expansion. In other words, man believes that there is ultimately harmony between human values and the nature of reality.

Hoffding, however, seems to identify Religious experience with feeling; as he himself says, "Religious experience is essentially Religious feeling, the feeling which

is determined by faith in the conservation of value." The fact is that Religion is not a mere passive faith in the conservation of values that already exists. It is also an experimental search for new values. The Religious consciousness is not content merely with maintaining the *status quo* of rational and spiritual beings, "we look before and after pine for what is not." In religious experience the quantity of value is not a fixed quantity. It may increase or it may decrease. The fact is that Religion consists in the reconstruction and transvaluation of life's values. The Religious consciousness is purposive and creative and not merely receptive and contemplative. Hoffding's definition fails to take into account that intimate personal relation to a super-human being regarded as the source and ground of all values, which is an essential factor in religious consciousness. In Religion we try to establish a personal relationship by means of worship, prayer, devotion and Yoga. In Religion there is always the knowledge of an ultimate reality, and the worshipper feels impelled to establish a personal relationship with that ultimate reality who is generally regarded as a personal being who is at once the supreme value and the standard source of all values. Religion is not merely faith in a personal principle of conservation but confidence in a personal friend and guide, behind and beyond the phenomenal world. In prayer and worship we re-inforce our faith in values and in the possibility of realizing them by entering into fellowship with the friendly power which is the source and ground of all values. This sense of a 'friendly presence' in the universe never supersedes that sense of mystery accompanying feeling of awe generated by the belief that God far transcends us in power and goodness.

The most satisfactory view of the nature of Religion :

The fore-going discussions conclusively prove that neither feeling nor activity, nor the intellect alone constitutes the true essence of Religion. Against the partial truth of all the above mentioned definitions we should bear in mind that religion does not merely occupy a part of man's nature, but is the reaction of his whole being to the Being whom he regards as superior. Religion involves a subject and an object and a relation between the two. On the subjective side, it includes all the psychical functions such as feeling, volition and cognition. On the objective side, it has reference to a trans-subjective Divine Reality. It further involves a living relation of the subject to that trans-subjective-objective Reality in worship, fellowship, and service. Such relation being controlled by a purpose namely, the conservation and enhancement of human values, both social and the individual, ultimately culminating in utter devotional love of the divine Reality for its own sake. Religious experience is more than a subjective state of consciousness. It points to a trans-subjective immanent spiritual principle wherein values coincide with Reality. In Religion this perfect world of value is already implied by anticipation of a present realization. Faith is no doubt the substance of things hoped for. But Religion is not to be identified with mere faith in a super-sensible Reality as the seat and source of all values, It is also the emotional reaction to that ultimate Reality which involves the adjustment of one's whole life so as to bring it into unity and harmony with such Reality.

CHAPTER II

Relations : Religion and Science :

It has been said that Religion and Science are opposed to each other. But this opinion is based upon a wrong estimate of the respective functions of Religion and Science. It is based upon a purely emotional and dogmatic type of Religion on the one hand, and on the other, a narrow type of Science. Such a science would be confined chiefly to material and physical investigations. It had its currency during the 18th and 19th centuries. Kant was responsible for a great deal of opposition between Religion and Science. Kant had said that scientific knowledge was confined to phenomena and Religion deals with realities beyond phenomena. Therefore, there could be no scientific knowledge of religious matters. This opinion was also held by Hegel and Spencer. The popularity of his philosophy (agnosticism) was largely responsible for the idea that Religion and Philosophy were opposed to each other. The limitations and defects, however, of this philosophy are becoming more and more recognised and it is now seen that there is no essential opposition between Religion and Science.

When we consider the history of Religion, it is clear that we see how a certain temporary opposition may have existed between Science and Religion. The beginnings of Science are found in Religion. Religious teachers were called upon to explain the phenomena of the universe, and they did so by means of, 'Mythology' and Legends. 'Mythology' might be said to be the first science ; as time went on, it was discovered that the Mythologies were not adequate to explain things and minds, Mythology has the supply of Religion and therefore, those who abandon mythology seem also to abandon Religion. An opposition between free thought and Religion thus grew up.

A similar movement may be noticed during the Middle Ages in Europe. The scholastic philosophers spent their whole time in formulating the dogmas of the Church. They received these dogmas as Authority and did not investigate their reasonable grounds. The result was that when the dogmas were separated from their properly religious source, they became uninteresting and insecure. Men were no longer attracted by them as they stood and began to ask for reasons why the dogmas should be accepted as true. They were no longer felt to be appropriate expression of a living faith. They have become out of date and therefore some grounds have to be supplied for their acceptance. The Scholastic theologians refused to allow proper investigations. If a man were unwilling to accept these dogmas, he was declared to be an enemy of Religion. And thus, again, an opposition grew up between Religion and Science.

The opposition was probably made more acute and radical through the influence of Renaissance or revival of learning. The success of new scientific conception filled the scientists with pride and made them feel that they could do without Religion.

It was not until the influence of a higher conception of Religion as a spiritual life, and not as a system of dogmas began to make itself felt at the time of Reformation that the way was open for a reconciliation between Science and Religion. The form in which Religion is held now-a-days, is not one to which Science can have any reasonable objection.

We see then that though there may be certain narrow scientific positions which make Religion impossible and, on the other hand, a certain narrow type of Religious doctrines which are incompatible with science, there should not be any fundamental opposition between Religion and Science. With all the differences in their immediate objects, Religion and Science still hang so closely together in their own

grounds that their normal relationship will not be one of opposition but friendly mutual co-operation. Conflicts arise only from abnormal tendencies of one or the other of both.

We may point out that if science is to be satisfactory it must depend upon Religion.

In the first place, science itself depends on faith, which is a religious attitude of mind.

At first sight, this may seem to be a strange or paradoxical statement. Scientists frequently argue that they have clear proof of anything and that they will have no more to do with what is simply a matter of faith, but there are still several points on which science must depend on Religion. Even scientists must have trust or faith in their faculties. They believe that the proper use of their faculties will bring them into contact with reality. Furthermore, the scientist proceeds upon faith in the *uniformity* and *rationality* of nature. He discovers certain natural laws and assumes that these laws will hold good universally. He cannot, however, prove this, that is, he cannot examine every instance of the application of these laws. He takes their uniformity, to a large extent, as a matter of faith. Similarly, scientists proceed on the assumption of the rationality and the ultimate unity of the world. The aim of the scientist is to give a rational explanation of everything i. e., to find a system into which every phenomenon must be fitted. This, however, means that the scientist tries to connect all the phenomena of the universe with a few supreme principles which will give rationality to the whole. The effort of science, however, turns out to be a vain effort. For it is impossible to think of the ultimate reality without thinking of it as a unity capable of giving law and order to the whole. The Scientist, in studying the universe, has brought it into relation with the Supreme Being. It is in such a Being, that the scientist could

proper explanation of the phenomena with which he deals. Unless science is willing to rise to the conception of God as the beginning and end of the world, its explanation will be incomplete. It may attempt to satisfy itself with certain materialistic categories, but it will soon discover that these categories or notions are insufficient and so, it is bound to go beyond sense-phenomena. And in this going beyond, it enters into the sphere of Religion.

We see thus that science cannot be complete unless it accepts ultimately the point of view of Religion. We must also remember that Religion, on the other hand, takes help from science. By means of mere intuition (or feeling) we have a certain amount of contact with the divine. But we must immediately attempt to put this religious feeling of ours into the intellectual or scientific form. Religion gives us the divine pleasure, but this must be put into some kind of vessel, if this is not to be lost. Science enables us to construct a proper kind of vessel, in which we may put the Religious feeling-factor.

Further, scientific foundations of Religious truths are necessary if we are to avoid the extravagances of merely emotional Religion. The emotional man who is unrestrained by intellectual considerations, is often in danger of being hurled into absurdities. A great attention to scientific demands will emphasise the necessity of our thought and will save Religion from depending merely upon Authority, and thereby, becoming 'Dogmatic'

Of course, we must remember that science is more theoretical, whereas religion is primarily practical. But this should not bring about any opposition. Theory and practice are both operations of the human mind and they cannot be separated from each other. Moreover, the attitude of sincerity and honesty which is encouraged by science is in itself practical, and besides this, science often leads to discoveries which are of great value in practical

life. Therefore, we cannot say that science is entirely theoretical and therefore it should be considered altogether distinct from Religion.

It might also be pointed out that science is objective in the sense that it takes no account of the personality of the scientist, whereas Religion has to do essentially with the relation to personality of God. Here again, there is no great separation. The personal factor plays a greater part in science; then, after it has been admitted, science regards its ideal only by relating so-called objective occurrences to the central personality i.e., God. The relation between science and religion might well be summed up in the following statement made by Bacon—'A little science makes a man atheist, whereas a great deal of science brings the man's thought to Religion. It is said of philosophy that if the cup is merely tasted, it leads man away from God; that if it is deeply drained it brings back again. A writer in recent years made the following remark in relation to the relation between Religion and Science, "Science is the truth of the natural world first, as the Religion is the truth of the spiritual. One is the light-house towards the *sailors of the rock* and the other is the star in the sky in which it shares one's knowledge in the natural world. Science and Religion live forth in perfect and beautiful accord."

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

From the crudest beginning of God-idea in the primitive man down to the modern age of reason and enlightenment, the notion of God has taken various forms. Everywhere and in every age man has entertained religious beliefs and practices. It has been said that man is inherently religious. It is a faith in God from which all actions flow. The belief is so universal that it is regarded as the religious consciousness of man. It is a basic notion that there exists in the world some superhuman power which demands of man an attitude of worship. Religion is thus mainly an emotional attitude towards the supreme reality regarding the value of it. Religious experience has its reference to the transcendent. The basis of religion is therefore metaphysical or philosophical. It is based on intuitive feeling or direct communion with God.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is the reasoned enquiry into the nature of the universe and reality. It refers to some ultimate reality i.e., it goes beyond the empirical world. It is the comprehensive study of human experience.

From these two definitions we find some points of similarity between Philosophy and Religion.

Both of them may be said to refer to the ultimate reality which is transcendental. It is the business of Religion to find out the real relation between the ultimate Being and the world of finite objects and finite minds. Religion must, in this connection, take the help of philosophy in order to assure us of intellectual apprehension of God.

Both believe in the capacity of human knowledge. Religion and Philosophy both depend upon faith in the validity of human knowledge.

Both are dissatisfied with the phenomenal world and earthly values.

Both of them start from common experience.

Although philosophy and religion have similar objects and ideals, yet there are some points of distinction between the two.

In scope, philosophy is wider because it deals with reality and the universe at large but Religion deals with the supreme reality. So Religion is narrower in scope.

They differ in regard to attitude. In religion the ultimate object is present to human consciousness in an immediate way as the object of devotion, feeling and reverence. In Philosophy the same object becomes an object of reflection and finally elevates it to a form of speculative thought, so its attitude is rational.

Philosophy is concerned with the comprehensive knowledge, i.e. philosophical experience includes all psychical factors of thinking, feeling and willing. Religion is concerned mainly with the partial aspect of mind i.e., the aspect of feeling is prominent here.

That is why absolute reality is concrete in the philosophy of religion which is based on feeling and volition. But in philosophy absolute reality is abstract as it is based on reason.

In philosophy we are to understand reality but in Religion we are to realise reality.

Religion is however much richer in content than philosophy, for philosophy the ultimate Reality of the universe has value only as satisfying theoretical or intellectual demand. Religion, on the other hand, considers in addition to this, practical effects of our belief in it. Therefore philosophy is theoretical or speculative. Religion is practical.

Philosophy satisfies the intellectual hunger but Religion satisfies the emotional anxieties.

Philosophy springs from the inquisitiveness of human being to solve the mystery of the universe. Religion

Religious faith springs from the pressure of human needs.

Lastly Religion is more intimately connected with reality than philosophy because it is based on intuitive and immediate knowledge and penetrates into the heart of reality which reason is not capable of doing. The power of reasoning which is so useful in philosophy gives place to intuition and is completed in the power of intuition, which plays such a large part in religion.

Now, let us assess the merits of our discussions. Though they differ in certain respects, yet both philosophy and Religion have common object and common content. Historically speaking, Religion is the emotional attitude towards God. Therefore, it is mainly based on feeling. But feeling cannot by itself be the measure of knowledge of God. Reason must play a prominent part, because without the intellectual interpretation of God, religion cannot fulfil its ideal. So religion requires to be dependent on philosophy. But, on the contrary, "in the explanation of Religion, philosophy may be said to be explaining itself." Therefore, the relation between philosophy and religion is very intimate.

RELIGION AND ART

If we take the view that truth, beauty and goodness at bottom one and the same, and if we also hold that Religion consists in taking up the proper attitude to this ultimate reality, then we can say that in a sense Religion must include Art. Art is specially connected with beauty; the aim of Art is to construct beautiful forms and so to help us to understand the spirit which is behind all physical beauty. The beauty of world it leads us to a consciousness of God who is the source of all beauty that is in the world.

Art is also of use in helping us to develop our faculties of investigation and it is often argued that it is by means of poetic and artistic imagination that we come into closer contact with the ultimate beauty. Therefore, Art, through its contemplation or imagination must be of great service to Religion. We should not, however, think of imagination as opposed to Reason; or as taking the place of reason in religious matters. If we take a broader view of imagination but the latter will be an ally of the former. Religion is the outgoing of our whole soul towards God. We should not place anyone of our faculties in rivalry with the other. All that is necessary to say is that imagination plays a great part in the development of Religion as reason does.

We may notice what service Religion has rendered through its history. Religion has kept itself in various walks of life by means of symbols and these symbols have frequently been the products of Art. They have taken the form of images of the divine, the ornaments in temple churches, poetic form of expressions and so on. They served the purpose of making religious ideas more

In the contradiction of these material images and symbolic expressions, Art has played a very large part.

It will, however, be a great mistake to substitute art for religion or to lay such stress upon the beautiful symbol as it is impossible to pass beyond it. If the Artistic symbol, the idol, the temple or the church is too elaborate, there is a danger that it may be worshipped for its own sake and may not lead the thoughts of the worshippers upwards towards God. It should be noticed that there are several points of distinction between Art and Religion which prevent an absolute identification of the two.

In the first place, the ideals of art are beautiful objects which yield immediate satisfaction, whereas the ideals of Religion are regarded as having supreme and ultimate worth, even though their immediate satisfactions may not be so great. The objects of artistic satisfaction do not point so clearly beyond themselves to the infinite and eternal Being as do the objects of Religious consciousness. While the two (Art and Religion) lead from the sensible to the super-sensible world, Religion brings with it the sense of a personal relationship with things unseen, which Art does not (of course, in the religious sense).

Secondly, Art as we have seen, depends largely upon the imaginative faculty. This means that its material is composed in great part of dream-fancies etc. For an artist, the reality of the beautiful poem or a picture is a matter of comparative indifference. Religion has necessarily a closer connection with morality than has art.

Religion, however, demands that we should deal with reality. Ideas of Religion must be regarded as true otherwise they cease to be the ideas of Religion. Religion involves worship, and we cannot worship truly what is merely the product of our own imagination or the work of our own hands. We can worship only what is *above* us, what created us and not *by* us. At the sametime, it must be recognised

that the highest art in this respect must come very near religion. The highest art is not merely fantastic or artificial but it tries to grasp in picture or stature or poem, the highest truth of things. The artists who have won immortal fame are those who had, to a considerable extent, succeeded in this attempt.

RELIGION AND MORALITY

Religion and Morality are usually recognised not only among the most influential forces of social control but also among the most effective guides of human behaviour. Flint has defined Religion as "man's belief in a being more powerful than himself and inaccessible to his senses but not indifferent to his sentiments and actions, with feelings and practices which flow from such belief". In modern times Fromm defines religion in another way. He says, "Religion is any system of thought and action, shared by a group, that gives the individual a cosmic framework, orientation and an object of devotion". The term 'Morality' is sometimes taken for those rules of behaviour which are admitted at large in a community. It (M) may be described as that solution of the contradiction between man's higher and lower nature which is accomplished by the transformation of the lower into the organ or expression of the higher.

Now, if we follow the history of human development we shall find that historically religion and morality have been Siamese twins, so to speak. At the primitive level, course, ethics and religion are not clearly distinguished and what there is of each seems almost identical with the other. When distinct moral rules do make their appearance they always enter the cultural scene in the form of di-

commandments. A prime example of this is the early Hebrew religion, which is centred in the law of Moses. The whole of the Ten Commandments is presented as the Commandment of God, spoken through Moses. Historically, there has been a very close connection between Religion and Morality, for it is likely that religious customs were recognised as such by men before moral customs were distinguished from them and in this way morality may be said to have developed from Religion. According to Descartes, Locke and Paley, it is Religion that makes Morality.

Morality implies a certain metaphysical outlook, at least a belief in the existence of individual selves who are in some sense the doers of their own actions. For most men, this outlook is provided by their religion. Religion gives objectivity to moral values. Morality is that side of life which is popularly and rightly regarded as nearest to Religion. It (M) culminates in Religion and Religion finds its practical expression in morality. Moral life may be described as the renunciation of the private or exclusive self and the identification of our life with an ever widening sphere of spiritual life beyond us.

Kant and Martineau hold that Religion is not the source of morality as held by Locke, Descartes and Paley but morality is the source of religion. They say that morality leads on to the belief in a moral providence or God who will ultimately reward the virtuous and punish the sinner and this belief is the basis of religion. Whatever may be the correct view, we cannot but admit that Religion and Morality are closely connected. Neither morality precedes religion nor Religion precedes morality but both are interdependent. Spinoza also in his "Ethica" found the highest level of morality in 'the intellectual love of God', a love where morality has been transformed into Religion.

It is rightly demanded that the religious man should be a

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

morally good man. Moral values are likewise religious values; and if morality appears to be a part of religion, in turn, comes to be judged by an ethical standard. Morality reacts upon religion and refines and purifies it while religion reacts upon morality and inspires and elevates it. Belief in God and immortality is common to morality and religion.

However closely religion and morality are connected, there are certain well defined differences between the two. Religion has its centre in God, while Morality has its centre in man. Morality lives in the arena of human effort, while conflict is its field of battle. But religion is victory and peace.

It is conceivable that there may be a purely human morality which contains no reference to the supernatural, but religion would lose its essential nature, if all reference to the supernatural were excluded from it.

Religion includes a wider range than morality. Morality deals with goodness while religion is more comprehensive in as much as it includes all other values, the Beautiful, the True as well as the Good.

Morality implies progress *towards* the Infinite while religion implies progress *within* the Infinite.

Religion is more characteristically an emotional experience than morality. This is the difference that is expressed by Matthew Arnold's famous definition of religion as 'Morality touched by emotion'.

Lastly, morality depends entirely upon the consciousness of freedom; religion, on the contrary, moves in the opposite sphere of necessity.

Neitzsche said, "Religion has nothing to do with morality. Modern western thinkers have more and more frequently constructed systems of ethics that have little or nothing

to do with religion. Some of them would say that religion has hampered morality by hitching goodness and God up together, and trying to make human goodness depend upon a divine commandment. The tendency of modern civilization has been to make the relation of religion to morality less intimate.

Whatever distinctions we draw between morality and religion, we must not ignore their deeper unity. They are stages of the developing spiritual life of man who moves upward to his divine goal. We can regard morality and religion as respectively a lower and a higher level of human experience. The lower leading up to the higher; and only when we consciously rise to the higher, can we discern the full significance of the lower. The problems raised by Ethics find their solution in Religion. Both religion and morality are concerned with the Absolute Good. Moral life is a temporal aspect of religious life and finds its (M) end and justification in religion. Morality is not self-sufficient, it is a phase of the spiritual life which points beyond itself. But for religion, morality is only part of the picture—however important a part this may be. Religion is necessary to morality and again morality is necessary to religion.

Again, there is also a close connection between the science of morality on Ethics and Science of Religion or Theology. Ethics when attempting to explain the grounds of moral consciousness rises into Theology: and Theology in giving us the grounds of our belief in the existence and attributes of God, falls back of Ethics. The disciplines of religion and ethics need each other. Religion, both in its Theology and institutional life, must have the criticism of the best ethical insight to keep it from sanctifying the *status quo*. Ethics, on the other side, needs the vision and power religion brings, lest it becomes simply a critique of manners and customs or a sterile making of rules.

So, from the above discussion it follows that Religion and Morality are partners in the spiritual enterprise of the human race. Moral and religious ideas seem to interpenetrate and function as common factors in the national well-being. The attempt to divide them and to oppose the one to the other (R and M), rests on a fragmentary and superficial conception of human nature.

RELIGION, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Religion is a mode of life, while both Science and Philosophy are the intellectual pursuits of truth. Science and philosophy lead us to think in a certain way and about certain things. But religion consists in following a certain mode of life.

Science, by an intellectual attempt, tries to know the physical world and rationalizes our sense-experiences of the physical world. Philosophy on the other hand, tries to know reality through intellectual attempt and it rationalizes the super-sensuous experience of the reality. But religion tries to attain certain forms of the super-sensuous experiences. It tries to attain and maintain the experience of the super-sensible reality and to live in conformity with it. It affects and transforms the whole of our life. It makes us think, feel and will in some specified way.

It is essentially based on the experience of the super-sensible reality beyond the visible world. It consists in the training of the body and mind so as to realise the super-sensuous in our life and in the world. Moral purification, devout meditation, renunciation are the key-notes of religious life.

The super-sensuous reality is regarded by religion as a personal Being in whom the highest qualities of truth, goodness and beauty are realised, who is the Creator of this world and by whom the world is maintained and destroyed at will. Religious life manifests itself in various activities which purify the Divine in us, and help us to understand our unity with God.

The need of psychology is felt when the question of the origin of religion is brought forward : What were the motives which prompted man to be religious ? What were the feelings, impulses and ideas that brought forward this state of mind ?

Man, civilized or uncivilized, as Goethe said, is moved by hunger and by love. The study of these abiding desires and needs, promises to help us, understand the necessity of religion in life and in its growth. The psychic processes are present in the primitive man also and impel him to express himself in religious acts. In every form of religion man seeks to establish a relationship between himself and the higher powers. The impulse to form the relationship with the higher powers is a felt-need. This need signifies the incompleteness in a subject which experiences it. If there was nothing lacking, no incompleteness in the subject or if he were kept ignorant of his defects, then the motives which lead to religion would not be present in either of them. So, the study of the mental factors like motive, desire, impulse are necessarily implied in the explanation of the nature and origin of religion.

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION

The distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion is, to a certain extent, the same as the distinction between Natural and Supernatural Religion. Martineau says, "the religious state of mind 'be reached by reflection upon the order of the physical and moral world, it is called Natural Religion' if it arises without conscious elaboration of thought, and is assigned to immediate communication with the Divine Spirit to the human, it is called Supernatural Religion. We may admit that revelation is necessary for all Religions. We cannot be content with a God who is merely the creation of our imagination or the exercise of our faculty of reasoning. If we are unbelieving, we need the divine help in order that we may get deliverance from our state of disbelief. A God who does not reveal Himself would not be an adequate God. Nor can we be content with the revelation which took place at the beginning of History. God must continue to reveal Himself. We therefore, admit the necessity of the two forms of Religion and we must try to bring them into proper relation to each other."

The distinction between Natural Religion and the Revealed Religion was a favourite theme for the Theologians of the 18th Century. They failed, however, to give a proper relation to Revealed Religion and laid exclusive emphasis on Natural Religion. Revealed Religion was looked upon as reorientation of Natural Religion. It is *Revealed Religion* when it is obscured by superstition and erroneous ideas. Secondly, Revealed Religion was regarded simply as anticipation of Natural Religion. This is the position of Lessing, who says, "Revelation gives nothing to the

race; only it has given and still gives certain dogmas and make-beliefs." The 18th century writers were wrong in giving an insignificant place to Revealed Religion which is not to be regarded as simply a collection or anticipation of Natural Religion. It is rather supplementary to Natural Religion. We are, indeed, meant to use our own faculties but these may not carry us far enough and Revealed Religion comes to the help of this faculty. At the same time we may draw distinction between the two, but such distinction should not be an absolute separation.

In the first place, there is a distinction as regards the source. In the history of the Western World the problems of the existence and Nature of God have been approached in two different ways, which may be designated as the way of faith and the way of reason. These ways have found embodiment respectively in the discipline of Revealed Theology and Natural or Rational Theology. Faith is a subjective activity. The source of Natural Religion is human reasoning, whereas the source of Revealed Religion is Divine communication which is often preserved in records, in scriptural testimony. Secondly, the method of appreciation is somewhat different. In the case of Natural Religion, the organ of appreciation is human understanding, in the case of revealed Religion it is intuitive faith. In Martineau's words, "Revealed Religion does not rest on the conscious elaboration of thought". As for example, we may formulate the idea of God and the idea of Love but revelation naturally supplies facts which will guarantee the validity and reality of these ideas. This factual basis depends either on historical process or on historical life. All these considerations lead us to think that Revealed Religion is naturally connected with a particular founder to whom God reveals Himself. There is thus in it more element of authority and intuitive faith than there is in Natural Religion. Moreover, the life and the teachings of the

founder are usually normative for all succeeding. Revealed Religion is thus characterized by its particular in its origin than Natural Religion. But this does prevent the ideas and the feelings which it expresses attaining a universal application similar to that of Natural Religion. Religious faith is regarded as assent to certain propositions such as "God exists", "God is one" etc. It is a relation of personal trust. All religious propositions are propositions of faith and that reason enters the scene as a means by which faith is communicated, related to human interests and criticized, tested and evaluated. Faith is primary and includes reason. As has been said by Augustine that faith is primary but not autonomous, for it must be stated and tested by reason. Natural or Rational Religion must be the criticism of actual religion.

Whatever may be the distinction between Revealed and Natural Religion, we must not, on any account, press the distinction so far as to imagine that Natural and Revealed Religion have nothing in common. Excessive emphasis may take two forms: In the first place revelation may be said to be contrary to Natural Religion; in the second place more generally it is said to be not so much contrary to reason but above reason in as much as it deals with what reason cannot comprehend. As regards the first point, viz., that revelation is contrary to reason (ref. Lotze), we may agree that this may lead us to a dangerous self-contradiction. It is an absolute opposition between reason and revelation, philosophy would be impossible. The position is its extreme form when it is said that the more absurd a religion is, the more true it is. We cannot, however, allow the human spirit to be thus divided against itself. If the conflict of reason and revelation are contradictory we should require some kind of umpire to decide between them and the decision of this umpire would itself be supported by an appeal to reason. Surely, however it is impossible to appeal

to reason for authority to set reason against revelation. Further, such procedure seems to be a reversion of the ordinary conventional course. As a rule, we are disposed to trust in the reasonable and orderly rather than in what is disorderly and irrational. The position that revelation may give us truths which are beyond reason is more tenable, but it is not without its difficulties. The position is that revelation gives us truths which reason itself could not discover, which are beyond the grasp of human reason but which yet do not contradict reason. The effect of the above theory will be to divide human reason into the higher and lower and to say that the higher has little connection with the lower. It is extremely difficult to draw a line of demarcation between these two kinds of reason. Moreover, if a doctrine were indeed altogether beyond the jurisdiction of human reason, we could not know it in any way at all even by revelation. What is beyond reason altogether is either nothing to us or is irrational. The fact is that revelation is altogether impossible unless the truths which it conveys are understood by reason even if they are not discovered by reason. It is impossible for us to believe in what we are incapable of apprehending rationally. Revelation must be supplemented by reason and we cannot draw a hard-and-fast line of separation between the two.

CHAPTER III

ORIGIN OF RELIGION IN THE LIGHT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Introduction : One of the main tasks of the philosopher of religion is to explain the nature and function of religion. But without a careful investigation into the origin and development of religion we cannot explain it. In tracing the origin of religion we can use two different methods : (1) we can try to discover the origin of religion in society. This demands a knowledge of primitive social conditions and therefore is the business of Anthropology. (2) we can search for its origin in the individual and this is the business of Psychology. Besides these two methods we must also take into account an adequate historical development of religion. For, without it we cannot understand what religion is, how it does, and what it has done in the wide field of human achievements.

Now, let us begin with Anthropology. Anthropology is a comparatively modern science not much more than a hundred years old. Previous to this there were two theories about the origin of religion viz : Divine revelation and human reason. Divine revelation means the revelation to mankind. It is purely an act of God. The other view is that of the 18th century deists who held the above theory and found the origin of religion in human reason.

But both of these theories have been thoroughly discredited by Anthropological researches on the following grounds. These theories are very crude and obsolete. The first is an unpsychological demand on the human mind. How can a being, who had no consciousness of religion in

receive all on a sudden the message from Divine Being ? The second makes men religious through reason, but neglects the intuitional and emotional elements in them. There is no evidence of a complete revelation from God at an early stage in human history. There is no evidence that mankind began with a philosophical religion which later became corrupted. We shall find it in our discussion of different theories.

Tylor's theory : The first theory that has been accepted by the Anthropologists is called animism, which was advocated by Tylor in his primitive culture for the first time. Primitive men believed that many objects were inhabited by spiritual beings and they attributed a kind of soul to the phenomena of nature. According to Tylor, it was on the basis of this animistic view of the world that religion arose, i. e. religion arose as men tried to come to terms with these spiritual beings. It is true that the primitive man was in a sense more spiritual than we are i. e., he regarded a large part of nature as intelligent and subject to the same emotions as we are. But his attitude to worldly things was not necessarily religious. He often thought of them merely as superior beings to be respected or flattered. Thus it may be true that when for the first time he became religious, man's view of the world was animistic. But animism does not explain religion fully. "Animism", says Hoffding, "is the most elementary of human philosophies"; it is a kind of rudimentary philosophy rather than a rudimentary religion. Again, religion means man's response (in some way) to the supernatural but the supernatural is no part of animism. Furthermore, to ascribe the primitive people so much of intellectual maturity, to apply the principle of analogy and to project life into the lifeless, is really thinking too much about them.

But the question arises here : was man animistic when he first became religious ? Some Anthropologists suggest

that there is a pre-animistic stage which is sometimes called animalism. Animistic man thought of the individual as a personal being. He (Animistic man) was aware of an impersonal indefinable mysterious force that localised itself from time to time in various objects or people. Anthropologists usually called this mysterious force or power 'Mana'. *Mana* is an old nomadic all-pervading, supersensuous power or influence that operates in a mysterious way like magic and appears in natural objects of a striking character. It is more psychical than physical in character, permeating all things but often concentrated in individuals or things that are reservoirs of energy on which man can draw for good or evil. Again, this force or power was a material fact to the primitive man. It was only in certain cases that he thought of it (*Mana*) as divine. *Mana* is far too complex and mysterious. Therefore we cannot explain religion by means of belief in *Mana* or indefinable mysterious force.

"Ghost" theory of Herbert Spencer—Another theory known as the 'Ghost Theory' was advocated by Herbert Spencer. According to this theory religion owes its origin to ancestors' worship. The ghosts of ancestors and their experiences of them in dreams first arose in the religious instinct and undoubtedly ancestors' worship exists. Herbert Spencer, believes to be the most primitive form of religion. But it cannot be maintained that ancestor-worship is more primitive than the worship of the spirits of natural objects. We can only say that it is one of the many primitive forms of religion. Spencer's theory errs on the side of over-simplicity. The deification of ancestors is far too narrow a basis on which to rear the structure of religion. Religion is too complex a phenomenon to be accounted for by the growth and spread of a single custom; worship, however primitive a character, is not the expression of a single thought or a single emotion, but the product of complex and powerful thoughts. Dr. Jevons said, "it ne-

appens that the spirits of the dead are conceived to be good. Man is dependent on God or gods, but the spirits of the dead ancestors are dependent on him and he is not bound to worship them." Hume maintained, "The first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind."

Totemism—According to W. R. Smith, the origin of religion lies in the worship of 'Totem'. A 'Totem' is a species of animal, or plant, or more rarely, a class of inanimate objects to which a social group or clan stands in an intimate obligation, an especial relation of kinship—frequently it is thought of as the ancestor of the clan that provides a social group with its name. The 'totem' is not exactly God but a cognate being and one to be respected. It is an object of worship common to a family or tribe. It is usually symbolised in an image. But tradition had it that it must not be used for common purposes, nor must it be eaten except in some sacramental way. According to Dr. Jevons, animals were the first of the external objects that came to be worshipped, and totemism was the first form of that worship, and for a long period man continued to have only one object of worship, namely, the 'totem' or natural God. Often the tribe regarded itself as descended from the 'totem.'

But against this theory it may be pointed out that the latest recent researches have not sustained the view that every religion has passed through the 'totemistic' stage. There are many peoples of very low culture among whom there are many peoples of very low culture among whom there are unknown or at least unrecognizable.

A new form has recently been given to this theory by the French Sociologists of whom Durkheim was the most distinguished representative. He regarded totemism as the most simple and primitive form of religion. His real God

is society; the power he really worships is the power of society. Totemism appeared to him as the most elementary form of religion. But there are large parts of the world which no traces of totemism have been found and strictly speaking, totemism is not a religion at all.

However, the chief criticism that can be made of these thinkers is that they have started from the wrong point, i. e., from the characteristics of the external world of some social practice. It is only the theory of 'fear' which points to the inner aspect of the human mind to approach the origin of religion but this too is also the half-hearted attempt to explain the origin of religion.

Magic and religion—Anthropologists have often discussed the relation between religion and magic. Because of the two types or attitudes of behaviour have an important bearing on the problem of the origin of religion, both religion and magic presuppose some kind of force qualitatively different from us. But these two differ from each other. Magic tries to control that force by mechanical means, while there is an element of secrecy about it. Religion recognizes that this force demands worship and is worthy of worship. Unlike Magic Religion is a unified force in Society. Magic is little concerned with social values, it is rather indifferent to it. Religion is mainly concerned with values. Magic is at self assertiveness, but religion is a matter of self submission on the part of the individual to the object of worship. While magic claims submission by compulsion, religion claims it by rational conviction. Magic is arrogant, religion is submissive. These distinctions are true of the two attitudes in their ultimate tendencies and results. Even then Magic and Religion might have a common origin in man's experience of the mysterious forces of the world. "Religion", Frazer says, "I understand a conciliatory attitude towards powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."

for him, as for Tylor, essentially bound in souls or spirits, agencies of a personal kind, as the explanatory causes of natural events. But, however true it may be that religion tends to envisage its objects in this personal guise, and that personalism, moreover, is profoundly characteristic of religion in its highest reaches, it by no means follows that religion cannot exist in the absence of such personalization, or that this is the only channel through which religious emotion seeks outlet. Hence a number of the young Anthropologists has recently challenged Tylor's animistic philosophy.

To class magic loosely under religion as one of its lower forms, but when the meaning of religion was restricted to the manner specified, a definition of magic had to be framed on lines which would clearly distinguish between the two. A hard and fast line is accordingly drawn by Sir James Frazer in the later editions between rites and ceremonies which are religious in character and those which, it is contended, must be regarded as magical or non-religious. The object of the ceremonies in both cases, he indicates to be the same—'to turn the order of natural phenomena to man's (man's) advantage.'

But the question arises: Is religion prior to Magic, Magic to Religion? According to Dr. Jevons, Religion is prior to Magic. He said that "the belief in supernatural (religion) is prior to magic". But modern research gives us evidence in its favour. Then is Magic prior to Religion? This is perhaps the natural view. This view takes the form that magic was the germ, out of which religion, in course of time, developed. We are also inclined to think that the higher springs from the lower. That is a natural tendency of human nature. Frazer says that magic is older than religion in the history of humanity. He suggested that man was forced into religious attitude by the failure of magic to give the results he wanted. Thus the "age of Religion",

came into existence because men came to realize magic he was simply pulling at strings to which nothing was attached.

"An age of Religion", he ventures to surmise, "has where been preceded by an Age of Magic." It is in connection that Frazer elaborates his well-known theory of the affinity of magic to science and their common opposition to Religion. "In so far", he says, "as religion assumes the world to be directed by conscious agents who may be influenced from their purpose by persuasion, it stands in fundamental opposition to magic as well as to science, both of which take for granted that the course of nature is determined not by the passions or caprice of personal beings but by the operation of immutable laws operating mechanically."

But this view is not without defects. It is not true that magic gives place to religion. In most societies and among individuals both exist together. But Frazer's hypothesis that primitive men were forced to a religious attitude because of the failure of magic is purely a speculation. It may be that magic comes first. But we have little evidence which to base definite answer. It is really impossible to answer the question whether religion is prior to magic or magic is prior to religion. Taking note of the fact that both attitudes co-exist in the same society and even in the same person, we may perhaps believe that both these attitudes originated as soon as man became aware of the supernatural.

Otto's Theory : Prof. Otto in his book "the Idea of the Holy" offers a new and unique theory of the origin of religion. He does not see the origin of religion in any new activity such as 'communicating with spirits' or in some new ethical attitude such as 'dependence'. According to Prof. Otto, religion is something absolutely unique and demands a quite distinctive method of interpretation. It cannot be interpreted in terms of

good, the Beautiful, the True, although these may enter the religious life as secondary factors. Its category of value is the 'wholly' or the numinous which may be mediated through any activity no sooner as such an activity becomes the vehicle (instrument) of this experience, than that activity becomes religious. Thus he does not distinguish magic from religion. In this sense of Religion magic may also be regarded as a form of religious activity.

According to Otto, the character of the "numen" or deity cannot be verbally or conceptually expressed, it can only be felt. Otto's "numen" is the "wholly Other", that which falls quite outside the sphere of the usual, the familiar, the intelligible is commensurable with the rest of our knowledge and experience. But how can we have any relation at all with a "wholly Other?"

So Otto's theory is also not free from defects. Yet the above brief study of the origin of religion in the light of anthropology will help us in considering the nature, meaning and function of religion.

THE PSYCHICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION

Here we shall discuss the origin of religion from a psychological point of view and take into our consideration the contribution of mind towards the origin, existence and development of religion; for, there is a mental unity underlying all religious experiences. Now, the question arises where does our mind entertain the source of it?

In this connection different thinkers hold different theories:

Religious instinct theory—According to some thinkers man has a religious instinct, by which he becomes religious. But there are some arguments against such a theory. It is true that we have a few simple instincts, but they are very few. Not only that, these instincts are traceable in animals too. But religion is by no means a simple and traceable thing. It is a complex thing and a heterogeneous product. It is not a simple organisation of elemental instincts and emotions, but a synthetic organisation of elemental instincts and emotions of our being in the pursuit of ideal ends.

Theories of religious faculty—some, others, account for religion by saying that man has a religious faculty. This is also equally unsatisfactory, since it fails to explain our religious experience as a function of a particular department of our mind. But Edward Ogburn opines that there is no such part of our mind as can be labelled as religious.

Theory of fear—The most common and oldest theory is to hold our emotion of fear as the ultimate cause of our religion. Hume, Robert etc. support this theory. Lucretius identified religion with superstition.

Many of the psychological theories ignore the mental unity of the human mind and suppose that each element may function apart from the whole. For instance,

religion has been traced to a special faculty viz. religious sentiment. But neither any kind of sentiment nor any kind of emotion can solely be responsible for the birth of religious consciousness. It is not even a mere aggregate or mosaic of various psychic elements. It is rather an organised whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. Like any other organisation it also aims at something.

Moreover feeling, particularly fear, has been regarded as the impelling force which drives men to religion. But 'fear' in the form of fear is only a partial explanation of religion.

Now, to trace the origin of religion we must turn inside out with a sympathetic imagination to apprehend and appreciate the living movement of our mind. So in the study of religious consciousness we must observe particularly what it aims at. In this respect we shall turn back to the early history of man in a certain age, men were helpless in the hands of powerful elements and they always tried to establish a mutual relation with the objects of nature, obviously because they felt an all-pervading supernatural spirit in every object of nature, they found there a reservoir of power which man required for the self-preservation of his own against the forces of destruction around him. So they could worship every object of nature.

But gradually they became more conscious about their religious ideas. According to their reason they began to select only the animate things of nature as the object of their devotion. The basal impulse which we may take into account was self-preservation.

However, in the course of evolution these self-interested men turned into selfless and from the individual to the group. 'Totem' was their God, and they made offerings to please 'their' totem for the benefit of the tribe. Thus, the struggle for self-preservation took the form of clan preservation. By and by men came to possess the insight into the

true way of life, and the individual was uplifted above selfish desire, they began to sacrifice their life to the life of the community.

And consequently a sense of obligation grew in them. Thus the religious consciousness was developed. Through religious activity man gradually tried to attain the good, beauty and truth. They began to feel an unquenchable thirst for truth.

Having seen the emotional needs which religion satisfies, let us again look at those elements in human nature which are most closely associated with religious experiences. From the days of Plato, the nature of man has been divided into three parts: (1) feeling, (2) willing and (3) intellect. Feeling is a sensibility to stimuli. It expresses itself through pleasure, pain etc. Will is a response to these impressions in the form of desires and actions. Intellect is the capacity for reflection in the course of our experience.

In actual life, these three elements viz, thinking, feeling and willing, are usually found together. For example, if we plan to go for hunting, this is intellect; because we know that to go, this is Will. And we want to go because we have a feeling of adventurous journey. As Prof. Leuba says, "The unit of conscious life is neither thought (intellect) nor feeling, nor will, but all three together in movement towards an object".

Nevertheless, psychologists differ in their opinions as to which of these three is the most primitive. Some say it is intellect, although this view is abandoned altogether. The "New psychology" of to-day has shown that even the most modern educated and civilized people is by no means governed only by reason, he is to a greater degree ruled by irrational impulses. Some say that it is will, others say that it is feeling. It seems natural to think of feeling as the primary element; for, it is impossible to think of one without the other or to will except on the basis of feeling. We should

think of them in this order: (1) Feeling (2) Willing and (3) Intellect. Religion begins predominantly in feeling. Feeling is the deepest and most vivid of our experiences. The recognition of the basal importance of feeling as a factor in human experience came to modern theology and philosophy through the influence of Schleiermacher and later of Lotze. The centre of religion is an emotional experience and on the basis of this experience the rituals grow up and at a later stage, a sense of responsibility to God in all matters of conduct. Then out of the ritual and conduct a theology comes explicit, i.e., a doctrine of God expressed in dogmas. This process is primarily intellectual. Last of all, there comes the most abstract and purely intellectual approach to religion-viz; philosophy of religion.

In the whole of the above discussion of the psychic factors in the origin and development of religion we must hold that religion must always go back to its source in feeling and that the purification of its rituals and dogmas.

The Historical development of Religion.

While classifying Religion, it seems better to follow a mode of division suggested by the historic evolution of religion itself. There are two critical points in the history of the religious consciousness. The transition from Tribal religion to National religion, and the transition from National to Universal religion.

Tribal Religions.

The tribe is an exceedingly small and limited social group consisting merely an extension of the family. Though small, the tribe is a very compact body. The individual as such is scarcely counted. He is in the grip of a complicated and rigidly enforced system of social customs. Early religion naturally reflects this overwhelming tribal consciousness.

The savage does not rise much above material wants. His religion remains on the same low plain. The influences that underlie his religious customs are those connected with food-getting, marriage, birth, sickness etc.

Thus, man's spirit is subject to nature and dominated by bodily needs and the idealistic elements in his consciousness stand in the back-ground. But even now there is an emotional response to the invisible forces of nature.

Characteristic of the savage that he gives a meaning to the world by involuntary projection of his experience on things. Conscious of power, will, activity in himself, he cannot but conceive of effects in the surrounding world as brought by the same principle. The most primitive elements of language, the verbal roots, suggest that man is first attracted by objects in which movement and energy are very evident. The rushing river and the spring fountain, the waving tree and the howling wind are beings possessing powers and manifesting energy of their own. By an involuntary anthropomorphism man projects his environment with wills that he recognises to be his own. This tendency of the primitive man to treat things which impress and attract him in terms of his own known as "Animism."

Animism, however, gradually develops into Spiritism. Animism regards each spirit to be bound to its object. Spiritism gradually it is believed that the spirits are free to quit their objects at pleasure just as it is believed that in dreams the soul or own spirit quits its body and roams about. Even the shadow of himself is the evidence that he has a fine and independent moving self. On similar grounds it is maintained that all animated things are possessed by spirits who dwell in them and use them as their instruments. So, man people the world with a host of spiritual beings who can be approached through the material things, in which they dwell, and dwelling; but who, in themselves, are invisible.

marks a distinct advance of thought for it assumes an awakened consciousness of the superiority of the soul to the body and of its relative independence. It awakens the consciousness that in the adored beings their spirit is the essential thing. It paves the way for spiritualism which regards God as an Absolute Spirit.

The above discussions should not however lead us to suppose that the history of Religion is a history of unbroken progress. Fetishism, for instance, is a retrogression rather

than progression. A fetish is an inanimate object supposed to be inhabited for a time at least by a spirit, worshipped and cared about for luck. A fetish may be a stock or stone, a claw or even a detached bit of a human body, the essential point is the belief that it has mysterious powers which are due to the presence of a spirit within it. Between the fetish and the spirit, there is no organic connection. The spirit is capriciously present in the object and may desert it when it will lose all efficiency. A fetish is only sacred so long as it has worked. Then it is thrown on the scrap-heap of discarded futilities.

The background of Fetishism is always some well-defined Spiritism, and fetish worship is an attempt on man's part to control the spirits for his own purposes. It is a deterioration. It means that man will not recognise that he must depend on higher powers, but he seeks to compel them to observe his wishes. Consequently, when the cult of fetishism plays a predominant part the power of a religion to evolve fresh spiritual ideas fades and dies.

We should now pause a moment to consider the claims of Totemism and Ancestor-worship as independent types of primitive religion. The cult of the spirits of ancestors is a specific application of Spiritism and presupposes it. It is based on the belief in the immortality of soul. Besides, ancestor-worship is not a universal practice. The emphasis in ancestor-worship is more on the aspect of tribal unity

than on religious element. Similarly, with Totemism. 'totem' is the visible embodiment of the social unit. Its life is bound up with that of its individual members.

The religious importance of Totemism lies in the motive which works behind it. The explanation of the is the felt unity of the group, that kinship of blood and of which it is the visible token and guarantee. Totemism is not a universal stage of religious development.

We may now turn to our main theme, viz., the nature of primitive religion which can be designated Polydaemonism or the worship of many spirits.

Main features of Polydaemonism.

The whole world is thickly populated with invisible beings, who may at one moment make their presence felt to man's advantage or disadvantage. The savage translates what he does not understand into an account of spirits that is equally unintelligible. Sickness, hysteria, trance explained through possession by a spirit. It is also seen that due to the essentially uncritical attitude of the primitive mind no distinction is drawn between organic and inorganic, mind and matter.

In keeping with this fusion of the material and spiritual, the gods of primitive religion are more or less materially conceived and cannot dispense with a bodily habitation. The soul is conceived as a shadowy body. The idea of a pure substantiated spirit is far beyond the grasp of the primitive man.

The prayers addressed to the spirits are purely selfish and concerned with the getting of material gains, objects and like good health, success in war etc, well noted earlier.

The tribal religion is exclusive. The conception of religion which can be shared by all is regarded as foolish.

The beings worshipped are very ill-defined. They remain shadowy and elusive. We do not know anything about these concrete nature and attributes. The only distinction drawn between spirits is that some are propitious to man and others are malignant.

In the higher form of Tribal Religion the spirits begin to be organised and receive special functions e. g., spirits of vegetation of ancestors, of disease etc. The original sphere of their operation is extended, e.g., spirit of a tree into spirit of forest. In some religion, the idea of a Supreme Spirit is to be found. This may be thought to be the counterpart of the Chieftain of the Tribe. But the Supreme Spirit has no connection with the various spirits.

This idea of a Supreme Spirit is the pointer to a vague monotheistic faith even at a very low level of culture.

Criticism of Polydaemonism.

The defects of Tribal religion are too numerous to be mentioned.

It is dominated by fear. The animist feels himself at the mercy of hostile spirits.

It is too narrow, and refuses to include within its outlook any but members of its tribe.

The spirits are not God. Their personality is dim and undefined. They can hardly be distinguished from one another. They are not nobler and better than man, only more powerful and cunning. Moral qualities like holiness, love, righteousness are not associated with them. The only quality that is associated, is power, arbitrary, irresponsible and dangerous.

Yet, in spite of these defects and credulities and ignorance which characterise Polydaemonism, the sympathetic eye can discern in it the promise and potency of better things.

Firstly the savage is shown to have a conception of

spirit which, though utterly inadequate to us, it is continuous with the more refined conception of spirit, the cultured man of to-day. Spiritism, for instance, is an advance on rude nature-worship by its conception of a world of supersensuous spirits which works through a world of sensible beings but is not identical with it.

Secondly, in encouraging loyalty to the ancestral spirits or to the tribal Gods, primitive religion makes for solidarity and a sense of common obligations. Loyalty to the custom is the root from which the ethical spirit is developed. This loyalty also makes for spiritual progress in the individual a subordination of desires to standards. That progress can only come about by enlarging of the social outlook through the breaking of the tribe, and the formation of larger groups and loyalties.

Lastly, in the conception of a blood-bond uniting all members of the primitive group, there develops a spiritual brotherhood of the religious society. The line of religious progress lay in transferring the natural spiritual relation.

II. National Religion :

(a) **Transition to National Religion.** Tribes do not continue for long. They soon are fused together to become a Nation, either through the pressure of many common enemy, or through the conquest of many by a stronger tribe and the consequent assimilation of the weaker by the stronger. As a consequence, there is a widening of man's mental horizon and a deepening of his interests. The growth of the nation meant a large expansion of functions, a greatly increased differentiation of functions, a corresponding development of the individual consciousness. The regulations of life by immemorial customs become inadequate and is superseded by law. The primitive

of blood-revenge is replaced by judicial punishment; traditional usages yield to organised institutions.

This development in social organisation is accompanied by a corresponding development in religion. Of course there is no sudden emergence of a fresh religion. The change is slow. New wines are put into old bottles, and the nation has to create for itself a form of religion, sufficient for its wants. These wants Spiritism and Animism are powerless to supply. The call is for gods of a more individual character. In short, the transition from Tribal to National religion is not due to a process of conscious reflection, but rather to the pressure of practical needs coincident with an advance in social organisation. This transition, in a word, is from Polydaemonism to Polytheism.

Special Features of National Religion (Polytheism instead of Polydaemonism) :

As indicated above the special characteristics which distinguish Tribal religion from National Religion may be traced to the higher social order and the needs which flow from it. The savage can worship the vague and formless spirits, the civilised man needs some special object of reverence. We have seen that Tribal Religion consists in polydaemonism, the worship of many spirits which cannot be dignified with the name of gods because they have no personal history or personal character or individual values. The change to polytheism consists in the process by which the Nature-Spirits come gradually to be anthropomorphised, i. e., to be vested with human passions and faculties and to be addressed like human beings with proper names. The local nature-spirits are themselves elevated to the status of God or gods, dwelling in heavenly regions above the world. They become less familiar beings and more the objects of reverence. They are no longer entangled with the things of earth but dwell in higher regions, though their original associations with natural

objects is not forgotten at first. By degrees, however, the ancient associations of gods are obliterated and the gods are now ethicised and humanized, become patrons and helpers of certain departments of life or of state, e.g., war, agriculture, art, etc.

We can classify the distinguishing features of Polytheism under three heads:

- 1) Moralisation of Gods.
- 2) Movement towards Monotheism.
- 3) Development of specifically religious acts.

(1) **Moralisation of Gods**—The spirits become humanized and elevated to a supernatural realm. They become ethical powers, patterns of conduct and protectors of the ethical world-order. In this process of moralising the virtues are frequently associated with certain gods. Thus, Indra, Mars, Thor are associated with virtues of valour, Varuna, Osiris as administrators of justice, etc. Thus Gods as idealised, come to be regarded as types of human excellence.

(2) **The movement in the direction of monotheism may take one of these forms:**

a) **Monarchianism**: There is a tendency to exalt one God above all others in the Pantheon. The analogy of the social order among men is applied to the relation of God to one another. Corresponding to the monarchy on earth, it is thought, there is a monarchy in heaven. The Gods cease to be equal, independent or rival beings and come to be looked upon as a heavenly hierarchy under the way of a supreme God, who occupied a place analogous to a human monarch.

b) **Monotheism**: Here though many gods exist, the worshipper in the act and attitude of devotion concentrates his attention so intensely on one particular deity that it seems for the time being at least to swell out into universality

power and absorb all others. It is an attitude of piety rather than of theoretic belief, i. e., vedic hymns.

c) The tendency is to recognise all the gods as the manifestation of one Divine principle, e. g., Rita, again Agni who is born Varuna becoming Mitra etc.

(3) **The development of sacrifice, mode of worship, etc., prayers, sacrifice etc.**

Fundamentally Religion is a matter of entering into a friendly relationship with the deities, culmination in fellowship, self-denial and sacrifice. Polytheistic religion shows marked developments in the modes of worship which now assume a fixed and elaborate form.

a) **Sacrifice**: Nothing definite and exact can be spoken about the origin of sacrifice. Four attitudes may roughly be distinguished in sacrificial observances: (i) First comes the attitude of gratitude for favours received, (ii) this gives place to the attitude of bargaining with the gods offering to them gifts whereby they may be induced to bestow a boon in return, (iii) A craving for participation with a deity, exemplified in the partaking of sacrificial meals, (iv) Desire for reconciliation with the gods, the offering being regarded as an act of propitiation for some slips on the part of the worshipper.

b) **Prayers**: The method of prayer is that of moral aspiration. It is marked by humility and reverence. The object of prayer is gradually spiritualised. There is a gradual reaching forth of human aspiration towards moral and spiritual blessings and a movement of the spirit beyond the level of petition for special blessings to that of submission to the divine will. There is an increasing emphasis on purity of heart and concentration of thought and purpose as essential conditions of true prayer.

III. **Universal Religion**: National Religion is just an aspect of the national life, a department of the state. It is not so much a matter of individual choice or personal

conviction as a matter of loyalty to the State conformity to national customs. Moreover, the National Religions show but little tendency to go beyond their native boundaries, at least by means of deliberate propaganda or persuasion. Further, at this stage of religious development there is little desire to test the mind of individual or test his belief. He remains religious so long as he pays outward respect to the religion and complies with its demands. For this reason externality which is inseparable from national religion in its more developed stages, is inadequate to the religious mind when it becomes more reflective and conscious of itself. The consciousness of this defect leads to the rise of universal religion.

(a) **The Rise of Universal Religion.** The universal religion were already latent in what had been before. A religious environment has been gradually forming which became the medium in which those personalities could develop, who were to be the leaders and reformers of religion. The monotonous uniformity of society begins to pass away, and in religion as in other things man differentiates himself from those about him. With the development of the inner side of religion, the external acts by which existing religion expressed itself no longer sufficient. Inward feeling and individual belief must somehow find utterance in religious worship. There came into beings some individuals whom spiritual development and insight have gained the highest degree of development. They grasped the truth and imparted it to others. Their knowledge was gained by insight, but it was matured by reflection.

These prophetic figures have appeared at various times in history. In Israel, for instance, under the tutelage of the great prophets like Aton, Isiah, Jeremiah, etc.

became more matter of inner connection and personal experience than a matter of national ritual.

With the death of the prophets, here was a return to the ritualism as we find in Escodus, Leniticus. This means a return to the nationalism and particularism and the need for the larger and more human outlook. When religion becomes a tyranny of sheer observance it can only be saved from decay and death by a new and powerful uprising of the ethical spirit which breaks the dominance of a priestly class and proclaims the freedom of faith.

The important thing to be noted in this connection is that these commanding figures do not step up on the stage, divorced from all connection with what has gone before. Their reaction, against existing religion is made possible by their positive relation to it. But we can not fully explain them by an analysis of past history. There will always remain a unique and inexplicable element in the depths of personality and this is specially true of spiritual genius who founds a relation. Founded religions therefore lay stress on the inward and subjective side of the religious relation. Man's relation to his God is no longer a ready-made fact, but a spiritual one to be realised. The ancient limits are transcended, faith is possible for all, and because it is so, religion in its higher form becomes missionary in its activity and universal in its claims. Instead of a religion for a tribe or a nation we have a religion for humanity.

(b) **Main Features of Universal Religion.** It is evident that universal religion arises through a process of individualising religion. Though paradoxical, it is obviously true. For, individualising is, here, meant constructing religion as something inward and personally realised, and as men have the same spiritual nature they can partake of the same religious experience. Universal religion in appealing to the spirit appeals to men without distinction of class or race. It has a message of value and hope to all mankind and has

spread far beyond its native boundaries (i.e., limited space and time, class and nationality). There is in nature of a deliberate missionary movement. A religion is incipiently universal when it becomes a matter of state of mind and heart, and not a matter of performance of external rituals only. If (in a religion) the conditions of the relation between God and men are inner and it is open to all men in the world who are prepared to conform to these conditions and share the same religious experience. The presentative instances of universal religions are three in number :

- (a) Buddhism.
- (b) Christianity.
- (c) Mohammedanism.

Buddhism : It is strong where Islam is weak. It appears to the inner spirit of man and sets aside the whole of external precepts and ritual ordinances, it offers salvation to the suffering in the form of Nirvana. Its value and significance lie in this that Buddhism has the qualities of inwardness, universality and humility. But it has attained them at the expense of ceasing to be a religion in the ordinary sense of the word, in as much as it did not believe in any God.

Christianity : So far as christianity is concerned, it is a living relation between man and God. Christianity is transcendent, yet immanent, the love which encompasses the human individuals, as also the spirit that draws the world into themselves. Emphasis is also laid on the value of the individual soul and its preciousness in the eyes of God.

Mohammedanism : The rise of Islam was mainly due to the inspiration and religious genius of Mohammed. It should be noted that it also owed something to the Jewish and Christian influences which were at work in Arabia towards the close of the sixth century. The unity

omnipotence of Allah stand in the fore-front of the creed of Islam. The mind and will of Allah were communicated to his Prophet, who in turn revealed them to man. It is a book of religion *par excellence* and *Koran* is the book of Mohammed. The supremacy and even arbitrary nature of the divine will; the manifestation of that will in his Prophet, the responsibility of man and his duty of slavish submission to that will, heaven for the faithful and hell, for the infidel,—are the main traits of the religion in Islam.

Its Limitations. Anthropomorphism, an atmosphere of miracle, the poverty of its ideal of God, and its intolerance, are the chief limitations of Islam. It is essentially weak on its inner and spiritual side. Moreover, its conception of deity is external and mechanical. Stress is laid on unquestioning submission and mechanical obedience. In a word, Mohammedanism lacks the inward spirituality and humanity which must characterise a religion for all men.

“HISTORY OF MAN IS THE HISTORY OF RELIGION”

The truth of the statement can only be justified if we accept that religion is the whole of man's action. If we study carefully the history of religion, we shall find that religion occupies a central place in human life, from the dawn of civilization. The origin of religion has been explained by different theories in different ways. According to some thinkers the crude form of religion has been said to be associated with many make-beliefs and superstitions throughout the ages, but its presence in the history of human race can not be denied. Comte admits that “religion embraces the whole of existence and the history of religion assumes the entire history of human development.”

In order to discuss the history of man in relation to the history of religion we should also consider the development of civilization of culture as a whole. Man's interest is determined by the constant and severe struggle for existence, search for food, need of self-defence against nature and the attack of enemies in the savage stage. We observe that the savage could not rise much above his wants. Consequently their religion remained on the low level; their religious customs were connected with birth, marriage, war and death. It is evident even now there is a deep emotional response to the invisible powers or spirits.

If we make a wide survey of the history of mankind as a whole, (As distinguished from any particular tribe, race or age,) we shall be able to find ample evidence of the development of religion throughout the different ages. The historical development of religion begins with the belief in a host of spirits possessing the mysterious power that is influenced by certain rites, rituals duly performed.

In primitive form of religion, fetishism represents a retrogression rather than progression. Apart from this degraded form of religion we may regard the religion of primitive Polydaemonism, that is, worship of many spirits. Natural features such as rivers, lakes, birds and snakes are regarded as the location of spirits which were worshipped. Ancestor-worship was very widely spread throughout the savage world. The bigger objects of nature, for example, the sky, the sun, the moon, the stars and earth have been invoked in that period.

In course of change in the structure of society with the combination of different tribes, into a nation either through the pressure of fear of common enemies or for a stronger tribe, there has been a great development of man's mental horizon. Consequently, the development

social organization took place and corresponding to it, religion has also developed.

With the development of National religion, two important movements are noticeable viz, the moralisation of gods and the movement in the direction of Monotheism. Thus it can be said that the history of religion is not only the story of the development of our beliefs about the Gods, but also of such acts, as prayer and sacrifice, devotion and worship, for establishing harmonious relationship with God. So far we had been dealing with religion at the stage of its evolution and reached the development of National religion.

Now we shall consider how National religion has paved the way for the universal religion. If by 'Universal religion' is meant that religion which all men share all over the world, strictly speaking, there is hardly any universal religion in this sense. Truly enough, God is one, but religions are many. Even then there are three types of religion which may be described as Universal religion in the broader sense. These are :—Buddhism, Christianity, Islamism. In this way the historical evolution of religion has made the following points clear :

(i) Religion has manifested itself in different forms, for example, crude, futile, ignoble as well as noble, idealistic and conducive to human well-being.

(ii) Secondly, through the apparent chaos, rites, beliefs, superstition etc., we can trace the achievements of, or progress in religion as a whole. However animism, fetishism and totemism, still prevails in many parts of the world. But the more a country is developed with culture and civilization the crude faiths have paved the way of a better, more rational and spiritual kind. Thus the progress of religion cannot be accounted for in isolation from the other aspects of life, but is simultaneous with the progress of social organization, culture and civilization.

CHAPTER IV

OBJECTIONS TO THE THEOLOGY OR
SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF RELIGION

Whether the scientific treatment of religion is possible at all has been a burning question from the remote past to the present. Some thinkers raise certain objections against the scientific treatment of Religion.

There are three different schools of thinkers who maintain, (1) a scientific treatment of religion or philosophy of God is impossible, on account of the very nature of human knowledge, (2) though human intelligence is capable of having knowledge of the Absolute, the Absolute can be known by intuition or immediate experience which is not rational but supra-rational. The religious knowledge, according to this school, is not based on feeling of truth; (3) lastly, because religious truth is not derived from all other kinds of truth in this that it has been authoritatively revealed, and an authoritative revelation implies the incompetence of human reason. The philosophy to deal with religious knowledge falls outside the ground.

According to some thinkers' science is natural, religion is *super-natural*. The 'super-natural' is beyond the scope of human reasoning and, thus, a science of the supernatural is not possible. When we try to know by observation and generalisation of facts, we know only phenomena. And this knowledge of phenomenal objects suggests that there lies beyond a vast region, a realm of mysterious and transcendental world out of which all phenomena seem to be where experience and reason are incapable of reaching.

Natural Theology is falsely regarded as a science. It seeks to weigh the Infinite in the balance of finite. But even the scope of Natural Theology is restricted to the region of truth only. Because, human knowledge is absolutely restricted to worldly objects. Thought cannot go beyond the spatial and temporal objects. Thus theology or scientific treatment of Religion is not possible. On the other hand, it is to be regarded as a fictitious or spurious science.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, while maintaining the same view suggests that science and religion are quite separate because the known and the unknown or the Unknowable are quite distinct. Science deals with positive and definite knowledge but there can be no definite knowledge of the unknowable and the dark unknowable background beyond human experience is the province of religion. The attitude of mind with respect to this is not intelligent or inductive knowledge but simply silent reverence for the Unknowable, and this is the common essence of all religions.

Thus, we find two basic points : Firstly, human intelligence is incapable of giving any knowledge of the Absolute, empirically and rationally. Human knowledge is restricted within the sphere of the relative world. To think is to be conditioned, but to think of the Absolute is to think of the unthinkable. The very nature of thought implies distinction and, therefore, limitation. But the infinite cannot be made finite and, therefore, Unthinkable. Secondly, the Absolute cannot be the object of thought, for thought is possible only in relation to a thing thought of by the thinker, and that an object of thought can only be known by those thinkers. Hence, all human knowledge is necessarily relative. Thing-in-itself or the Absolute is, therefore, unknown and unknowable. Thus a science of the Absolute or God is nothing less than a contradiction in terms.

In spite of all these difficulties, Mr. Spencer asserted

that we are bound to believe in the existence of the Absolute. Though the Absolute cannot be known in the strict sense of knowledge, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness or Knowledge. Reality is not capable of being known, because it cannot be brought within limits. Nevertheless, it remains as a fact of consciousness. This view may be criticised on the following grounds: Firstly, it involves self-contradiction because, according to Mr. Spencer, all knowledge is relative and yet we know the existence of the Absolute which is unrelated. In order to maintain the view of limitation of human knowledge, it is not possible for one and the same consciousness to be purely relative and to be conscious of its limitation. Because when we are aware that we know the phenomena, we are at the same time conscious of something other than phenomena i.e., we know the existence of thing-in-itself or realities lying beyond phenomena. It follows that the Absolute cannot be said to be known, as it is unknowable but it may be said that it does not exist. In other words, the assertion of existence is meaningless. It again gives rise to another problem. If no Absolute can be known by our consciousness, how can we be conscious of its bare existence? To speak of the Absolute is to relate it and so to negate it. Hence, the Absolute cannot be said to exist at all. Thus, to say that our knowledge of the Absolute is to say that we cannot know that the Absolute exists. If 'being' is thus eliminated, its thought is negated. But what remains, when we eliminate being from knowledge, is realities from thought. Thus, in ultimate analysis, the Absolute cannot be eliminated nor can be negated, because the presupposition and the final goal of thought is to comprehend all finite things and thoughts, only because it is itself unity of Thought and Being.

It appears to be an intellectual paradox at first when we select the Absolute as the supreme object which

reflecting any knowledge of it. The idea of infinite reality beyond the finite can only arise, not because it is inconceivable and unthinkable but because it is self-consciousness or realisation of the highest ideal of the spiritual.

Finite intelligence cannot be the measure of the infinite which demands reverence and respectful admiration. It is religion which contains in it the feeling of reverence for the infinite, which is the treasure of all knowledge and wisdom.

NECESSITY OF RELIGION

'Necessity of religion' does not mean that every individual man must needs be religious. It only means that religion is in it the highest necessity—a necessity involved in the very essence of reason and, therefore, bound up with the nature of all rational beings.

All religious experience involves feelings and acts which are possible only to rational spiritual beings. In fact, we may go further and say that religious experience is not an accidental feature of human life but the very nature of a rational self-conscious being and, as such, he transcends his own finitude and rises into communion with the Infinite. As Caird says, "to show the necessity of religion is to show that the religious relation—the transcendence of all that is finite and relative and the elevation of the finite spirit into communion with an infinite and absolute spirit—is a thing which is involved in the very nature of a man."

"In the nature of man as an intelligent self-conscious being there is that which forces him to rise above what is material and finite, and to find rest nowhere short of an infinite all-comprehending mind."

This does not necessarily imply that everyman is

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religious. There are indeed men who have not felt the necessity of religion on account of their intellectual backwardness, but still it is possible to show that religion is rooted in the very nature of man. Man is incurably religious.

The attempt to explain man's religious life by reference to his spiritual nature, which transcends the limitations of finite individuality, and thereby reveals the presence of the Infinite Being in man, would however fail, if materialism were true. According to Materialism, matter is the ultimate stuff underlying the universe and all phenomena of the world, including those of life, mind and consciousness can be explained in terms of matter-and-motion alone.

But a materialistic theory which attempts to reduce consciousness to a function of matter is open to serious objections: Firstly, material atoms from which materialism seeks to derive mind and consciousness are really objects which have no existence independent of mind. To posit consciousness as a series of causes or effects of infinite product has no relation to consciousness at all. It involves a logical fallacy.

Secondly, the attempt to explain all phenomena by means of mechanical causation is not successful. The activities of living organism exhibit certain characteristics which require categories other than mechanical causation for their interpretation. Such activities are evidently directed towards the well-being of organism as a whole. The relation between conscious self and its states and activities cannot be understood by reference to physical causation.

Thus it is impossible to reduce consciousness to a mere function of matter.

We may now show that there is something in the nature of a rational self-conscious mind that prompts it to rise above the point of view of religion.

Man is a finite being, but his finitude differs essentially from the finitude which belongs to natural objects. Such objects are mutually exclusive. Each one of them lies outside all others in space, and is capable only of being externally related to them. But the case of a rational self-conscious being is different. The things and courses by which man is limited on all sides are the objects of his knowledge as well as the objects of his own progressive development. Man cannot live his true self so long as he remains concerned within his own individuality. The more he shares in the life of the world without, the more he realises his true self. The barrier between human self and the thing which seems to limit him from outside breaks down anywhere and we find something in man which constitutes his true infinitude.

Man is thus a finite-infinite being. In all his thoughts and actions he exhibits a tendency to realise that infinitude which is already in him potentially. Further, the very fact that man can recognise his knowledge to be finite and imperfect, and can consequently make progress in knowledge implies the presence in him of an absolute standard of truth. The presence of ideals in man, impelling him towards absolute perfection, unmistakably indicates that man is the finite reproduction of an Infinite Mind. It is in this aspect of the nature of man that religion finds an explanation. Religious consciousness is the medium through which finite spirit is ever seeking to transcend its finitude and to realise its true nature as an Infinite and All Perfect Being. From this point of view religious ideas cannot be regarded as mere fragments of our imaginations, but are the forms through which the essential nature of man necessarily finds an expression.

PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

It is needless to say that religion is a very important outstanding feature of human experience. If we take a comprehensive survey of human experience, we shall find that religion, from the very dawn of civilization occupies a central place in it. Religion might have been very old in origin and might have been associated with many beliefs and superstition throughout the ages, yet its place in the history of human race cannot be denied. As admitted "Religion embraces the whole of existence and history of religion resumes the entire history of development". Recent researches in various departments of science such as Anthropology, Comparative Psychology and History of Human Culture go to show, by accumulation of an enormous mass of facts, the religious customs, beliefs, and aspirations of men.

The task of Science is to systematize and organize human knowledge. It accumulates facts, classifies them and is concerned with the grouping of phenomena into coherent systems. Thus special sciences are concerned with particular cross-sections of human experience. Philosophy, on the other hand, has for its subject-matter the whole of human experience and seeks to know its ultimate meaning, validity and ground. Science is abstract, and analytical, is governed by selective interest. Philosophy is concrete, synthetic, comprehensive and seeks insight into the meaning of the whole. Now, religion, too is an aspect of human experience but it always embodies in itself a philosophical interpretation of reality, of the meaning of the Universe in terms of its value in human life. It goes from the

things visible and tries to reach an inexhaustible fund of spiritual resource and a power which is available for the practical support of man in life's battle and for the satisfaction of its deep-rooted need. Hence it has been said that "Religion is Man's reaction to the totality of things as he apprehends it". The facts of Religion are a perpetual challenge to Philosophy compelling it to investigate the claims of religion to be valid interpretation of Truth and Reality. The Philosophy of Religion is the response of Philosophy to this challenge and a Philosophical enquiry into the nature, function and value of religious experience.

Like Philosophy, the philosophy of religion must find its data in real experience. Its task is two-fold: Firstly, Psychological investigation of religion as a normal and practically universal fact of human life. Secondly, the Metaphysical investigation of the relation of religious experience to the ultimate reality and truth. "Without the materials applied by Anthropology and History we could do nothing more than erect a spacious edifice of mere hypothesis and fancies, an amusement in which the speculative Philosophers of a former generation used to take delight." On the other hand, the mere gathering and arranging of materials do not constitute a philosophy of religion. We have to interpret and evaluate these various facts of experience and we have to face the question - how far the religious conception of mankind corresponds to truth. It may be pointed out here that even the purely empirical study of religion from the point of view of Anthropology, History, Psychology proves to us that the religious consciousness itself points to a Super-empirical reality as its ground and support and that therefore its essence is not to be understood empirically, that religion in its development strives for an ideal which derives its validity and authority from beyond the veil of sense, from spiritual values and not from empirical values. Again, if we hold the view that religion is nothing but a

mere subjective state of feeling, the result would undermine confidence of religion in itself and religion rapidly lose whatever working value it might have. The duty of a philosophy of religion is to furnish a ground for religious consciousness.

The first business of the Philosophy of Religion is to study the phenomena of religious experience. This study of the subject is technically called the Phenomenon of Religion. The religious Phenomenon may be seen from two points of view: Firstly, from the point of view of the inner or subjective experience which is the Psychological point of view; and secondly, from the standpoint of religious experience, as externalized into rights, traditions, institutions, myths, creeds, theologies etc., which is the Historical point of view. It is to be noted here that these two points of view, however, are interconnected forming the fundamental unity of the religious experience. We cannot fully understand the inner experience without studying the objective elements of religious consciousness, without an insight into its inner motives, desires, aspirations which operate within religious consciousness. The facts of history are more or less except in so far as we are able to discover within certain feelings, emotions and aspirations of mankind. On the other hand, subjective religious experiences and feelings are elusive, inarticulate and individualistic except in so far as they are manifested in historical forms of worship, institutions, activities etc.

Further, a philosophy of religion has not only to describe the facts but also to understand and explain them. The following questions naturally arise which the philosophy of religion must try to solve consistently e.g., "What is religion? How is religion related to Morality, Science and Philosophy? What elements are involved in religious consciousness? How religion originated and developed etc.?" We also have to deal with the question

of the validity of the religious experience; we are to justify it as a reasonable attitude. So the following problems naturally arise: Is the knowledge of the supersensible possible? Is the knowledge of the same kind as secular knowledge? Then, there is the metaphysical problem, namely, "Does the nature of Reality justify the religious view of the world?" Thus, there are many problems of Philosophy of Religion and there is vast scope of it.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

The relation between the philosophy of religion and theology can be discussed with reference to the nature of each of these two.

Theology is an articulated system of religious beliefs or doctrines which have been developed from some historic religion. It takes faith into account and tries to interpret it by reason. The proper function of theology is not to criticise the religious experience out of which it grew but rather to deal faithfully with that experience. Theology in its original state was something different than what it is at present, because it, at present, unfolds a world-view based on religious postulates and explains the nature of God, creation, the origin of man etc. But theology is not the proper science to deal with all the metaphysical issues. Theology presupposes the existence of a living Religion. Its problem is to mediate between faith and reason.

Philosophy of Religion, on the other hand, is the study of human life with manifold experiences and feelings with reference to supreme reality. The philosophy of religion is just the application of philosophical principles and methods to religion regarded as a matter given. In short, philosophy

of religion criticises and purifies the representative religious ideas in order to raise them to the specific form. It shows that the truth of religion is the specific idea of God.

The connecting link between theology and philosophy of religion can be established on the basis of the wider principle of authority. The character of such authority must be spiritual. Both theology and philosophy of religion accept the postulate of faith made on grounds of value.

Religion is man's reaction to the totality of things which apprehends it. Philosophy is rational criticism of religious experience. So "Philosophy of Religion" is a systematic enquiry into the nature, function, value and truth of religious experience, and into the adequacy of religion as an expression of the nature of ultimate reality. Theology is a system of doctrines, developed on the basis of a definite historic religion—say, Brahmanism or Christianity etc.

But Philosophy of Religion, like religion itself, is not tied to any particular sect but takes for its province religion as such, religion as a universal phenomenon in human experience. It gathers its data from the religious experience of mankind in general and traces the whole process of religious evolution from the lowest stage of savage life to the most advanced level of culture. In short, Theology recognises limitation in a particular sect but Philosophy of Religion is not confined to a particular sect.

Though the scope of Philosophy of Religion is wider than that of Theology, as Theology enlarges its outlook tends to broaden out in the direction of a Philosophy of Religion, though it need not wholly lose its identity in it. It may be added that the Philosophy of Religion will gain its vitality and wealth of content if it remains sympathetic communication with theology. Thus it can be said that Philosophy of Religion and theology are supplementary to each other.

Points of difference :

Firstly, faith holds the supreme position in theology whereas reason has much emphasis in philosophy of religion.

Secondly, Philosophy of Religion manifests belief which is subjective idea but objectively controlled, while theology tries to interpret faith by reason. So it is a dogmatic idea but it is not objectively controlled.

Thirdly, faith as a postulate is by no means limited in its operation to reason. It pervades practical life and neither science nor philosophy can dispense with it. The process of reason is never complete and exercise of reason ultimately rests on postulates which cannot be rationally deduced.

It may be well to say at this point that philosophy need not quarrel with theology, because the latter accepts the postulate of faith made on grounds of value. No rational deduction, for instance, can give for its conclusion the idea of God. Faith makes it real, not logical proof. In view of the stress philosophy lays on the principle of rationality, it might seem that the pre-suppositions of theology were unfavourable to any close relation on its part with a Philosophy of Religion. In all these respects, the difference between Theology and Philosophy of Religion is one of degree only. One lays greater stress on faith, the other on reason; but reason cannot work without faith, and faith has its proper ally in reason. Theology is and must remain in the exposition of the doctrines of a definite and historic Religion. In other words, the theologian must take his stand on the development of religious experience. In practice, it will sometimes be difficult to keep theology strictly apart from Philosophy of Religion. For they deal with the same materials. Hence it is right to insist that any speculative treatment of theological doctrines really belongs to the province of religious philosophy and must be judged as such.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND METAPHYSICS

We are all familiar with the claim that religion is tied to some kind of metaphysical reality. Theism is a metaphysical position. But we should be about the suggestion of some thinkers that metaphysical belief is to be identified with the irrational. Religion is fundamentally and inescapably anthropocentric. It is the record of man's quest for fulfilment and the establishment of his own values.

Metaphysics is the science of Being or Reality, the study of supernatural, supra-sensual essence and phenomenal world. In other words, it considers the noumenal principle of the universe at large and Philosophy of Religion is concerned with the common reality through worship and devotion. It is mainly a feeling. So Philosophy of Religion is a rationalized feeling for the supra-personal Reality or God.

A controversy arises in connection with the origin of Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion. According to some, Philosophy of Religion has been evolved out of metaphysical enquiry. They argue that Philosophy of Religion is concerned with the essence of supreme reality which assumes the character of God or divine entity which is usually a metaphysical concept. So there be Philosophy of Religion without any metaphysical enquiry.

According to some others, metaphysics is subordinate to the Philosophy of Religion, because it is observed that the primitive stage of human civilization some religious spirit is innate in man. It is said that religion is the life-blood of human beings. Philosophy of Religion

has been developed in due course prior to the development of the science of Being or Reality, i.e., Metaphysics.

Whatever may be the opinion regarding the origin of metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion, we should now draw a conclusion that Philosophy of Religion without reference to Metaphysics cannot be thought of, nor can we conceive Metaphysics without any influence of Philosophy of Religion on it.

Thus, from the standpoint of definition, we find that both Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion deal with the same principle of the universe at large. Consequently, it may be said that the ultimate object of study in both the sciences is the same.

But in regard to their method, it appears that Metaphysics follows the speculative method based on reason and logic, whereas Philosophy of Religion takes into its consideration reason; but reason alone is not the basis of investigation. Philosophy of Religion adopts the method of reason being influenced by feeling and willing. So, in any case we find reason plays the prominent part in another case the whole religious consciousness plays its role.

Though they differ in their method or in their attitude, there is also a striking similarity between them. But the questions for the existence of God are religiously as well as philosophically impossible. If belief in God could be confirmed experimentally, if God could be considered as the conclusion of a rational argument, we should have certitude about Him. If, on the other hand, belief in God be provisional, it would be alien to the whole spirit of religious belief.

The nature and attributes of God, as we know, are both metaphysical and religious. The problem of the relation between God and Absolute is both philosophical and religious.

Thus, from the modern metaphysical and religious points

of view it is established that the implicit understanding of the relation of Metaphysics to Religion is Philosophically inexplicable. Natural theology is equally indispensable. Philosophical criticism leads us to abandon the claim that there is reason for belief in God, religion becomes and metaphysics becomes prominent. Consequently, metaphysics becomes necessary for our belief in natural theology.

THEOLOGY, SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION

The broad distinction between Theology and the Science of Religion might be said to be that Theology deals with the products of religious consciousness, whereas the Science of Religion deals with the processes as a result of which these products arise. Theology attempts to analyze and systematize the results of our thinking of God. The Science of Religion, on the other hand, takes into consideration the nature of religious thinking or of the religious consciousness in general. It analyses the religious consciousness into its constituent elements and tries to show how these elements are combined with one another in different religions and how they have developed in connection with the environment in which the worshippers are placed. Religion is, in one sense, an experience and so comes within the scope of scientific study. It always implies an interpretation of the nature of the Universe and of the meaning of the Universe.

Comparative Religion is not different from the Science of Religion, but it might be said to have gone into more detail in order that it may provide greater mass of material for the study of the Science of Religion. All scientific

proceeds by comparison, e. g., if a botanist wishes to understand the essential nature of a plant, he compares different specimens of that kind of plant. Similarly, the scientist in religious matters compares different religions in order that we may make accurate and general statements about the nature of the religious consciousness. He will study in a way in which the religious consciousness makes itself felt and finds expression in different societies where different religions exist. Comparative Religion will, of course, deal with the Theological products of the different kinds of religious consciousness, but it will not deal with them in such a way as to construct a universal Theology but only in order to gain a full view of particular religious manifestations.

If any distinction is to be drawn at all between the Science of Religion and Comparative Religion, it may be said that Science of Religion is more psychological, whereas Comparative Religion is more historical. But it is not possible to draw a hard-and-fast line of distinction between the two, as no science can afford to dispense with the history and the data with which it deals. The Science of Religion must be generic as well as analytic and Comparative Religion is just the generic aspect of the Science of religion. Comparative Religion assumes that there is unity in religions, that the growth of religion is constant and that there is an organic connection between the various Religions. It tries to begin at the beginning and to understand how the religions have come into existence and how their present forms have been reached. The purpose of Comparative Religion is to show how the higher religions have developed out of the primitive ones. It will place different religions in a progressive scheme and considerable progress has already been made in showing the laws of the development of the higher religions out of the primitive ones. Some people are rather afraid of showing this organic connection

between the higher and the primitive, because that association with the primitive will degrade the elements in primitive Religion may show by contrast the value of the higher forms of religions. Further, it is a mistake to divide religion into true and false. We rather regard them as more complete and less complete. The study of how the less complete developed into the complete will increase our toleration of the less complete. Further, it will increase our sense of the value of the complete precisely because it retains all that is good in primitive religions and leads us far beyond the limits of primitive religions.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

There is a close relation between Philosophy of Religion and Psychology of Religion. The facts of religion are different from the facts of mechanics and biology. The former are the experiences of conscious minds and the latter are not, i.e., in the natural sciences we work out our problem without the help of psychology. In religion, we cannot do so. Religious phenomena are essentially reactions of the mind upon the external world and their specific character is not due to the environment, but due to the human consciousness. Therefore the interpretation of religious acts is impossible without psychology. An analysis of consciousness and a knowledge of its functions and values of different psychical elements implied in an endeavour to read the phenomena of religion.

meaning. To construe, for example, the growth of religion through biological analogy or by means of metaphysical categories signify that we are viewing the process *ab-extra* and are not in sympathetic rapport with the interior and moving forces. Therefore, if we are to reach a general conception of the nature and development of religion we must regard that development in the first instance as a continuous expression of the human mind seeking satisfaction for its needs. For man makes religion, and religion everywhere bears the stamp of the human mind. Hence it is the necessity of psychology of religion.

Just as a philosophy of religion needs to be guided by a psychology of religion, so also the latter needs to be complemented by the former. A psychological treatment of the subject leads us to the position that we understand the function and value of our religious postulates. We know the part they play in the normal religious lives, but we can give no assurance of their validity. A justification can only be given by speculative thought. Only by reaching the ultimate ground of religion and determining the principle upon which religion depends, it is possible for us to appreciate its final meaning and to defend its place in human experience.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE
METAPHYSICS OF REALITY AND THEIR
BEARING ON RELIGION

The objectivity of religion.

The question to be discussed here is whether religion is true. It is a metaphysical problem, a problem of the ultimate reality of religion. The question is whether religious aspirations and ideals are grounded in the reality, or whether they are nothing but mere creations of imagination. Have we any justification to hold that the religious man's world-view has an objective reality and is not a mere subjective impression? This metaphysical question must be preceded by an epistemological inquiry regarding the criterion or test by which truth or objectivity of religious beliefs is to be ascertained. Philosophers of different schools have different epistemological criteria of truth. There are three such well-known theories of the tests of truth—(i) The Correspondence theory, (ii) Pragmatic theory, and (iii) The Coherence theory.

(i) The realistic school of philosophers hold that the external world is a real world. Truth consists in the correspondence of the knowing subject with the known reality. A judgment is true when the thought expressed by it agrees with reality. Thus "all men are mortal" is a true judgment for what the thought asserts in the judgment agrees with reality. The judgment, "all men are honest", is false because there is lack of agreement here between the judgment and reality.

(ii) According to pragmatists, the truth of a judgment is to be judged by its practical consequences, it is true if it works satisfactorily, i. e., if it serves biological needs. Thus truth lies in the will, not in the intellect; truth in the static sense, waiting to be known by the intellect, does not exist. We thus find that truth is not a product, it is a process.

(iii) The absolutists hold that the reality is a whole, a system. Hence a judgment is true when it is in harmony with the systematic whole. The test of a judgment-truth lies in the consistency between that judgment and other relevant judgments. The judgment that 'all material bodies are void' is true, because it is consistent with our general knowledge about bodies, but the judgment "all men are honest" is erroneous, because it is inconsistent with the rest of our knowledge about human beings. ('Consistency' with the mark of truth, and the lack of consistency the mark of error or doubt).

The common assumption is that truth is correspondence with facts (that is, correspondence is the criterion of truth). Here our question is whether this test is applicable in examining the truth of religion; in other words, can we say that our religious ideals and beliefs correspond with a transcendent being? But this test is difficult to carry out, for we have no direct source of knowledge of God as He is Himself. We have only our idea of God which also gradually develops. Clearly then it is not possible to determine whether our religious ideas correspond with the divine reality or not.

The pragmatic criterion or practical working value also is not applicable in judging the truth of religion, for the history of religion shows that a particular religious belief may work satisfactorily for some time, and then it may cease to be so. If we say that a religious idea is true so long as it works and it becomes untrue when it ceases to work and, again, if in some future time it begins to work

it once more becomes true, such a view would deprive of its universal and necessary character. Besides, from the proposition "whatever is true must work", it does not logically follow that "whatever works must be true". Moreover the same religious doctrine (as, for example, faith or belief in the incarnation of God, the postulation of the belief in the transmigration of the human soul) has immense working value, according to some people. According to others, it is positively injurious. As a matter of fact, the different sects, within the same religion, arise from the workability or otherwise of a particular doctrine. Thus we conclude that workability cannot be a sure test of the truth of religious ideas and beliefs; according to this test, the same doctrine would be both true and untrue.

With popular mind the intensity of feeling counts for more in the measurement of the truth of religion. "I feel it to be so, and hence it cannot be untrue"—this is the popular test of truth. But the subjective feeling, however intense and intense, is always unsafe as an adequate test of truth.

Revealed religions claim that religious knowledge has been revealed by God and, therefore, religious knowledge is true beyond human criticism. Revelation may be questioned as a fact; but as revealed truths are communicated through human minds, which interpret them unconsciously at the time of revealing them and as a part of it becomes difficult to separate the divine element from the human mixture in revelations.

How are we, then, to ascertain the truth of religion? We must remember that the human mind is not a concrete whole consisting of thinking, feeling, and willing factors which, though distinguishable, are inseparable, by compartmental divisions. There is a harmonious relationship among these factors. We may

define truth as that which satisfies simply one or the other factor of the human personality. Hence we must judge the truth of any particular element of our experience by its coherence—its harmonious relationship with the other elements of the experience. Hence when we ask, "Is religion true"? The same question may be stated as "has religion an integral place in the whole content of human experience"? Does religious experience agree with other aspects of experience to form a harmonious system? This is the test by which religious ideas and beliefs have to be tested, and if religion can satisfy this test, religion is true.

Religion is concerned with the intrinsic values of life—truth, beauty and goodness. Its judgments are prompted and necessitated by the deepest needs of the inner spiritual life. They are consequently mere postulates of faith, supposed as capable of satisfying the demands of our personality. These judgments called value-judgments also give a view of the world. It is this view of the world which we mean by religious experience or the religious view of the world. This religious view of the world in its outlook differs from philosophy in this that whereas the latter is obtained as a result of a logical process of reasoning, the former is based on faith, spiritual fellowship and communion. It is an inner experience and insight into divine things directly by the devotee, in his communion with God, which is faith has postulated.

In order to answer the question at issue here that is to test whether our religious experience is an integral part of our totality of experience, in which case only religion is true, we have to examine whether the religious man's experience is not a mere subjective impression, a mere sentimentalism. There is a school of philosophers, called naturalists, according to whom religion is nothing but a subjective phase of the mind. They interpret the universe in terms and categories of Natural Science and reduces even

man to a mere mechanism or what Huxley calls a automaton, in which consciousness is nothing more than a kind of sleeping partner which, in its sleep, dreams, does things, whereas in truth the whole work is done automatically by the intricate bodily organism. Of course in such a system there is no room for spiritual values according to this view, are nothing but illusions, or are accidental by-products resulting from the mechanical clash of molecules and electrons. According to this school, e.g., the school of New Psychology headed by Freud and Jung (according to which school it is the instincts which man has in common with other animals determine our conscious behaviour) our religious values are mere projections of our own unconscious impulses, which are sexual in this origin and which are produced by the unconscious activity of the libido. We have to prove the objectivity of religion i.e., the truth of religion is not a projection of subjective human ideas, but that it is justified by an impartial interpretation of the real world. In other words, that our human aspirations are not mere dreams of imagination but are rooted and grounded in the very heart of reality. In language we have to show that the values of human nature are not simply in man but represent something real in the nature of the world.

The discussion of the problem in Ward's criticism of Naturalism whose principal thesis in this connection is that man is altogether a part or product of nature and that nature has no meaning or purpose or law of its own. Our cherished values are devoid of objective status. Naturalism lies in the fact that its method of explanation consists in explaining the higher by the lower, or the more developed by the less developed, by reducing the con-

thing to its simpler constituents. This kind of naturalistic explanation we find in its interpretation of sociological and psychological phenomena in terms of biology, a biological phenomena in terms of the chemical and the physico-chemical again, in terms of bare quantitative relationship. This naturalistic method of explaining by the process of reducing down is faulty. For we cannot get the essential truth of the world-drama by analysing it into its physical constituents. The truth of the world-drama lies in its meaning, value, purpose, ideals which escape the knife of the naturalist in his dissection. A truer explanation of nature as offered by idealist is by interpreting Nature not in her lowest and simplest, but in her highest and most developed manifestation. As opposed to Naturalism, Idealism, which is the more proper mode of the interpretation of nature, explains nature not by explaining away her best and highest product (e.g., man) as a conscious spiritual being, but by recognising that those values which are so essential to man must also belong to nature. Could a universe, if it were totally meaningless and valueless, produce beings (i.e., man) where the fundamental characteristic is the recognition and appreciation of aesthetic, moral and religious values. These values must, therefore, belong to the real order of things and express something real and fundamental in the real constitution of the world itself. Man is organic to the world which gave him birth, and therefore man's world of values must have an integral place in the whole system in which he and the physical world fall alike. The causal world with which the scientists deal and the world of values with which the judgments of aesthetic, moral and religious values are concerned, are aspects of the same reality. God is a common ground of both. We thus find that religion has an integral place in the total system of reality. Herein lies the truth or objectivity of religion.

RELIGION AND PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

The problem of knowledge in its bearing on philosophy Religion. (a) No man can claim to have infallible and final knowledge of the world. For experience is always incomplete and grows ever more so with his experience. Not only is knowledge incomplete there is always the risk of actual error and illusion. Some of our most assured beliefs seems incapable of proof (e.g., belief in external world - otherselves Solipsism is theoretically plausible though practically absurd. It must be borne in mind that the more abstract and formal the subject under discussion, (e.g., in Mathematics), the more easy is it to arrive at greater certainty but finality of knowledge is difficult to attain with respect to the nature of the ultimate Reality, which means character of the universe in its concrete wholeness.

(b) Hence there is need for reversed agnosticism: our attitude towards the transcendent mysteries which surround such certain and lucid knowledge as we possess. This reversed agnosticism consists in the humble recognition of the fact that the resources of human thought and language are inadequate to express all the truth and meaning of the Ineffable Power that over-rules all that we etc., could thrive in a world which had been reduced to a simple noon-day transparency of the multiplication of the world which was all light and no shade.

(c) This means that we do not know all our knowledge as valid so far as it goes. Theoretic uncertainty is incompatible with practical certainty. Life would be intolerable and scientific knowledge would be impossible for us to translate our experience of it into ideas sooner or later.

(d) This implies an objective reality which

self-communicative. Truth is not a man-made convention. It is an apprehension of reality, which impresses us with its transcendent objectivity. It comes to us with all the force of something given, though its givenness has for its correlative receptiveness which achieves response on our part. An idea "works" because it is true, it is not true because it "works."

(e) Is the organ of religious knowledge then identical with that of scientific and philosophical knowledge? Or, do we come to know God in a different way? Here we are brought up against the familiar anti-thesis between faith and reason.

(i) It may be said that there are two kinds of knowledge. Firstly, the matter-of-fact knowledge of the world around us which comes to its perfections in the Natural sciences. Secondly, there is the practical acquaintance gained by experience and aided by sympathetic intuition, as exemplified in the relation of friends to one another. Religious knowledge is of the latter kind. It is not the information about God acquired by a strict process of induction. It is acquaintance with God.

(ii) Yet the two types of knowledge are not antagonistic. There is no clear-cut division between them. Scientific knowledge implies faith and faith implies some amount of ratiocination. There is an element of faith in reason and an element of reason in faith. The value judgments of religious experience must unite harmoniously with the fact-judgments of secular and scientific experience, to come to a philosophical world view.

(iii) We must not ignore the fact, however, that the unity of knowledge is a unity-in-difference. Reality has many strata. Each new level demands a new category which is not relevant to the lower levels. So the categories must be capable of being arranged, according to the degree of their complexity. Each is valid within its own frame of

reference. But it is only whole hierarchy taken together that can give an adequate clue to reality as a whole. The ways of knowing are not one but many. Yet diverse ways of knowing must coalesce in one system, if our knowledge is to be adequate. Thus when we ask, "Is religion true," what we really want to know is "Does religion fill an integral place in the whole of human experience?" We are not trying to compare the different parts of experience cohere with one another into the harmony of the whole. The part that stands loose to experience as a whole is the part about which we are most in doubt. This does not make the criterion subjective. The satisfaction we derive from coherence is not a momentary feeling, nor is it a feeling of a few eccentric individuals. It is a permanent and growing satisfaction tested by repeated and growing experience and social criticism.

Secondly, experience is not subjective. It is an experience of something, a contact with a self-revealing, self-comprehensive reality. It is in this way that we come to know reality, and religious experience is one way of knowing. Religion is regarded as valid because it is capable of standing the test of experience.

RELIGION : SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE

The term 'subjective' means something which is private to an individual. Subjectivity of knowledge implies that the knowledge changes from person to person. It is variable in nature. In this sense colour, taste, smell, sorrow, happiness etc. are said to be subjective. Thus what is blue to one may be green to another. Knowledge of happiness of mine is different from the knowledge of the happiness of others. Similarly, my knowledge of sorrow varies from the knowledge of sorrow in others. Thus all such subjective knowledge is particular and variable in nature. But in the case of objective knowledge, it is different. Objective knowledge is that which is universally grasped by all men alike, e.g. knowledge of fire. Every body knows that fire burns. From this universal attitude, knowledge becomes objective.

Some people think that religion is subjective in nature and religious rites and conception of God etc. differ from man to man. It does not seem to have any objectivity or universality. In favour of the subjectivity of religious knowledge three fundamental arguments amongst many may be taken into consideration. Firstly, it is said that all men in this world are not religious. There are some people who believe in God and there are some others who do not. Hence it is obvious that religion can not be objective in nature, because what is objective must be equally accepted by all.

Again, the nature of religion varies from nation to nation and from person to person. Theists believe in the existence of God. But they differ among themselves regarding the nature of God. For example, the Muslims,

Hindus and Christians differ in their respective rites and activities. Even in the same society, the knowledge of God varies from person to person. So, knowledge of God varies from person to person can not be regarded as universal or objective, rather it is subjective in nature.

It is generally held that religion is essentially a matter of feeling. Hence it is subjective in nature. For, religion is something which has no objective or universal aspect. It is an element of mind which differs from person to person. So it can not be objective or universal in nature. Thus they deny religious knowledge to be objective or universal knowledge.

In reply to these arguments we may substantiate our view in favour of the objectivity of religion.

Firstly, it can be said that though human beings are outwardly religious they are potentially religious. Man is a rational animal, his very faculty of reasoning makes him potentially religious. We are rational and spiritual only in virtue of the fact that we have in us the power to transcend the bounds of our narrow individuality and find ourselves in that which seems to lie beyond us. We are conscious in the form of religious men and some of them have implicit power in the form of religious men and some of them cannot workout them. But it does not prove that religion is not religious. From this it follows that religious knowledge is inherent, that is, potentially present, so it is universal and objective.

Secondly, it is said that religious ideas differ from country to country and person to person. But different religions differ from one another in their concepts though they agree with one another in a common essence. This common characteristic consists in the closest communion of the finite with the Infinite. This communion is the very essence of religion.

Lastly, feeling may be predominant in religion but it does not mean that it is the sole constituent factor of religion. In religious experience there is thinking as well as feeling. Religion is ratiocinative (Rational). It is not merely a matter of feeling but it also includes the rational aspects of a man's nature.

As man is a rational being he knows his finitude and limitation, and also knows that there is an Infinite and Perfect Being. This sense of the infinite being is implied in the very faculty of the reason of man. Thus every man is potentially religious. Consequently, there remains no difficulty in accepting religion as universal and objective.

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

The religious consciousness is that which is related to the religious state of mind. In other words, when the religious thought grows in our mind in any form, it is known as the state of religious consciousness. The religious consciousness may also be regarded as original, in the sense, that it is not an accidental feature of man's life but is inherent in the very essence of his nature as a thinking rational being. It is through the religious consciousness that we can enter into communion with that which is universal, objective and infinite. This universal, objective and infinite entity is known as a supernatural being or power possessing the highest moral and aesthetic excellence. The psychological state of religious consciousness is peculiar and supra-rational.

Religion is defined as the communion of the finite with the infinite. It is generally thought that in 'feeling' such a communion with Divine is possible. Though thought as a

process implies a distinction of self and not-self, yet in form of thought the opposition between self and not-self is broken down and the spiritual affinity of the finite and infinite is felt. This spiritual consciousness of the Divine has long been a matter of controversy with the thinkers of different ages. There are some who emphasise the essence of Religion in it, the place of feeling and place the essence of Religion in it, the others who give the place of pride to thought or knowledge still there are others who lay stress on activity, and as the essence of religious consciousness. The problem thus centered round the question of the nature of religious consciousness.

In the first place, it is maintained that religion is exclusively a matter of feeling i.e., it is a matter of the heart and not of brain. The advocates of this view argue that religion is the elevation of the human spirit to the level of the Divine and that this is possible only through feeling and communion with the infinite. On the other hand, the rationalists of the 18th Century in England and in France placed the core of religious consciousness in thought. Religion must indeed be a thing of the heart (feeling) but in order to elevate it from the religion of subjective caprice, we must appeal to an objective standard. That which enters the heart must also be discerned (approved) by the intelligence to be true. It must be seen as having in its own nature a right to dominate feeling and thus constituting the principle by which feeling must be judged and regulated.

But to place the essence of religion in thought is to have only a partial view of the picture. Human thought finds its expression through his language, art, sculpture, literature etc. Therefore, Practical activity has a vital part to play in the religious consciousness of man. Moreover knowledge or thought, be it scientific or barely metaphysical falls far short of religious consciousness, it would be a mere abstraction. The notion of the nature and attributes of God, His relation to the soul and the world cannot be scientifically demonstrated. These can be metaphysically conceived but the start in that direction requires to be intuitively felt.

would be on the same level; one would have as much justification as the other. As such religion would be a matter of individual fancy and feelings and the objective character of religion would go.

Moreover if religion is relation between the human spirit and the Divine, then feeling cannot be a bridge between the two; for that side of our nature, the characteristic of which is to be individual, partial, variable and accidental—cannot be that which corresponds to or is capable of entering into relation with an object, the very idea of which is universal, whole, immutable and necessary.

The above considerations had obviously led to the conclusion that the essence of religion lies in knowledge or thought. The rationalists of the 18th Century in England and in France placed the core of religious consciousness in thought. Religion must indeed be a thing of the heart (feeling) but in order to elevate it from the religion of subjective caprice, we must appeal to an objective standard. That which enters the heart must also be discerned (approved) by the intelligence to be true. It must be seen as having in its own nature a right to dominate feeling and thus constituting the principle by which feeling must be judged and regulated.

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In recent years, therefore, there has been a tendency to swing back from intellectualism to voluntarism. Kant accentuate will as the essence of religion. Kant, Schopenhauer, Hoffding and others are the spear-head of this new movement. They argue that it is the motive will that makes our thought or feeling significant. This thesis is all the more strengthened by a reference to the outward expression of the religious mind. Religion demands outward expression. And the inward feeling demands outward expression. And the possible through worship, ceremonial rites, prayers, sacraments etc. The ceremonial and the ritual aspects of religion occupy a prominent place in religious consciousness. In ancient vedic religion and the religion of old Testament support that religion belongs to the active aspect of conscious life. But mere activity without any intellectual and emotional support turns to be mechanical and would demoralise and degrade religion to formalism. Activity devoid of any respect or reason falls far short of being religious. So the heart must not be left alone to head and the heart must go together in it.

The above survey of religious consciousness throws a flood of light on the true nature of it. It is evident that to point to any particular aspect of mind as an independent and exclusive region of religious consciousness is to fall on a false psychology. The ordinary consciousness of individual cannot be divided into any such watertight compartments. So, also the spiritual life and consciousness of man can hardly be broken up into independent regions. The spiritual unity of human consciousness is a continuous one and manifests itself through diverse aspects of its life. Feeling no doubt is necessary in religious consciousness but it is by the content or intelligent basis of a religious act that its character and worth are determined. In other words, in considering the nature of religious consciousness, we must regard

primary importance not the element of feeling, but the objective character of that about which we are aware. We must look beyond feeling to that intellectual activity by which feelings are determined. It is indeed true that willing or activity gives concrete shape or impression to the outward feeling about the object of devotion. But the central principle which guides the many-sided aspects of our spiritual life is thought which gives organic relation to all our spiritual activities. God and divine things may touch our feeling, kindle our emotions, awaken in us desires and impulses, dominate our practical activities, but under all these, there is the activity of that organ which alone can help to raise us above ourselves and bring us into relation with the Eternal and Infinite and that organ is thought.

FAITH AND REASON

It is said by some thinkers that knowledge of God and divine truth is not rational or mediate. It is immediate or intuitive. This immediate apprehension of God is called faith by the religious people. These thinkers advocate faith as an organ of divine knowledge and put forward some arguments against reason.

It is held that reasoning takes away the mind from divine realities, and instead of God it gives us only arguments, propositions and propositions about God. It is said that in the attitude of devotion, in simple faith and communion with God, this spiritual mind seems to be in immediate contact with its objects. As the ordinary consciousness has of the reality of the external world, the religious people have the assurance of their reality in simple faith and devotion. The notions and propositions are mere abstractions

which break up the living reality into fragments and exhaust the content of the Infinite.

It is said that the attempt to prove God is virtually putting something above Him. To attempt to prove Him is to try to find in the finite the reason of the Infinite, actually making God finite by discovering the necessity of His being as something outside of itself.

Thus these various objections lead to the fact that reason but intuition or faith is the legitimate organ of knowledge. But this theory of intuition or faith as a substitute for reason is not tenable. These objections may be met in the following ways :

The aim of philosophy of religion is different from that of religion. The former does not pretend to make religion pious. It presupposes religion and makes no claim to produce it. Religion, no less than other spheres of human life, has its own reason implicit, and philosophy is reason self-conscious. What we get in religion through faith must be verified by reason. A faith, which is irrational, cannot give knowledge of the divine reality which is rational. Thus faith cannot justify its claim before the bar of reason.

Rational or scientific thought is not narrower than intuition or faith. In pursuit of its own ends, Science begins indeed by sacrificing the spontaneity and harmony of perceptions, (i.e. the spontaneity of immediate experience is broken up by the method of Science aims at a fuller reorganised unity.

The third objection against reason that the attempt to prove God is to try to find in the finite the reason of the Infinite is also not valid. In rational or mediate knowledge of God, the proof or mediate process is one which is contained within God's own nature. The philosophy of religion is not the aggregate of thoughts or reasonings of a finite observer as to the being and nature of God, but simply a conscious development of the process

given implicitly in religion. All true thought of God is God thinking Himself.

Thus it does not follow that faith alone and not philosophy or speculative thought is the criterion of truth in religion. Immediate knowledge or faith gives us that is particular and accidental and no objective and necessary truth. Not intuition or faith but some higher principle, when, must be the criterion of truth. This is evidently the objective authority of reason. The fact is that faith and reason are not opposed to each other. Reason and faith like subserve the struggle of the human spirit to its Divine goal. Both reason and faith should interact with each other in the cause of spiritual progress.

MYSTICISM

It is generally said that the object of religion must be a personal God and therefore the Absolute which is impersonal cannot be the God of religion ; secondly, it is also said that both the worshipper and the worshipped must be persons, otherwise religious communion would not be possible. Thus Pantheism is no religion at all, because God e.g., the Substance or the Absolute and individuals are both devoid of personality. This is the contention of some class of philosophers. But in the *vedanta*, (the highest form of religion in India) and in Sufism, the object of religion is an impersonal being. This form of religion is called Mysticism.

Mysticism is a type of religion, the essence of which consists in direct and immediate consciousness of the divine presence and immediate awareness of God (*aparaksanubhuti*). It involves an ecstatic condition in which the

soul of the worshipper becomes lost and identified with the deity (Tadatmya). The end or goal aimed at in mysticism is union with the ultimate one, a state of absorption in the All. It is the elevation of consciousness to a place in which the usual distinction between subject and object is obliterated and the whole existence resolved into oneness. The self thus identified with the object of worship is capable of an infinite vision. The mystic becomes acquainted with *ineffable* things. The mystic becomes aware of a realm of reality higher than the one with which we are acquainted through our senses. This awareness is attended with an unspeakable joy which a mortal being can never generally feel. Due preparation is necessary. Three stages of preparation for the attainment of such an experience may be indicated thus (as does Evelyn Underhill in her authoritative book on "Mysticism" bearing the same name): (i) The Purgative stage, (ii) the Illuminative stage and (iii) The Unitive stage.

(i) The negative or purgative stage means that it consists in emptying the self, i.e., in stripping oneself of those things which may distract the mind. "When we prayest, shut the door of thy senses, consider the outside of the worlds". When desires are quitted, suppression of sensuality and there is complete detachment from the life of the senses, it is then only that the contemplation of the Absolute becomes possible.

(ii) This stage is known as the stage of illumination. At this stage the inner eye of the soul is opened, and there is an insight into the heart of things. Thus wrote Augustine about himself—"I believe with mysterious light of my soul the light that never changes as if the day were to grow brighter and brighter flooding all space." (iii) The next stage which comes after full contemplation or meditation of the soul on the Absolute is in i.e., absorption or rest in the one. This is the consummation

in which the contemplative life of the mystic culminates, when the soul is at peace with the Absolute. The identification with the divine is the goal of all Mysticism. Thus the celebrated European mystic Eckhart says—"If I am to know God directly I must become completely He and not I".

Is not this merging of the finite self in the impersonal Absolute, tantamount to the loss of human personality? The defenders of mysticism deny this, and, on the other hand, claim that mysticism aims at the attainment of human personality in an overwhelmingly higher degree through communion with the highest being.

The organ by which the mystic attains the direct vision of God is not analytic thinking or intellect, but intuition (Scientia Intuitiva).

Intuition is the faculty akin to the aesthetic faculty of the artist or the superior insight of the poet, which does not, like the intellect, survey its object piecemeal from without but is acquainted with it by identifying itself sympathetically with the reality itself. It is the faculty of apprehension by the whole of one's personality which gives an insight into the inmost nature of reality. This faculty called 'the eye of the soul', the mystic holds, is latent in every man, and opens up only when sense-activities and intellectual operations are held in abeyance.

The ecstatic state, the attainment of which is considered to be the supreme end of mystic experience may be described thus. It is unique and incommunicable (anirvacaniya). Hence doubt arises (as it has arisen in the minds of many) as to whether such states are at all real and not a mere emotional rapture, a mere feeling, a purely individual experience. Much has been written on the question of the objective validity of the mystic experience; on the part of the mystic subjects themselves, there is never any doubt as to the reality which they *see* and *hear*. The

remarkable agreement among mystics of all countries as regards their method and result, is a strong evidence in support of the truth-value of their experience.

But undoubtedly there are differences in experience which cannot be regarded as purely subjective. For example, both the Christian and Hindu mystics have visions; but the contents of those visions widely differ. St. Teresa saw the Virgin Mary, the Sakta sees the goddess Kali, the Vaishnava sees *Visnu* and so on. It is apparent that the content of the mystic's experience depends on his previous history; he sees what he is prepared to see.

The fact is that there is an essential element as well as a non-essential element in the mystic's experience. The essential fact is the unmistakable expansion of the consciousness, the dawn of a new sight and a new life which overwhelms the subject, like what takes place when flood-gates are opened. Such a mystic element is present in every religion, and can be detected in the prayer which follows communion with God. Mysticism differs from ordinary theistic religions by the fact that ordinary religions are concerned with the practical problems of life and they develop in a moral atmosphere, by the mystic drunk with divine joy and in a state of intoxication with divine love, rises above all practical concerns of the world 'far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife'. It is worthwhile to recount in this context the four distinctive marks or characteristics of Mysticism, Eastern as well as western, after William James in his Gifford Lectures, "Varieties of Religious Experience". They are the following:—(1) Noetic quality, (2) Transiency, (3) Passivity, (4) Ineffability.

CHAPTER VI

GROUND'S OF BELIEF IN GOD

Theistic arguments or the proofs of the existence of God

I. ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT:

This argument finds in the very idea of God, the proof of His existence. When we search amongst the ideas of our mind, we find that there are various ideas of an innate character, for example, idea of the Infinite: idea of the Independent and idea of the All-perfect Being. From the very fact that we have such an idea, we conclude that such an Infinite, Independent All-perfect Being exists. In this way, Descartes puts the argument from effect to cause. Further he argues that nothing in the finite world could originate the idea of the Infinite. Descartes supports his argument by means of an analogy. He says, "when I examine the idea of the perfect being I find the existence of the being is comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of the three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle thus it is impossible to think the idea of Absolute perfection without the real existence. Before Descartes, St. Anselm in the middle ages gave a similar type of proof for God's existence.

But according to Kant, from the idea of God we may get the idea of existence of God, but not its real existence. Here Descartes made a confusion between the idea of existence and real existence. Kant maintained that if reality could have been deduced from mere ideation, then the mere (idea) thinking of a hundred thalers would have brought the thalers into real existence. Again, from the

Analysis of the Nature of Causality

Causality involves a relation between two distinguished as cause and effect, the second of this, effect must be some event or phenomenon, but the term 'cause' has been variously described as a thing, phenomenon, or as force. It is obvious that this description of cause as a thing cannot give us an adequate theory of causality. Causality always implies movement or change of somekind. Mere existence does not carry it this idea of movement. If a thing is to be a cause, it does something. "To be" is not the same thing as "to do."

In the next place, cause cannot be described simply as an antecedent phenomenon (Cf. Hume). This theory Hume does not give us any adequate conception of causality. His theory is that invariable succession is the only thing binding together cause and effect. When in our experience we see that without exception one phenomenon is followed by another and the order is never inverted, we call the first phenomenon as cause and the second as effect. Martineau criticises this theory of Hume by pointing out that causality is not successive; although the cause never succeeds the effect. It does not necessarily precede but may be simultaneous with it. In the first place, Martineau points out that unbroken succession does not imply causality. Mill tries to correct Hume's theory by pointing out that the antecedent will not be invariable, but also unconditional, i.e., the antecedent must be followed by the effect without being dependent on any other condition. This modification of Mill's theory leads to questions: "What is the cause of any particular effect?" And seeking to complete our statement of the cause, we are led to ask secondly, "What is the originating cause of all?" The first of these questions might, to some extent,

be answered by the theory of causality as held by Hume, Mill etc. But the second question cannot be so easily answered. If we are to find out the full meaning of causality, we must describe the cause as something more than mere antecedent phenomenon.

In the usual treatment of the terms 'Cause and effect', we are accustomed to use the dynamical aspects. We speak of force, power, productivity etc. Energy is supposed to be transferred from the cause to the effect. The cause is said to produce the effect. Thus we arrive at the idea of force as the essence of causation. The idea of force is altogether vague. But the force which is necessary for explanation of world or human action is not of this vague character. It is a definitely directed force and in order to understand how force, in general, may become a definitely directed force, we must make some enquiry as to the origin of the idea of force. The idea of power or force which is essential to the understanding of causation is obtained from our own activity. This activity develops within the idea of opposition between the self and not-self. A relation of reciprocity grows up between us and the world in which we live. When we are active, the external world seems to be passive and receive the result of our activity. When, on the other hand, the external world is active, we are passive and receive, by way of sensation, the results of the activity of external world. The general consequence of this relational reciprocity is that we attribute to the phenomenon of external world the same power of action as we have discovered within ourselves ("The ego and non-ego are known to us from the beginning as reciprocally uniting powers. When I am resisted and resolved to persist in my effort, I am conscious, of exercising a causal will in relation to external things. We are guided in this matter by analogy to our own willing and doing. We ourselves are the only causes of whose mode of action we have immediate knowledge".)

In ourselves, however, we discover something else mere 'force'. We discover that we can act in a definite direction. In other words, we are conscious of energy as the "energy of our will" and the chief characteristic of our will is the power of distinguishing between alternatives. (If we have already been led to think of the exercise of power of the world, like our own will, we now also think of this power as one which directs us to act in certain definite ways.)

Cosmological Argument

After this analysis of our belief in causality we proceed to the Cosmological argument. From our discovery of causality, we should carry with us the thought that it is an event or change which invites us to apply the principle of causality and secondly, that our trust in the conception of causality is obtained from our own will. Now the cosmological argument is an attempt to give a proof of the existence of God upon the principle of causality. We may take for granted that every event must have a cause, a sufficient cause. We seek for such a cause in relation to the particular event of the world. In the way we may seek for the cause of the world as a whole. We consider all the events of the world and we cannot be satisfied until we find the cause for them to be a cause which is itself uncaused.

The Cosmological argument is often called the argument from the contingency of the world. The contingent exists or the world of our immediate experience is contingent, therefore an absolutely necessary Being exists. It starts from the thought that the world as presented to immediate experience has in it no substantiality or independence. Its existence cannot be explained from its own mind in trying to account for it is forced to fall back on something outside of it and finds rest only in the idea

Being who is necessary, self-dependent and substantial (Martineau). We may look upon the world as an effect and we may argue that the First Cause is capable of explaining it. Whatever form the argument may take, it is based upon the feeling that the world and the things of the world are transitory and substantial. In whatever direction we look, we are impressed by the fleeting character of human life, the fragmentary character of our experience and the inadequacy of the satisfaction of our desire. Thus we seek for something eternal, something complete and altogether satisfied and out of such a feeling, the cosmological argument is born.

We take our stand on the principle that the world cannot be explained from within itself. We must show that the phenomena of the world, taken as a whole, are insufficient to explain themselves. (Can we look upon the matter of the world as eternal and as carrying within itself its own explanation?) It is obvious that the matter of the world is not permanent in the form which we know it. Chemistry has made great progress in reducing the number of elements of which the world is composed. But even, if we could reduce all the elements of the world to some simple atoms, we should not be any the nearer to the explanation of the world apart from God.

These atoms do not carry an explanation within themselves. It is impossible to discover their fundamental nature. There must be something more in them than mere physical quantity. And this mysterious element which we cannot fathom, would seem to show the affinity of the atom with something beyond themselves and probably the same is the Divine power. (Vide, Nyaya Philosophy).

Even if we were to admit that atoms were sufficient for their own explanation, they certainly could not explain the combinations into which they have entered. Whatever we may say of their constitution, they certainly seem to point

to a controlling power in regard to their arrangement. (It is impossible to think that the atoms could be taken counsel together about the arrangement of the world and it is equally impossible to think that mere chance have brought about the magnificent system of the universe which we know.) We must, therefore, conclude that matter in itself is not sufficient to explain the origin of the world.

The world is not self-caused but is the effect of a cause and power beyond itself i. e., to say it points to a supreme cause.

Kant's criticism is directed against the contention that we must suppose a supreme cause unless we are willing to embark upon an infinite regress. Kant, however, maintains that there is no real reason why we should ever stop the regress. It does not justify us in supposing a supreme cause. Kant also points out that the arrangement will lead us to a cause which is just sufficient to produce the effect. He would support Kant in this criticism. He says—"We can infer from finite effect is the finite cause or effect a series of such causes. (It is illegitimate to say that because we can think in terms of this theory of cause, we can therefore demand that this series should come to an end. What the cosmological argument really means is that we cannot be content with merely phenomenal and transient aspects of things. We must seek a fundamental and permanent reality behind the phenomena. We must seek the explanation under the material. Of course, the Cosmological argument can no longer be accepted in its solely deistic form which separates God from the World (and confines his action to the original act of Creation). What the religious demand demands is not a prime mover but an immanent ground.

We must argue from the whole changing scene of nature to that which makes nature possible. God is the true ultimate

being who gives reality to the changes of nature. In reference to Caird's criticism that the Cosmological argument gives us only a finite and not an Infinite cause, we may point out that in modern times, it is not necessary to look behind. Thus the conception of Descartes is that the idea of the infinite is prior to the idea of the finite. Each finite thing not only points to another finite but to the Infinite also. Moreover, we are not starting with the world as contingent i. e., with a world as pointing beyond itself for its explanation to the Infinite or as the potentially Infinite. In reply to Kant we may say that we cannot be content ultimately with the unending succession of causes. There is an inherent tendency in human nature to discover the starting-point of the series, any series of causes seems to imply the ultimate ground. The very fact that we are dissatisfied until we reach such a point, that there is in reality a starting-point that we desire.

Martineau points out that it is only in Theistic faith that we can reach such a starting-point. If we attempt to satisfy ourselves with materialistic answers, we never seem to reach the end from one cause to another cause. We must find something definite to start from, something which will give us the beginning of the world, the world which we know. The world we know must have been different from what it is, but as a matter of fact, it is just what it is we have to ask what gives its determinate character. From our study of the doctrine of causality, we find that it was from the nature of our own will-power that we discover the true meaning of causality. We may use the same principle in application to the world. We may argue that the cause or the ground of the world is a will like ours. We may point out that only such a cause can give us a resting place in the regress from cause to cause. Any exercise of will in ourselves seems to us a sufficient explanation of our action. In the same way, may the exercise of will in God, be the explanation of the action

of God which we find in the universe, "May his acts for ends? We must bear in mind our formal truths between possibilities give us a sufficient explanation that the world is an effect and we ask if, by further study determinate character which the world has, as compared of the effect, we are not compelled to believe that intelligence is an essential characteristic of the cause. What, then, with any one of the many possible characters which it might have had." Martineau points out, "In assuming there are some of these characteristics of the world which will that which makes the initial state out of the indeterminate seem to lead to such a conclusion? These characteristics to the determinate we, at least, provide something which are specially obvious :

know and which alone seems to be precisely what Selection or Choice : whenever we see things which want, the power of determining the contingent, of selection have no natural connection with each other, selected among possibles that which shall become actual. From many other possible things and brought together so as personal decision fails to explain an act and leaves to serve a special end or purpose, this indicates that mind has more to be said, so in an Eternal Living Will the simple been at work to select them and bring them together (Cf. conception we can form of the universal cause is some examples or evidences of selection in nature—the uncaused" (Martineau : A study of Religion, vol-I p. 2) requirements in respect of Locomotion, for example—the fins of fishes, wings of birds, legs of beasts). In all such cases, special forms are selected and adapted to the element in which they live, these limbs again are further modified into claws, hands etc. According to the nature of the creatures other organs (Cf. also the different organs of senses) are adapted to different forms of stimuli.

III. TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Teleological argument or the argument from the Final Cause :

The prefix "Teleo" is derived from the Greek word "Telos" i.e., 'end' or 'purpose.' This argument is called by the oldest, clearest and the most rational of all theistic philosophers. At the same time, it is best not to treat it independently but to take it in close connection with the cosmological argument. In the cosmological argument we found reason for believing in the First Cause of the world which is described as "will." In the Teleological argument, we ask whether we are justified in designating the cause as intelligent and as intelligent in the highest sense i.e., in the sense that certain ends are aimed at. In other words, we can find characteristics which can be explained only by regarding them as the result of intelligent and intentional action.

Can we find evidences in the world of the will-power of our own? We ourselves are conscious of acting for ends.

Does our study of the world enable us to say that God also acts for ends? We must bear in mind our formal truths that the world is an effect and we ask if, by further study of the effect, we are not compelled to believe that intelligence is an essential characteristic of the cause. What, then, are some of these characteristics of the world which will seem to lead to such a conclusion? These characteristics are specially obvious :

Selection or Choice : whenever we see things which have no natural connection with each other, selected from many other possible things and brought together so as to serve a special end or purpose, this indicates that mind has been at work to select them and bring them together (Cf. some examples or evidences of selection in nature—the requirements in respect of Locomotion, for example—the fins of fishes, wings of birds, legs of beasts). In all such cases, special forms are selected and adapted to the element in which they live, these limbs again are further modified into claws, hands etc. According to the nature of the creatures other organs (Cf. also the different organs of senses) are adapted to different forms of stimuli.

Combination or co-ordination : When we see many different things not only selected, but adapted and fitted to each other and made to co-operate we are compelled to accept a designing (intelligent) mind. Simultaneously, for a special end, then this is the mark of the designing (intelligent) mind—for example, the thickness of all the parts of the organism to each other.

Gradation : If we can discover ends or results in nature to be made by means towards higher ends and these again towards still higher ends, then this subordination of the lower ends to the higher ends, and this again to still higher ends is a mark of designing and adapting power of the ultimate cause, for example, 'matter arising into vegetable life, plant into animal life.' Plant and animal

life again become the means and support to mind.

Hence, if we can show that nature abounds with which cannot be explained in any other way than as combined and subordinated as a means to find out final ends, then our previous inference from the existence of the supreme mind, as a cause to the world will be Teleological Argument, which has thought as the most convincing of all. When we these characteristics together, we find that the world the whole, an orderly arrangement, and also there are number of particular adjustments of one part of nature to the other, so that all the different parts may be for a systematic universe. In the ordinary action of nature we select one particular line of action from amongst possible ones. We combine all the parts of our life into one permanent line or policy. We subordinate the Teleological argument is simply this that if we find the same characteristics in nature which we know of characters of intelligent will-power from our own consciousness, we may conclude that intelligent will-power is explanation of the construction of the world as a whole.

Wrong ways of stating the argument :

In stating the argument, we should be careful what to assume and what we want to prove. not, for example, speak of finding "instances of design in the world and then argue from such instances to a designer. The word "design" designates conscious intention and to say that at the beginning find instances of conscious intention in nature is the question. All that we should say is that we find characteristics in nature which we can understand by taking them to be the work of conscious purpose.

should call this argument not the "argument" from design but the "argument" to design.

The same remark applies to the other name, frequently given to this argument, namely, the argument from the final Cause. Usually we understand by a final cause an "end" which a conscious subject has in view and, according to the full use of the word, the final cause of this universe would be the end which God had in View in constructing.

But if we begin by saying that we find evidences in the world of final causes, we are again assuming what we want to prove. Such an argument would simply repeat in the conclusion what we have already assumed in the premises.

Besides the wrong ways of stating the argument, we may notice that sometimes wrong emphasis is being placed upon an otherwise perfectly correct argument. The older defenders of design argument concentrated too much upon the most striking adaptation of nature and specially upon adaptation which are useful to human beings.

The last point brought the whole design argument into dispute. It was easy to show that besides the instances of adaptations, there are many instances of disharmony, again, it was easy to show that adaptations to human use were not very conclusive. As a matter of fact, however, the attacks made upon the design argument have not destroyed, but have compelled the upholder to seek for it, the more secure basis.

They base their argument not upon external adaptation but the slow and continuous work of nature through centuries.

Substitutes for Teleology :

Various attempts have been made to show that Teleology is unnecessary. It has been argued that the marks which we take to be the evidences of intelligence, may just, as well, be regarded as due to some other causes.

The explanation of "automatism" is brought forward as said that apparently intelligent processes in the universe are just like an automatic machine to which we ascribe intelligence. Even though there are certain degrees of intelligence, namely, combination, gradation etc., they may have come in an entirely automatic manner. The universe, as a whole, may be automatic, and as such, the knowledge, which we get from our own nature, is unnecessary and illegitimate.

In reply to this, we may say, that as a rule, we regard things as automatic only, when we do not know the cause of them or when the cause obviously does not lie in the things themselves. It does not follow that such things are automatic. It only means that the cause lies hidden from our view, or at least lies outside the particular phenomenon. Moreover, a thing which we describe as a truncated cone, we should not take it, as if it represented the whole of the matter.

Further, if it is allowed that in our own actions we have one hand and in nature on the other hand, we have no characteristics and if we still argue that nature is automatic, we shall be driven to a contradiction. For, we should be arguing that the same effect can be produced by different causes in one case by conscious intention; and in the other by absence of conscious intention.

We should ask further whether automatism or conscious intention explains the greater number of problems which shall find that there are certain characteristics of our operations which cannot be explained by the "blind automatic force." We cannot explain in the fact that our present action is influenced by the past which have not yet come to pass. Our actions, we are guided by the anticipated results of them. But our action belongs to this sphere of mind and is a character

conscious intention. We may conclude, therefore, that the explanation given by automatism is inadequate.

Another substitute for Teleology is often found under the name of natural laws. Scientists have laid a great deal of emphasis on the conception of law and of thought that if they could succeed in showing different stages in the process by which things have reached in their present form, they have, thereby, excluded Teleology. They held that the laws of nature are sufficient enough to explain all about the world. In this connection, scientists lay particular stress upon the conception of evolution (mechanical form of evolution). We do not need the idea of 'purpose', if we can trace the development of the universe from its earliest form to its present form. This is all that is required. 'Accidental variation', 'natural selection' or the law of 'the survival of the fittest' together with a principle of heredity are sufficient to account for all the problems of the phenomena of the present world.

In criticism of this position, we might point out that there is no law is no explanation. When we discover a law of nature, we have simply found a conception, by which we may arrange, in an orderly manner, the effects of nature.

But we have not, in this way, given any explanation. We should not assume that a law can produce anything. On the contrary, it can only describe things after they have been produced. Explanation is arrived at only if we can discover the ultimate cause from which all the phenomena of the world proceed. A law can describe only the way in which the ultimate cause may work. It cannot be a substitute for the ultimate cause itself. In the same way, we might go on to discuss the evolution-theory (mechanical).

It is certainly true that the supporters of the evolution-theory have disturbed the position of the older Teleological writers. But still, we should not regard 'evolution' in itself as an explanation. There is not more power in evolution

than there is in a law. It is simply a conception by which we gather together several natural laws. It is the development of the universe must be taken place, but it shall not be regarded as an explanation. It may describe the way in which the universe when it has once been set going, has developed. Evolution is not successful in proving that "natural selection" is sufficient to explain the universe. All organisms tend to vary in an infinite number of ways, but only those variations which are suited to the environment, will survive. The present state of the world is due simply to the fact that the less suited organisms have disappeared. We should notice, however, that natural selection is a negative principle, rather than a positive one. The important thing to explain is not the rejection of the unfit, but as to how the organism can be there for acceptance or rejection. Evolution is a sufficient explanation of the different forms of life. We should remember, however, that the different forms of life must be there before natural selection can work on them. Different organisms must have certain definite characters which are accepted or rejected by the environment and are in search for an explanation of how these different characters came into existence.

In connection with evolution, a great deal has been said about 'accidental variation' or 'chance'. But for scientific reasons, it seems impossible to regard 'chance' as a satisfactory explanation of the world. 'Chance' gives us no satisfactory explanation of the constant re-appearance in nature of the unsuccessful types. If everything is left to chance, why should not the types which have been previously rejected reappear and destroy the successful type. This, however, we cannot find.

Secondly, if chance is to be operative everywhere, there is no security that the law of heredity will be observed. From this it follows that we have no assurance that favourable variations will be transmitted to posterity. If, however, these are not transmitted, then the principle of evolution theory disappears.

So, we may say that even if evolutionists are to put their own theory, they must admit something more than chance. Finally, we must take an account of the general considerations that chance can never be an ultimate explanation of anything. Chance is simply a confusion of own ignorance. When we say that thing happened by 'chance', we simply mean, that we do not know the cause. Therefore, we may say that for the evolutionists to put 'chance' in the place of God is really to put *nothing* in the place of God.

Objections to teleology :

In addition to the substitutes for Teleology under wrong ways of stating the arguments we may now notice some criticisms which are offered against this argument as actually stated. The first objection of Kant is that this argument does not prove an infinite intelligence of God. All that it enables us to establish is that God has sufficient intelligence to produce a finite Universe. In reply to this, we may say that this is all that this argument intends to prove in the first instance ; still, we find that this world is so complex, and its arrangement so intricate, that the Divine intelligence must be of an extremely high order. The wonder of the world is great enough to make us think of the Creator as possessed of superior intelligence.

The second objection is somewhat of a similar character. It is alleged that the argument proves only an intelligent artificer of the world and not a creator of it. God is simply supposed to arrange the material world and not to

create it. In reply to this, we may say that this arrangement is just what this arrangement intends to do. It does not profess to be independent of the other products of the Divine origin of the matter of the world. This argument, as it were, at a second stage and after we have discovered a first cause of the universe, it asks whether we are not compelled to regard this cause as an intelligent cause. It says nothing about the origin of the world, simply that the present form of an arrangement of the matter of the world indicates an intelligent designer.

Further objection is raised that if God is the creator of the matter of the world, His creation in the elaborate system of means discovered in the universe seems somewhat unnecessary. It works as if God were a man Himself by setting problems for Himself and then solving them. Why could we not put the matter of the world immediately, and at the beginning in the form which afterwards assumed? Does not His work by slow and elaborate methods seem to indicate a kind of weakness for God as if He has to struggle with a refractory material and could only by degree overcome the difficulties of this material.

The objection is based upon the immediate and simple action which is always better than an elaborate plan. Can we admit this contention? Is not our admiration carried forth by complex and elaborate scheme for the attainment of an end rather than by impulsive action? Would we really estimate the world more highly, if we could regard it as coming from God in a series of incoherent surprises? Surely all the orderly and systematic character of the world cannot be regarded as evidences of weakness. We cannot see why the divine power should be regarded as manifested in a single creative act than in gradual stages by which the present condition of the universe has been brought out.

The next objection is that this argument is an evidence of Anthropomorphism and is therefore, illegitimate. Anthropomorphism means a tendency to conceive God in the image of man and it must be admitted that Teleological argument is an evidence of this tendency, but it does not follow, therefore, that it is illegitimate.

We may point out that provided we refrain from ascribing to God the lower attributes of humanity the interpretation of God in terms of humanity cannot be forbidden. As it has been said, "God created man in His own image and ever since man has been conceiving God in the image of a man". The justification for the objection to Anthropomorphism is that it warns us against attributing to God the lower attributes of humanity.

The Final objection to teleology is based upon the general consideration that in proving the wisdom of the world, we have picked our examples. We have chosen illustrations showing clearness and we have overlooked the defects of nature. If we had considered these more fully, our conclusion might have been different. It is pointed out that there are many useless arrangements in nature, for example, the destroying of one species by another. It is also pointed out that the law of birth is unreasonable, inasmuch as more creatures are born into the world. Many creatures are simply prey to others and do not get a chance of full development, and in the human sphere it seems unreasonable that man should have such a small span of life and many of them should be cut off just in the fullness of their power (Cf. Martineau's Study of Religion Vol I).

In general, it may be said that even if the defects were much more than they are, this world would not diminish the value of instances of wisdom, where we have found them.

"Teleological proof is nothing but an extension of cosmological proof".


In this connection the question, 'how cosmological proof leads to teleology' will also be discussed.

The cosmological proof is sounder than the ontological proof. It has two forms, in the first instance, we start from the contingency of facts within the world. They either be or not be, so it is said that there is no element of necessity in them. This contingency, however, leads to something which is necessary and we have to postulate a necessary Being as the ground of the contingent. In our experienced world, effects are always preceded by causes and these in turn, are the effects to other causes. The chain of causality runs back step by step. But an infinite chain of causes is impossible, we must stop at a point (self-caused) and this First Cause is God.

Kant was no doubt right when he said that the ontological proofs would not yield a necessary Being over and above the given series of facts. Again, it may be asked, why the unconditioned Being said to be necessary? The answer is, 'in the current use of the word, is that which is not conditioned', in other words, determined to be what it is and not something else; and this idea of necessity shows that it is predicated uncritically of the unconditioned. It is derived from a necessary Being. On the other hand, we think the line of regress under the notion of effects and causes, there are just as good reasons for saying that the series can be extended indefinitely as that it must end in a First Cause. Then the causal series in the world are many fold, and it is not legitimate to assume that all the lines converge upon and end in a single First Cause. Is not the

a plurality of First Causes? Finally, there is the objection that the notion of cause is a category by which we connect and organize elements within experience and ought not to be applied without some reason and explanation to a Being supposed to exist beyond the experienced world. The truth is that, while the principle is sound that we should argue from the facts of experience to a ground of experience, the cosmological proof gives effect to this principle in a faculty and one-sided way. The line of proof, even were it purified of flaws, can not take us beyond the world-system, it cannot lead us to God in the theistic sense of the word. The teleological proof is rather extension, as a special application, of the cosmological than a separate argument. The teleological proof bases itself on the presence of order in the world; this order it takes to be the token of design, and concludes that God must be the source of the design of all the proofs. This, to the ordinary mind is the most simple and striking. Dr. Martineau points out that Selection, Combination and Gradation are the marks of an intelligent design. An intelligent Being selects his means, combines them in an order of gradation and God is the Intelligent Designer in nature.

Thus we find that in cosmological proof the world is taken as an effect, and from this effect, this theory tries to prove the existence of its cause, who is none other than God. So it is just a single step which draws a line of demarcation between cosmological and teleological proofs. i.e., in the first case, we proceed from effect to cause and, in the second, we proceed from design to designer. In other words, both the starting-point and the point of culmination are the same in both the arguments. Thus we conclude that the teleological proof is nothing but the extension of the cosmological proof.



VI. MORAL ARGUMENT

Religion is the knowledge and feeling on the part of finite minds of the relation between themselves and Supreme Mind on which all finite things and minds depend together with a conduct which the knowledge, and feeling give rise to.

The relation of the Supreme Mind to finite things and beings will be found to have these two aspects : (a) It will be dynamical or causal relation. The Supreme Mind must be regarded as a pioneer or source of energy determining existence, form and order of the world and giving existence or activity to both things and minds. This will include (1) the cosmological argument, and (2) the teleological argument.

The relation of the Supreme Mind to the world will also be a moral relation. The Supreme Mind must be regarded not only as giving existence and activity to finite minds but also as holding out to them an end or standard activity and a type of perfection, which by this activity are to approximate more and more and as judging them for or bad accordingly as they approximate to or diverge from this standard, for activity would be meaningless without something for which to act. Activity implies an end, therefore, God would not have given men activity without giving them something to act for as a law according to which it is to act.

Hence the relation of God to the world which religion assumes will be that of moral Governor and Law-Giver presenting to finite minds an end, activity and requiring them to adjust their activity. This may be called the 'moral relation' of God.

It will have to start from the human conscience, with its feeling and cognition of duty, obligation and responsibility to a higher power and the ideal which it gives of moral excellence and reason from this upwards to the instance

nature of the Supreme power, to whom all obligation is ultimately due, from the ideal of perfection which our conscience gives us upwards to the perfect personality in whom the ideal is realised. This is the moral judgement for the being of God, from the moral law to the law-giver.

The only satisfactory form of argument for the being of God is the one based on immediate perception or self-consciousness. This self-consciousness has two aspects, namely, Sense-Consciousness and Moral consciousness. This principle of "Veracity of consciousness" requires us to believe not merely what consciousness directly reveals but also what it indirectly implies.

In fact, the direct and indirect data of consciousness are co-related and both attain with them the same degree of certainty.

Our moral consciousness, quickened by conscience and stimulated by duty, reveals the existence of something Higher than ourselves—God, as a Supreme Moral Perfection, demands Moral obedience from us. These two implications, of course, have the same degree of validity, though it is not apt to be perceived by popular thought which admit the first, but is more or less doubtful about the second. We believe, then, in a God for exactly the same reason for which we believe in the existence of a material world outside us.

The object of the moral judgment is to prove the second implication of our consciousness. It may be thus formulated : God as a supreme Personality in whom the highest moral ideal is realised and perfected.

An analysis of moral consciousness shows : (a) Certain springs of action. (b) All of which possess certain units ultimate, unanalysable quality called 'goodness' or 'badness', 'rightness' or 'wrongness' which (c) can be arranged in a graduated scale according to the degree in which they possess the moral quality.

Now this difference of rank in our springs of action is not created by our own subjective and variable feelings; it is imposed upon us from without. This rising scale of moral perfection is not delusion (deception); its reality is testified by our conscience. This rising scale of moral excellence gradually leads the mind upwards till the conception of concrete personality, in whom the moral idea is perfectly realised, is forced upon the mind.

Again we classify our fellow-human beings as higher or lower in an ascending scale according to the degree in which the moral ideal is realised in their lives, and this also leads the mind to what we can conceive as Supreme Personality which is the eternal embodiment of the moral ideal.

God, as the supreme personality who imposes upon us moral obligations or to whom all moral obligations are ultimately due.

Conscience, not only reveals to us the rightness or wrongness of action but also imposes upon us an obligation to follow the one and avoid the other. Now obligation is a relation and involves two persons:—the person who imposes the obligation and the person who authoritatively is man himself, but who is the second person? A school of materialists holds that this second also is man, that all moral duties are due either to single individual man or to all men collectively, i.e. to the society and state, so that moral obligation does not point to anything beyond the world. But a large portion of our duties is indeterminate. For example, benevolence, charity which are not due to definite individuals. They cannot claim such things from us. Hence such duties are directly due to God and even in the case of determinate duties, for example, fulfilment of explicit contracts, it is evident that though they are proximately due to men, they are ultimately due to God, unless we feel that we shall be tempted to evade them whenever we

opportunities 'for doing so', hence our duty to man falls under and is included in our duty to God.

Thus moral obligation brings us into contact, as it were, with God as the judge or moral Governor of the Universe, requiring us to conform to the moral ideal which He constantly holds before us through consciousness.

We assumed before that moral intuitions are the same to all men—that the right is universally valid. But Hedonists deny this. They maintain that the rightness of an action depends upon its utility to the agent and to society of which he is a member. In other words, rightness of an action is not an ultimate quality inherent in the very nature of an action, but depends upon the collective judgment of our neighbours i.e., upon the *Social vote*. An action is right or wrong, according as society tries to enforce or repress it; similarly, moral obligation involves a relation, not between man and God, but between man and man, between the individual and society or the state. Martineau is of opinion that *rightness* is not a contingent thing, created by the arbitrary will of man, but that it is the Divine in the human.

The Indian View

"As you sow, so you reap" is the essence of the Law of Karma. According to the Naiyayikas, one enjoys or suffers according to his good or bad deeds. The Law of Karma or the Law of Universal causation implies that as bodily acts result into bodily changes and mental acts produce mental changes, so good or bad deeds from the moral point of view lead to reward or punishment, happiness or misery in this life or hereafter. The stock of merit of good deeds and demerit of bad deeds constitute '*Adrista*', literally an unintelligent principle. The '*Adrista*' being unintelligent cannot produce any change or consequence of actions; it requires an intelligent guide or agent. This agent is no other than God who guides the '*Adrista*'.

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God, as the supreme personality who imposes upon us moral obligations or to whom all moral obligations are ultimately due.

Conscience, not only reveals to us the rightness and wrongness of action but also imposes upon us an obligation to follow the one and avoid the other. Now obligation is a relation and involves two persons:—the person who is under the obligation and the person who authoritatively imposes the obligation. Now the first person in all cases is man himself, but who is the second person? A school of materialists holds that this second also is man, that our moral duties are due either to single individual man or to all men collectively, i.e. to the society and state, so that moral obligation does not point to anything beyond man. But a large portion of our duties is indeterminate, for example, benevolence, charity which are not due to definite individuals. They cannot claim such things from us. Hence such duties are directly due to God and even in the case of determinate duties, for example, fulfilment of explicit contracts, it is evident that though they are proximately due to man they are ultimately due to God, unless we feel that we shall be tempted to evade them, whenever we find

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Therefore God must exist for rewarding good deeds and punishing bad deeds either in or after this life.

There are certain other proofs of God's existence in the different systems of Indian Philosophy.

(i) Argument from the authoritativeness of the scriptures: According to the systems of Nyaya and Yoga philosophy, the authority of the scriptures is unquestionable in all religions, because the source of it is the supreme author i.e., God who has direct knowledge of all objects, past, present and future, phenomenal and noumenal. Thus the Vedas are the revealed books like other scriptures and cannot be the object of knowledge of any ordinary individual being. Since the Vedas are regarded as Revelation, the existence of God must be presupposed. These are

(ii) Argument from the testimony of Shruti. The scriptures (viz. Shruti) stand for the existence of God. The Shruti which is the expression of direct experience of God is the source of our belief in Him. Hence we must depend on the Shruti and on the Seers who have direct experience of God for proving the existence of God.

(iii) Argument from the Law of continuity: According to the Yoga philosophy, the Law of continuity means whatever has degrees, must have a lower and upper limit of it. In this sense, knowledge and power must have their limits. Therefore, the greatest knowledge and the highest power must have their limits in a supreme God.

(iv) Shankara's proof of God: According to Shankara the argument for the existence of God cannot be logically proved. Kant in the West also maintained a similar view at a later day. All proofs of God's existence are merely indications of possibility. The reality of God can be traced out by spiritual insight of seers only and not by rational analysis and comprehension as it transcends reason and experience. It is through the scriptures (Shruti) that we come to know that God is the creator, Maintainer and Destroyer of the Universe. The conception of Ishvara, Shankara holds, is not a logical truth nor a self-evident axiom, but a necessity,—a necessary presupposition of our experience which is practically useful for our worldly lives.

CHAPTER VII

GOD AND THE WORLD

In order to discuss the relation between God and the world, the following theories viz., Deism, Pantheism and Theism are critically discussed here.

Man's belief in God or gods is as old as his relation to the world. In his transactions with the world, he often finds himself so placed that his wishes, desires and activities, his coming into being and passing out of it, his good fortune and misfortunes i.e., is health and disease, are often beyond his control. Natural calamities in nature, like the wind and rains, storms and famines, also appear to him puzzling and mysterious. They create in him the conviction that he is too small and helpless. He thus comes to believe in a power which seems to control the destiny, not only of his own but also of the world at large.

Now the relation between God and the spatio-temporal world has been conceived differently by the Deist, the Pantheist and the Theist. All these thinkers believe in one God but they conceive the relation between God and the world-order differently. We shall now give the accounts of Deism, Pantheism and Theism respectively.

Deism: A band of English theological writers which included among others, John Toland and Chubb, revived the teachings of the Bible and accepted its cosmogony. These writers were called the Eighteenth Century Deists. They believed that God is the one fundamental rational principle who created the world out of nothing by His fiat or will at some point of time, before which God was without His World. Without the World He was a self-contained

Reality. World, therefore, is not necessary for God's existence and the relation between God and the World is conceived in an arbitrary fashion. God exists outside and independent of space-time order and is unaffected by its imperfections. He creates the world, but after creation the world is run by itself in accordance with its inherent laws without co-operation or interference from the creator. Just as a mechanic leaves his created machine to go by itself but intervenes only at times of occasional necessity.

Dr. Martineau in his "Study of Religion" says, "The World was created in time, in course of time it will perish like everything, which has a beginning, after which its Divine cause will exist to eternity without it." According to this theory (Deism), God is the First Cause of the world and its inherent laws and forces operate as secondary causes. God transcends the world completely. He is not immanent in it.

But the deistic idea of God as purely transcendent and external to the world-order makes God finite and limited by the world, alien to Himself. It gives rise to the difficulty of creation at a particular point of time. What, we may ask, was God doing before creating the world and why did He choose one particular moment and not another for creation? Was He imperfect without the World? Why did He create such a world and no other? What need had He for a world at a particular time? The theory of creation contradicts the scientific evidence of evolution. Again, Deism believes in Divine interference. It is an anthropomorphic conception. It makes God behave like a human artificer, who interferes with his machine to mend it at times.

It is irrational also to think that God, whose very essence is ceaseless activity, should withdraw from the world after creation, and lapse into inactivity. Martineau truly says, "To an Eternal Being, Eternal Life i.e. Eternal action,

must be an essential element of perfection : all cosmic power is will ; and all cosmic will is His. He is the one cause in Nature acting in various modes".

Deism believes in the existence of God as a self-conscious Being before creation of the world. But self-consciousness depends upon a distinction between self and not-self.

So God could not be self-conscious before creation. God, before creation of the world, was an unrealized potentiality without concrete manifestation, and unconscious without any object of thought. Moreover, the natural laws and forces cannot act of themselves without the guidance of God. They are not "Secondary causes", but are the transmitters of the energy of God which sustains the world. Thus Deism as a doctrine of the relation between God and the world is an inadequate conception of God and the inadequacy of Deism led to Pantheism as a reaction against it.

Pantheism : Pantheism, as a doctrine of the relation between God and the world, literally means that all is God and God is all (*Pan*=all, *theos*=God) or more commonly, the world is God, and God is the world. It is a reaction against Deism which makes an absolute separation between God and the world. Spinoza, is the author of this doctrine in Modern Philosophy. Pantheism regards God as wholly immanent in the world, and tends to identify Him with it. It denies transcendence of God.

According to Pantheism, God is the *antaryami* or indwelling essence of everything in the spatio-temporal order, which is fully dependent upon Him for its being. God alone is real ; and apart from God every other thing is unreal. Thus the world of space and time, taken by us as different from God, is an illusion. The world and finite souls are engulfed in the Divine substance.

Pantheism is abstract monism. It recognizes the reality of One God, and denies the reality of the finite selves and

the world. It sacrifices many to one—Plurality to Unity. But unity without plurality is an unreal abstraction. A concrete unity is a unity-in-plurality. God is Infinite. But the Infinite is expressed in the finite. If God is the only reality, man as distinct from God, becomes an illusion. Hence the relation between the worshipper and the worshipped becomes impossible. Pantheism denies human freedom and undermines morality. Flint says, "If human personality and freedom are illusions, then must obligation and retribution be the absurdest fictions. Pantheism makes human beings merely puppets completely dependent on God and having no independent and free status."

Moreover, the distinction between man and God is essential for religious aspiration of man; but pantheism merges man and world in God—which is untenable. Pantheism contradicts the testimony of our experience also. We are clearly conscious of ourselves as distinct selves endowed with self consciousness and self determination. But Pantheism does not agree with it. Further, if God is identical with all things then there is gross materialism which takes the spatio-temporal world as the only reality. A thorough-going Pantheistic world-view will lead to Materialism and make Religion impossible.

Hegel's view of the relation between God and the world has also been interpreted by his left-wingers, like Fechner and others. Fechner, dissatisfied with the tendencies of contemporary science and theology to make an absolute separation between God and the world, tries to identify them on the analogy of intimate relation between soul and body in human personality. He thinks that the entire physical world is the body, whose indwelling soul is God. An important point of distinction between Spinozism and Pantheism of Fechner seems to be this that while in Spinoza the substance is a psycho-physical whole in which the physical and the psychical, nature and mind, are regarded as

having equal status and as running parallel to one another, in Fechner the reality (substance) is also a psycho-physical whole, yet nature is only external appearance or body whose indwelling soul is universal consciousness. The universal consciousness is thus the inner reality and determines nature as its phenomenon. Here we get the cardinal principle of all idealism. Hence, his Pantheism is generally known as Idealistic Pantheism.

The Idealistic Pantheism of Fechner also fares no better than the traditional Pantheism of Spinoza, except in one respect that the external world of matter is allowed only a dubious kind of reality as it is supposed by him to be the body of the all pervading universal consciousness which is the truer reality. Individual selves are absorbed within the universal consciousness and with them also their personality. The ethical consequence of both traditional and idealistic forms of Pantheism thus appears to be equally dubious. Hence the inadequacy of Pantheism paved the way for Theism.

Theism : As Pantheism arose as a reaction against Deism, Theism arose as a reaction against Pantheism. Deism conceived God as wholly transcending the world. Pantheism went to the other extreme and conceived God as wholly immanent in the world. The conflict between Deism and Pantheism is the conflict between the complete transcendence of God and the complete immanence of God.

According to Theism, as maintained by Martineau, Lotze and others, God is immanent in the world, but not in the finite minds. The opposition between Pantheism and Theism is to use the words of Dr. Martineau, the opposition between "All-immanency" and "some-transcendancy". Theism holds that God transcends the finite minds which are external to and outside of God, and are free to act of themselves. Theism holds that finite minds have been created by God and have been endowed with freedom of the

will, so that they may be regarded as "secondary causes" having the power of free initiation.

Martineau, in his 'Study of Religion' says—"The whole external universe we unreservedly surrender to the Infinite Will, of which it is the organized expression. But the voluntary nature of moral beings must be saved from Pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as within the sphere, a free cause other than the Divine, yet homogeneous with it."

Theism is right, when it affirms that God evolves and sustains the world by his divine will and transcends it by definite power extending far beyond the limits of the world. But it is wrong when it holds that God wholly transcends the finite spirits to save them from Pantheistic absorption in the Divine will.

Finite spirits are not absolutely free. Martineau admits that human wills are second causes, "We are second because there is a first (viz. God), in relation to whom we are effects; we are causes, because, in spite of this, we are not only effects, but are constituted with a will and directed faculties, which have a store of power at their disposal to be thrown on the line of this possibility or of that, and are therefore mere implements or media for executing the volitions of another."

According to Theism, then, human freedom was derived from God at first, but after its origin it is quite independent of the divine will and absolutely free. Martineau says "God may be the cause of all our possibilities, without being responsible for our actualities." He has partly determined the general outline of human actions, but not the concrete details. God is partly immanent in man also in another sense. He reveals Himself to man as the Moral Law or the Moral Ideal; the voice of conscience is the voice of God in man. The difference between the Theistic view and our view is this:

Whereas Martineau takes the Moral Law as the command of God who is outside our minds and thus imposes the Moral Law from without, we take it to be the voice of God who is not outside our finite minds but is immanent in us as our Ideal self, and inspires our Moral Ideal, since, "moral obligation must essentially be self-imposed", the Moral Law must be imposed by the self upon itself, by the Ideal self (which is the finite reproduction of the Divine self) upon the actual self.

The Indian view:

From the dawn of Indian Philosophy we find that the hymns of *Rg-Veda* refer to some deities, namely Indra, Varuna, Agni etc., which are conceived as realities underlying and governing the objects of nature. The Law of *Rta* controls all objects of Nature and living beings of the world. The Vedas are regarded as Henotheistic Polytheism. It is admitted in the *Rg-Veda* that the different gods are only manifestations of one underlying reality. In some hymns, all existent things are conceived as parts of one Purusha who pervades the world and remains beyond it. In some other hymns, it is stated that the Reality can be described neither as existent nor as non-existent—it is the indeterminate, indescribable Absolute.

The Absolute Reality of the Upanishads is described as *Brahman*, *Atman* or *Pure Sattva* (Being). *Brahman* is conceived as the ground of all reality and consciousness on the one hand, and as the source of all Bliss on the other. *Brahman* as *Ishvara* is the efficient and material cause of the world. Hence the world is real.

Reality has been interpreted by Shankara from two different stand points. According to Shankara, God (*Ishvara*) is the creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world, so the world is conceived as real from the *Vyavaharika* standpoint. God is Omnipotent and Omniscient. God

is regarded here as the *Saguna Brahman* and as such He is the object of worship. But God is regarded as Impersonal Brahman, pure Being or Consciousness from the *Paramarthika* or metaphysical standpoint. Here God is *Nirguna*, indeterminate Brahman Who alone is real. The world is nothing but illusion. Thus we find that Shankara believes in Immanence and Transcendence of God, from two points of view—Empirical and Transcendental.

But Ramanuja maintains that the world is real, because it is the creation of God and God is the only reality and therefore God's creation is real. God creates the world from matter within Him. Thus Ramanuja's doctrine is theistic.

In this way we find in Indian Philosophy that the relation of God to the world is described in some theories as immanent (which leads to Pantheism), in some other theories as transcendent (which leads to atheism on the one hand, Absolute Monism and Deism on the other), and finally as both immanent and transcendent (which leads to Theism).

GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE

The sense of affinity between God and man is a fundamental but by no means the only element in religious consciousness. It is over-whelmed by the feeling of a great distance between God and Man and by means of something in God, which is unique and incommunicable, Religious experience has, from the very beginning, been deeply tinged with the emotion of awe in the presence of a mysterious power. In the higher religions too God is regarded as the ultimate source not only of values but also of power.

Here we are led to such questions as these : How far is the idea of God's power to be pressed ? Is it so overwhelming as to leave room for no other ? Or is it in some way limited ? However, it is clear that God's power must have some limit. For if unlimited it would seem that it can scarcely be called power at all, for if there is no resistance, power is absolutely superfluous, if not meaningless. Thus we seem left with the idea of one Being, an indivisible, all-inclusive Absolute, outside of which there is no other or within which all things are embraced. In other words, on the one side it may be held that God is the ideal tendency in things—the rest of the universe being, so to speak, the environment within which He strives for the realisation of His increasing purpose. On the other side, it may be said that He is the all-inclusive Absolute, the Totality of things, regarded as one comprehensive system without environment. What, again, is the status of human persons within the system of the universe ? Are they real individuals existing on their own rights ? Or are they but modes or functions of a single Absolute Reality, the only true Individual, there is, or can be ? These questions seem to converge on one main issue : Is the God of Religion identical with the Absolute of Philosophy ? Or, are we to think of God, as in some sense finite, ultimate indeed for Religion, but for philosophy merely a kind of "half-way house" between the finite and infinite ? We are thus face to face with the ultimate problem which may be variously described as the problem of the Absolute and God, of one and many of immanence and transcendence etc.

Identification of God with the Absolute : We begin with those theories of the Absolute, which are monistic or Pantheistic. This type is represented in antiquity by the Eleatic School.

(a) **Spinoza** is the first great absolutist thinker of the modern age. To him God is identical with the Absolute,

with the Infinite Substance which is the only reality. As is well-known he made the Cartesian dualism of thought and extension his starting-point, but transformed Descartes' two ultimate substances into one Infinite Substance, with thought and extension as its attributes. There is only one self-subsistent being. Particular things and beings, freedom, time, change, developments—all these are transient modes, or appearances. They are even illusions.

It is obvious that the Substance of Spinoza is essentially a principle of identity. There is nothing to explain why the unity should even in appearance be broken up into multiplicity, why the infinite should appear in the guise of innumerable finites, why this world of illusion should be there at all. It has been well said that the substance of Spinoza is like the lion's den to which many paths lead but from which no path leads out. The equation, Substance-Nature means that nothing is actual, save the necessary and nothing is necessary, save the actual. It banishes all distinctions of better and worse. For whatever is, is good. Every thing is necessary in its appointed place within the whole. There is no room here for individual initiative, for movement, or for time. All is eternally complete like the truths of mathematics which do not become but are. Here is indeed a 'block-universe' "whose parts have no loose play".

It is true that these phrases cannot do justice to the sublime elements in the teachings of the 'God-intoxicated' man. But though his system, looked at from one point of view, culminates in a lofty mysticism in which the Soul seeks to realise its freedom in union with the whole and finds its highest life in the 'intellectual love of God' which 'is part of the love where with God loves Himself, looked at from another point of view it lapses into sheer naturalism or 'polite' materialism. For it reduces the realm of ends and values into a rigid determinism in which moral distinctions cease to have a meaning. He identifies God with

Nature, which though it be spelt with a capital 'N,' becomes under his analysis a mechanical system wherein the soul is but a reflex activity mirroring a natural process. Reality is too rich and complex to be imprisoned within the rigid walls of Spinoza's Monism and the solution he offers is too concise and meagre to do justice to all the facts. It is an accepted truth that moral and other values are ultimate constituents of reality. Therefore we cannot accept the theory that makes the universe viewed "*Sub Specie Aeternitatis*" a system which is beyond good and evil.

(b) Hegel: Like Spinoza, Hegel also regards finite world and finite spirit as differentiations of the one all-inclusive Absolute. But he differs from Spinoza, in fact from all other monists, in his insistence on the idea of logical development as essential to the very being of the Absolute. Like Spinoza, he regards the universe as a unitary and eternally complete being. But whereas Spinoza's substance is conceived statically, what we have in Hegel is the dynamic self-evolution of the Absolute Idea, after the manner of a living spirit. He discovers a living principle of differentiation at the very heart of identity. This principle of differentiation within the unity of the Absolute he interpretes in terms of what he calls the dialectic movement of concepts. In the opinion of Hegel, concepts are even passing beyond themselves into each other by their own immanent dialectic. According to him, every notion suggests its opposite. But thought cannot rest satisfied with contradiction. The same immanent logic that leads from thesis to anti-thesis leads also to a synthesis or principle of reconciliation, whereby the contradiction is resolved into a higher unity. But that unity again suggests its anti-thesis and again the eternal antagonism is transcended in a still higher and more inclusive unity. Thus the dialectic process goes on culminating in the ultimate synthesis of the Absolute Spirit within which all contradictions fall, but by

which they are all transcended in a comprehensive unity. The Absolute is the entire system of internal discords transmuted into ever richer harmonies and into the harmonious unity of the whole. The evolution of the universe is thus identical with the logical self-development of the Absolute, outside of which there is nothing. It is obvious that Hegel identifies the Absolute of his philosophy with the God of Religion. Philosophy is to him the rational explanation of the true content of religious faith, and the only difference between the Absolute and God is that the former is the ultimate reality interpreted in terms of pure thought, whereas the latter is the same reality represented pictorially, i. e., in terms of imagination and emotion. Example of Trinity —

Thesis. God the father. — Absolute as pure Idea.

Anti-thesis. God the son. — Absolute as objectified in Nature.

Synthesis. God the Holy Ghost Absolute as the return of the object upon the subject. The purport of this is to show that the life of God and the history of the universe are one and the same thing, viewed from two different stand-points. It is just the logical, self-evolution of the Absolute Idea.

Criticism of Hegel: It cannot by any means be denied that Hegel makes a most serious and strenuous attempt to work out the true idea of the universe as a significant whole and to eliminate from it every trace of contingency, and irrationality, or whatever might appear even in the least degree to make it a multiverse rather than a universe. It can also claim great practical value in that it meets man's deep long craving for stability amidst change, offers a rounded completeness in a world of fragmentary experiences and many apparent imperfections.

But in other respects it fails to satisfy the demand of the mind and the heart. It is true that Hegel discards static

concepts and laid great stress on the idea of development. But according to one main line of thought in his philosophy, the development is merely a logical and not a historical one. It is purely formal and schematic, and does not imply any real strenuousness or output of energy. It costs no effort, on the part of the Absolute, for a logical concept to evolve its own opposite or for both to generate a higher synthesis. Conflicts are explained by the mental contradiction of concepts. But conflict between disembodied thought-entities involves no real physical or psychical wear-and-tear. "Bloodless categories have no blood to shed," hence the battle is no more than a sham fight and its issue is a foregone conclusion. There is no real change as we know it in experience, for the movement is purely dialectical. All this arises from Hegel's one-sided intellectualism. His world is nothing but a net-work of logical relations. The Absolute has no history and the Absolute never comes out into the open on the field of human experience. From the point of view of Eternal Being, time and history are illusions.

But at times no one seems to have a greater sense of the importance of history than he. Time is real at least in the sense that it is the field within which the Absolute comes to itself and attains full consciousness. But as indicated earlier, the other equally fundamental side of his teaching reduces history into a mere spectacular show,—in which "we are no other than a moving row of visionary shapes that come and go."

There are many passages in Hegel which make it abundantly clear that in his opinions the conflicts of life and history are but appearances of an eternally complete Absolute which has no "unfulfilled purposes or unsolved problems and which needs not wait upon us."

But as Pringle-Pattison says in commenting on this passage, this is, "to paralyse our energies at their source, if

the antagonisms of moral life are not real, then we have no standard of morality left."

Further Hegel's theory provides no satisfactory status for individual persons. Individuals like ourselves shrink into the position of mere adjectives of the Absolute which alone has substantial reality. Man becomes a mere passive tool yielded by the Absolute rather than an active co-operation and partner with God in the spiritual enterprise. The swallowing up of the individual by the universal leads to the annihilation of ethical values. From the standpoint of Eternal Being there can be no evil or sin. Everything is good in its place.

Here we have a "spherical system with no loose ends", a closed circle in which the ideal and the real coincide, and there is nothing really unaccomplished. Obviously, this is a view fatal to the idea of progress and which gives no standing ground from which to criticise things as they are.

Hegel's theory, again, leaves unanswered the question,—"why should Absolute Perfection to which there is nothing 'unaccomplished' delight in creating the illusion of imperfection?"

Hegel identifies his Absolute with God. But we cannot accept the view that the Being which is a more apotheosis of an impersonal logical process, which supplies us with no criterion of distinction between the *is* and the *ought* is the same as what in Religion we mean by God. Hegel seems to oscillate between two ideas of God or the Absolute. According to the first, God is the Absolute existing timelessly in static perfection; according to the second, he is identical with the process of development.

(c) **Bradley:** We now come to the Neo-Hegelians, especially Bradley and Bosanquet, who are all inspired by the central vision of the whole in the parts and of the parts finding their truth and meaning, only in their proper place within the whole.

Bradley's theory of Absolute is more akin to Spinoza's than to Hegel's. He makes little or no use of the Hegelian principle of self-development of the Absolute through time, and carries on a vigorous polemic against the reality of time as such. "The Absolute, he repeatedly mentioned, is timeless, has in itself no history or progress. On one important point, Bradley differs both from Spinoza and from Hegel—he sharply distinguishes the Absolute from God, while admitting that the idea of God tends to pass into that of the Absolute. "The Absolute for me" says he, "cannot be God, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will. When you begin to worship the Absolute or the Universe, and make it the object of religion, you in that moment have transformed it. It has become something forthwith which is less than the Universe." A personal God "is not the ultimate truth about the universe." This does not mean that the idea of God's personality is not relatively true. Personality of God has a partial value in so far as it satisfies the popular religious consciousness. But ultimately this has to give place to the conception of the Absolute.

From the above notion of the ultimate reality of the Absolute the illusoriness of finite selves follows as a corollary. As there can be no distinction in the Absolute, since it transmutes all distinctions, plurality of souls is to be regarded as an illusion.

In spite of the marvellous subtlety and energy of Bradley's arguments, it must be admitted that he professes to preach a doctrine that is impossible. Religion cannot be content with worshipping a Supreme Being who is discovered not to be supreme at all but to be the appearance of a greater and more ultimate Being. Nor does it become clear to what extent Bradley's God is intended to have an Ontological status. Is He supposed really to exist

any-where in the universe? In spite of his assurance that though God is not ultimately real, He is yet emphatically "more real than you or myself", the general impression left in one's mind is that He is an unsubstantial theophany which may, at any moment, be withdrawn into, and lost in the Absolute.

We are said to have an all-pervasive transfusion of soul in the Absolute. But Bradley is here proving too much. Even though all might be illusion, finite selves cannot be so. They must really exist at least to be the victims of illusion. Finite selves are real also from the point of view of the Absolute; for, the creation of souls, constitutes the very essence and opens secret of the Absolute life. When Bradley speaks of the transmutation of the finite souls, he looks upon the selves as mere bundles of qualities. But that they are not. They are self-conscious individuals existing for themselves and are not merely impersonal qualities.

As a compensation for the "fundamental inconsistency" of the religion and all other forms of human consciousness, we have an empty, abstract and inscrutable Absolute, which has no history, no life, no movement—whom we cannot properly call beautiful or moral or true—which has no quality that we can know except a purely formal and barren self-consistency.

(d) Bosanquet is another renowned Absolutist. He insists that there can be one true or complete individual—the Absolute,—which, like Bradley, he refuses to identify with God. He recognises both the distinctness of finite selves and their existence in God. But he emphasises the unity of the finite self with God so much that he considers the reality of the finite self not as vital. The unity of selves in the absolute is the essential fact, their difference is inessential.

(e) Royce, the famous Absolute idealist of America, agrees with Hegel in that he equates God with the Absolute.

In spite of these divergences, Absolute Idealism is characterised by a sustained effort to see reality as a unified self-determined whole to which all things are organic, and by the refusal to accept any fragmentary or isolated piece of experience as affording a clue to the nature of that reality.

But the Absolutist Philosopher fails to do justice to human and personal values, as well as to the universe in its totality, because he regards these values as fragmentary experiences which are transmuted beyond all recognition in the totality of things, instead of accepting frankly the highest values we experience as the best available clue to the ultimate reality.

It is true that the individual can find his true meaning only in the context of the universal, but this does not mean depriving the individual of his uniqueness and permanent value. It is, on the contrary, the very condition on which the individual can attain fullness and abundance of life. There is indeed a force in the universe working for an ever richer and more inclusive unity, making for a totality in which all individuals shall become part of a harmonious whole. But side by side with that tendency, there is a tendency making for greater individuations. The highest kind of unity is not the static unity of the Absolute. It is the dynamic unity of the Society of souls realising their highest destiny in love and in mutually enriching fellowship, which is only possible where each has a unique individuality of his own and respects the individuality of others, but yet where each does not lose, but finds himself in others. God himself is alone and needs such a society. The absolutists need to set a higher value on the Many as well as to respect the claims of the One.

Pluralism advocates the claims of the Many as against the One of the Pantheists and Absolutists. It stands for the philosophical attitude of those who are more impressed by the multiplicity and variety in the world than by any

underlying principle of unity or identity. In its idealistic or spiritual forms it regards the world as made up of a vast number of spiritual units or souls, which are not mere appearances of the Absolute, but are, on the contrary, modes or appearances of one all-inclusive reality.

(a) **Leibnitz** may be regarded as the founder of modern Pluralism. For Spinoza's One Infinite Substance Leibnitz substituted a plurality of independent finite substances meaning by 'substance' not something static or inert, but that which is essentially dynamic and active. These individual substances he called 'monads' which he regarded as self-sufficient centres of energy, containing within themselves the source of all their own activities. The monads were arranged in a series, at the lowest of which were the atoms and at the highest God. Since it is of the very nature of the soul that its activities are spontaneous and not controlled from without, it follows that the monads cannot directly act upon or influence each other. In the famous words of Leibnitz, "The monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out." It would seem that the view leads to sheer chaos and anarchy, and a multiverse in which there are as many worlds as minds. "A world.....is independent of everything else, except God." But the qualifying epithet "except God" indicates the way in which an attempt is made to save the situation. For ultimately all monads are dependent on the "will of God" through whose intervention the unity and harmony of the world is preserved. There is a pre-established harmony "among the monads in accordance with which each expresses the one and the same universe from different points of view."

Thus the unity of the world is saved, but only at the expense of the absolute independence and spontaneity of the monads, which are now seen to be controlled from

above and to be fore-ordained to express the universe as a whole.

The reason for these may be traced to the fact that unqualified and absolute pluralism is impossible. Plurality to be intelligible must have reference to some background of unity.

The next question before us here is: What place does Leibnitz assign to God within the whole?

In answer we are told that the place of God is within the system of things. He is the absolute ground of the world-unity. He is the original simple substance of which all created monads are the products. Here, indeed, the position of Leibnitz is not far removed from that of Spinoza. But this must not blind us to the suggestiveness and value of his emphasis on the principle of individuality and freedom.

Modern Pluralism is characterised by a rejection of this highly artificial doctrine of Pre-established harmony and denial of the possibility of direct interaction between finite spiritual beings. There is also a tendency to assert that God in some sense must be regarded as finite.

(b) **Howison** is an uncompromising pluralist. He believes in a "universal world of spirits, everyone of whom is free, and not operated either directly or indirectly from without by any other". The selves constitute an "Eternal Republic", the unity of which is the result of a spontaneous harmony from within. The Republic of souls has 'God' for its central light. He exists only as the centre of a circle, eternal and indissoluble.

(c) **James** prefers a universe "with ragged edges and loose connection of parts to a closely knit... universe." The assertion of God's finiteness, definite and unqualified character has found place in James. God is only one of the distributive world. He and we stand outside of each other. If the absolute exists at all, it is not to be identified with

God of religion. God is the name only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person who calls us to co-operate with his purposes and who furthers ours if we are worthy.

(d) Ward takes his stand on experience and gives us a genuine plurality of individuals. He believes in the existence of the infinite variety of selves. The highest self is not an absolute really including them. The world is the joint product of these souls mutually striving for the best mode of existence, and so fashioning a system analogous to a social order or state. The medium in which these multitudes of individuals work, is real time. (Instead of the timeless Absolute as the sole reality we have here a strong insistence on historical development in time as constituting reality. But unlike James, Ward lays special emphasis on the fact of unity and harmony. To him history shows that all development is towards more and more unity and harmony, and towards the production of apparently over-individual ends. The 'wild universe' of William James does not give Ward any guarantee that all will end well. This sense of inadequacy in Pluralism leads Ward to conceive a more fundamental standpoint than that of the many, namely, that of the One that would at once furnish an Ontological unity and insure a teleological unity, i.e., the One as the ultimate source of the Many and the ultimate End of their ends. (The idea of God is necessary to unify the world and give meaning to history, time, and progress. Though God is the Creator, the creation implies a limitation of God. For the world consists of the created creatures who are themselves creators, possessing freedom and power of initiative.)*

*For Conclusion see Author's "Important Philosophical Essays"

The Attributes of God.

Every religion in whatever stage of development it may be, assigns some predicates to the divine being. These predicates are called the attributes of God. They arise out of the religious consciousness of man, for every religious man endows his God with some attributes. These attributes are mainly of two kinds :

A. The metaphysical attributes.

B. The moral attributes.

A. *The metaphysical attributes* are the qualities which the rational element in our religious consciousness must ascribe to the Divine Being as the world-ground. These are the qualities which must belong to God as the ultimate principle of the universe, the originator and the sustainer of the world of things and minds. Our reason cannot be satisfied unless these attributes are assigned to God. The following are the metaphysical attributes of God : (a) omnipotence, (b) omnipresence, (c) eternity, (d) omniscience, and (e) unity.

All religions, above the lowest stage of spiritism attach these predicates to their God, at least in a degree relatively superior to that in which human beings possess them. Gods are universally esteemed to be super-humanly powerful; they can always be on the side of the worshipper, they know certain things hidden from man and if they are not immortal their lives are, at least, more enduring than those of men. The conception of the utility of God, i. e. of the oneness of the Divine Being is, however, late in the development of religious consciousness.

(a) Omnipotence—God, as a creator and sustainer of the universe, must have power. At every stage of religious development, God is endowed with power, but the attribute of power expands into omnipotence only gradually with the growth of religious development. The conception of omnipotence has a negative as well as a positive aspect. Negatively taken, omnipotence means that the Divine Being

is dependent on and bounded by on other thing, so far as possession of power and exercise of power are concerned. Positively taken the attribute means that all possible and actual energies of finite things and of selves have their source in God i. e., He is the inexhaustible fountain of the entire manifestation of the energies in the universe. The whole realm of mundane existence is *sustained* by his activities.

The question whether anything is impossible for God, whether God has the power to do what is absurd, has often been raised in philosophy. But it has no relevancy in relation to God, for the ideas of possibility and impossibility have significance only in relation to finite dependent beings. The next vexed question is whether omnipotence of God is consistent with the existence of evil in the world. If God be an omnipotent being, how can He allow evil to exist in the world? This question is discussed under *theodicy* or the problem of evil.

(b) Omnipresence—Negatively taken, it means that God has no limitation from space i. e., God is unlimited in space. In primitive religions, gods are local and have peculiar habitations. In pantheism, the activity and influence of particular deities are restricted to particular spheres. In monotheism, God is everywhere present, as we find for example, in the Old Testament—"If I ascend up to the heavens, thou art there; if I make my bed in the sea, thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uppermost part of the sea, even then thou art there, have Positively taken, omnipresence means that the sphere of the divine activity extends everywhere, his work is felt everywhere."

The presence of God must, however, not be understood in the Spatial sense, for God is spirit. God is omnipresent in the sense that He is the ever-present ground of the world. The omnipresence of God may be understood by an

analogy with the spiritual principle or soul, which pervades the whole body without being located in any part of the body. God pervades the universe without being located anywhere.

(c) Eternity—Negatively taken, the predicate means that the activities of gods are not subject to the limitations of time. God had no beginning in time nor will He cease to be in time, the conception of the origin and development in time has no application to God. Positively taken, the predicate means that whatever changes take place in things and minds in the time-order; have their ground in the Divine Being.

(d) Omniscience—This quality has also negative and positive aspects. Negatively the Divine knowledge is not subject to the limitation of space and time. Distance in time and space puts no obstacle in the way of Divine knowledge. All human knowledge is liable to error, on account of the limitations caused by the piecemeal process of finite minds and also on account of the imperfect process of acquiring knowledge. The divine mind is not subject to the human type of reasoning; objects are not given to Him from without; they are dependent on Him. Consequently, the Divine knowledge is not ratiocinative. It is obtained by what may be called, after Schelling, *intellectual intuition*. God has an immediate apprehension of the whole, His knowledge is scientific intuition. Positively taken God is conscious of everything that happens within the universe. His consciousness embraces all finite consciousness. He is Universal Consciousness.

It must be acknowledged that Divine knowledge is a difficult embarrassing problem. For the question here is, how is human self-consciousness, which is the basis of morality and religion, consistent with the all-embracing Divine consciousness. There is also the other question, e. g. how Divine fore-knowledge is possible, if there is free will

on the part of man. This difficult problem has been much discussed by philosophers and theologians from the earliest time, but without any satisfactory solution. The plausible solution is that how men will exercise freedom which is contained in the all-embracing Divine consciousness, the channels along which the human freedom will be exercised, are conditioned by the wider activity of God. Hence the spontaneity of human beings may be embraced within the larger providence of God.

(e) Unity—As stated before, the conception of the unity of God-head is of much later origin. Negatively, it means that there are no gods or separate divinities. Positively, it means the oneness or aloneness of God, as a supreme Power and as a supreme Mind, which unites in itself the powers attributed to the different gods in polytheistic religions. Different deities are called different manifestations of the same supreme e.g. God in the Hindu religion.

B. *The Moral attributes of God*—The moral attributes of God are those qualities, which must be ascribed to God to satisfy the emotional or practical demands of our religious consciousness. The emotional and practical sides of our nature cannot be satisfied, unless these attributes are ascribed to God. The following are the moral attributes of God: (i) Love and benevolence towards all sensible beings. Love and benevolence are the highest springs of human action. These could not have been implanted in us by a being who himself does not possess these attributes. But we cannot say that human passions also belong to God in the same manner. For passions belong to us as finite imperfect beings, and they have been given to us for defensive purpose in our struggle against other creatures. Therefore they cannot belong to God.

(ii) Justice: Justice is a necessary supplement to benevolence; for, indiscriminate benevolence is a weakness and not a virtue. Our conscience leads us to believe that

God distributes rewards and punishments to his creatures, according to their moral worth. Hence Justice must be an attribute of God.

(iii) Mercy (Grace and Goodness): God favours those only when their moral strivings participate in the Divine nature.

In ascribing attributes to God, we must be careful not to be guilty of the charges of anthropomorphism. Men have always shown a tendency to ascribe to God in magnified forms what they find in themselves, with the result that God becomes only a magnified non-natural man. Hence anthropomorphism has been the subject of Philosophical criticism from the earliest times. Xenophanes, the great Greek Philosopher, tauntingly said that if horses and oxen could paint, they would have painted their Gods as horses and oxen. Some modern thinkers have so great a fear of the charge of anthropomorphism that they fight shy of ascribing any attribute to God. As said before, if this obligation be enforced fully, we are led to the absurd position that God cannot possess any attribute, of which we have any idea and that he possesses only such attributes, of which we have no idea. (As remarked before those attributes which are finite and relative in their scope cannot be ascribed to God without anthropomorphism but there are some attributes e.g. wisdom, mercy etc. which are unlimited in their scope and therefore can be attributed to God without incurring the charge of anthropomorphism).

God as an ethical being: A view has been getting into a prominence recently that their is a realm, beyond good and evil, and that God is a being who is supra-moral and who should not, therefore, be clothed with ethical qualities. Goodness has no meaning apart from evil, the idea of good is the indispensable correlative of the idea of evil. Hence "good" always presupposes "evil" which opposes it; consequently, the sphere in which ethical qualities play part is

one in which there is an opposition between good and evil. When we pass beyond this region of struggles, the ethical qualities, at the same time, drop off as bearing no significance at all. Consequently the attributes, which we employ in the sphere of human relations, have no meaning in the realm beyond human relations. Therefore, "when we speak of a moral God, we make God too much a man".

In order to refute this objection we have to remember that ethical attributes, when applied to God, have a deeper and richer meaning than when applied to man. "Divine goodness is essentially different goodness. Goodness in man has been gradually and strenuously developed by overcoming the resistance of evil; but the divine nature is intrinsically good. Goodness in man is the fruit of a struggle and, consequently, it is a thing which is progressively attained. The divine goodness is not so, it is by its very nature perfect".

To dislocate moral qualities from God is to deprive religion of spirituality. A God without ethical qualities would not be a God of religion for man. A God who is a non-moral being cannot be the true object of religious worship. Hence we cannot dissociate moral qualities from God. Ethical ideas of God are not deduced from our idea of God by a process of inference; they are demands of our spiritual consciousness. In short man does not argue himself into a belief in a moral God; the whole spirit and tendency of man's religious life imperatively call for it.

God as a Personal Being :

All forms of working religion regard God as personal. As God is regarded as responsive to man in the way that a human being can be responsive. Man is made in the image of God and as man is personal, God also is regarded as personal. We can have communion in the real sense only between other minds and our own, and the religious sense

of communion with God implies the notion of God as a personal Being. It may be difficult to determine the exact nature of God's personality as distinguished from human personality, for God transcends our knowledge. Again, there may be some metaphysical difficulties with the notion of a 'person'; yet that God has a personality, in some sense, seems to be a necessary postulate of religion.

Lotze does not question the personality of God. He attributes personality to an Infinite Being without Sacrificing self-consciousness which is the essential characteristic of personality. But he is inclined to question 'personality' as an attribute of human beings. All that we can say is that God is the highest Personality and we are lesser persons, reflecting more or less the supreme personality. In saying that God is a person, we are not dragging God down to the level of human beings but raising man towards God in religious communion. Human personality is not infinite, it is only progressively developed. Complete personality, as Lotze puts it belongs only to God as an Infinite Being while to man belongs a faint copy there of.

"A person" is an individual substance of a rational nature. It has two aspects. (i) A person is an individual having its own unique nature, not found in others. (ii) Again, a person is of a rational nature which is a universal property common to many individual persons. While all persons are individuals, all individuals are not persons. A 'personality' thus is a self-conscious self-determined being and it is a spiritual existence. It is never fixed and static. It is ever growing and dynamic. The more these are experienced, the more adequately and forcefully the inner bond is established, and thus the Supreme Personality is the all-comprehensive, and all-systematic experience. Through such organisation of experiences, a person becomes self-conscious and in the realization of personality, we are free and self-determined.

If "self-conscious" spirituality is a connotation of personality, a person is necessarily limited and finite. A self requires a not-self outside it to be conscious of itself in the background of the not-self. If God is a person, he will be limited by the objective principle against which he is self-conscious. But we have seen that human personality and God's personality are not of the same kind. We may think of God as the all comprehensive experience outside whose life there is nothing. Thus He is truly infinite. The objective principle and the duality of subject and object may be involved in the all-embracing sweep of God's experience and there may be internal differentiation in God's life. The opposition of self and not-self falls within God's nature and thus God can be a person without being finite and limited. Of course how this is possible in detail is not known to us, as the essence of the infinite principle is unfathomable by our intellect. God's nature cannot be fully and completely known by us so long as we are on this final level. The conception of ultimate reality as unitary, all-comprehensive experience is most satisfactory to the philosophic speculation, and it satisfies the yearning of the devout soul. The absolutists like Bradley and Sankara believe that the Ultimate Reality transcends personality. It is Supra-personal, including personality no doubt, but something more. With such a colourless Absolute, there cannot be any communion and absolutism, in a sense falsifies religion. The highest with us is personality and thus supreme reality to us must be a personal experience, however different it may be from our personality.

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION AND THE ULTIMATE REALITY

The question that now lies before us is, "Are human values objectively true?" Or, are they but figments of the human mind? The religious consciousness derives much of its strength from the conviction that values are real, and as the ground of all values cannot be regarded as a fiction.

But this conviction is rudely undermined by those theories which attempt to deny all values from the world. Prominent among those theories are Materialism, Naturalism and Pessimism.

Both Materialism as well as Naturalism interpret the universe in the terms and categories of Natural science, rather as ultimate and exhaustive in the realm of reality, or at least as the most adequate of which the human mind is capable and which, therefore, rejects as futile all attempts to interpret the world in terms of spirit, value and purpose.

For materialism, the system of nature with which the physical scientist deals is thought to be the ultimate reality. Matter alone is real spirit, as the existence of anything other than mere modes of matter is categorically denied.

The real difficulties of the modern mind with regard to religious faith do not lie in the direction of materialism with its wholly unwarranted reduction of the qualitative riches of the universe into mere modes of matter in motion regarded as the only reality but by reducing all things to matter, and thus making the lowest common measure of all things the absolute ground of them all, materialism is guilty

of over-simplifying, in an almost naive way, the complex facts of life and of the world.

Naturalism refuses to dogmatise about the nature of the ultimate reality. It regards both matter and spirit as substance to be unknown and purely hypothetical. We can know only appearances and never the reality behind them. By phenomena or appearances it means primarily phenomena of the physical world. Spiritual phenomena are regarded as mere epi-phenomena.

Naturalism, as characterised by James Ward is "materialism with most of its consequences but divested of its metaphysics. The difference between Materialism and Naturalism is purely nominal. For, in the best analysis the system of nature is nothing but a ceaseless redistribution of matter and motion under the sway of mechanical forces. Naturalism reduces man to a conscious automaton, consciousness being an unimportant and superfluous appendage, mysteriously attached to the body. By parity of reasoning we must infer that if in such a mechanistically determined universe there is no room for a God, He too can be nothing more than the shadow which accompanies the movement of the cosmic automaton.

Criticism : The naturalistic hypothesis has great methodological value for scientific purposes. The mechanical theory enables the scientist to attain a high level of accuracy within the sphere of investigation he has marked out for himself. It helps him to get rid of all irrelevant categories.

But it ceases to work if hypostatized and universalised into an all-inclusive philosophy. As a scientific method within selected areas of experience, it is valuable, but it is unconvincing. Naturalism excludes meanings, values, purposes, ideals, which are essential features of the world of

experience. Its success lies in the sphere of description ; it fails absolutely in the realm of valuation.

Even within science we notice a gradation of strata. The method of naturalism is, in the words of Pringle-Pattison "interpretation of the higher by the lower, or interpretation by reduction." Sociological and psychological phenomena are interpreted in terms of biology, the biological are reduced to the level of the physico-chemical, and these again to bare quantitative relationships. The world's wealth of meaning is lost in the dance of atoms, life's variegated landscapes become one arid desert, and whatever daylight we enjoy passes into a starless 'night in which all cows are black'.

The naturalistic thinkers regard mind as an epi-phenomenon, an impotent appendage to the human organism. It is utterly useless and it has no part to play in the economy of things. But it is a fundamental tenet of the naturalist that nature eliminates everything unnecessary through Natural Selection. Consistently with this view that which is of no use to the struggle for existence should not have been repeated throughout the ages. Yet we notice this very repetition. What does it signify ? Though the naturalistic writers remain curiously silent, we can find an explanation of this repetition in the fact that far from being unnecessary, the mind is of vital importance in the process of evolution. The entire logic of life goes against the naturalistic presupposition. Man's spiritual endeavour is in the 'conscious automaton' theory turned into superfluous images in an impalpable mirror. This is something which we cannot simply stand.

The bearing of all this on the question of the truth of Religion is obvious. Our religious consciousness proceeds on the assumption that the supreme values of life are not mere conventions pitted against the nature of things, but that the ultimate grounds of things as revealed to us in the

universe is akin to what we recognise as the highest and the best in our own experience. But naturalism depicts a nature which is coldly neutral and indifferent to the highest and best in our experience. Human values sink into insignificance against the background of the gigantic mechanism of the universe with its cold impersonality and sheer physical determinism. To the ordinary individual there seems to be much in our experience which seems *Prima facie* to support the naturalistic assumption. Nature is not hostile, for hostility implies interest. Nature is coolly and crudely indifferent to human welfare. The mechanism of natural law seems to be cruel, "not with the ferocity of a tiger, but with the dull insensibility of a cartwheel which will roll over a man's neck as easily as over a flint". Moreover, the automatically working laws of Nature seem to recognise no distinction between a saint and a sinner, between a man of genius and an imbecile, as in an earthquake or shipwreck.

But the question is whether the world is a place that conduces to the development of personality, and whether the very neutrality of the world may not be another name for justice, which is always impartial and allows no room for favouritism or differential treatment. This will be discussed shortly. Suffice here to say that all idealistic philosophy agrees with religion in refusing to interpret Truth, Beauty and Goodness as accidental by-products resulting from the mechanical clash of molecules and electrons. We regard them as blossoms whose roots are in the deep subsoil of the world rather than as by-products of a machine. They are, in fact, authentic revelation of the character of reality.

Pessimism and the problem of evil: To naturalism the universe is ethically neutral neither good nor bad, coldly indifferent to merely human values. But to pessimism, the world is positively and fundamentally evil, or evil is so

prominent a feature of it that if it can be said to have a purpose at all it must be a malevolent rather than a benevolent purpose. Here we are confronted with the problem of evil, which baffled the deepest minds of all ages.

The fact of evil is patent to all. There are at least four kinds of evil in the world,—pain, error, ugliness and sin, corresponding to the ultimate values of pleasure, truth, beauty and goodness.

Pleasure is not regarded as a supreme value. Yet we expect the God-governed world to be one where there is perfect adjustment between virtue and happiness.

These evils are usually classified into two groups—Physical evil (pain or suffering) and Moral evil. The question that confronts us is, "How in a world, created by a Perfect God, is evil possible?"

Existence of suffering: As to suffering, harrowing pictures might be drawn of the pain and suffering that are in the world much of it apparently manifested. Besides the cruel sufferings which the Struggle for Existence involves in the animal world, there are those innumerable tragedies of private life which are no less painful to those involved, e.g., poverty, disease, madness, and the petty anxieties and worries of daily life. Such experiences as these have led pessimists of all ages to say that, "all is vanity and a striving after wind". This mode of pessimism has sometimes developed into a distinct philosophy, as in the case of Schopenhauer, for whom life is not only evil, it is an essential evil. For to live is to will, to will is to desire, to desire is to feel the want of something, which implies a defect and therefore suffering. It is to be noted that the problem of evil can arise only within the sphere of the religious life. It presupposes the religious point of view though it challenges it. Apart from a prior belief in the goodness and power of God no issue is raised by the existence of sin and suffering. If the world is the sport of blind forces that have no conscious-

ness of what they do, the question why the righteous suffer and the wicked enjoy has simply no meaning.

Pessimism: Many questions may be evolved from the problem of Pessimism but some of them viz., "What is pessimism? Is pessimism antitheistic? Or, what is the bearing of pessimism on theism?" will be discussed here. Pessimism implies that the world is fundamentally evil, and if it has any purpose at all, that is a malevolent one. Such a view originates from the conception of the fundamental frailty of human efforts and achievements. Everywhere in nature we see continuous strife, competition, conflict and a suicidal alternation of victory and defeat. We can never escape from the clutches of evil though for the time being we may feel happy.

Theism, on the other hand, proclaims that evil is nothing but an apparent state of feeling. Beyond this, there remains the eternal peace, bliss and happiness. We the finites being ignorant, cannot always introspect into this state and so allow a pessimistic outlook to develop. God, the All-Perfect personality, expresses Himself in and through all worldly things and beings, and thus the world can never be fundamentally evil.

So we see that both pessimism and theism present two contradictory attitudes regarding the fundamental nature of reality; while the former maintains the eternal existence of evil, the latter denies it. One believes evil as the prime-mover and the other proclaims goodness to be so.

Now, let us see how far the distinction is tenable. Are they really contradictory? Is pessimism really anti-theistic?

A close analysis of the nature of both these theories will suffice to show that though pessimism presents an opposite view of theism, yet it indirectly emerges out of theism. The existence of evil, by its very conception, implies the existence of goodness. A thing can scarcely be called good

until and unless we see it in contrast with what is evil or bad. Pessimism starts with a prior belief in the existence of evil and apart from such a prior belief no issue is raised in the goodness and power of God. Thus it is revealed that theism finds its strong basis in the fundamental postulates of pessimism.

Pessimism, from another point of view, helps to frame a theistic attitude in us which incites our spiritual abilities to prove their actual operation through the struggle with the evils to overcome them. Pessimism gives an open challenge to theism and theism accepts it.

Here we may refer to the views of Indian philosophical systems which are often branded by the western interpreters as pessimistic. But a critical study of this system will prove that though almost all of these systems spring from a spiritual disquietitude and malady of the soul (dissatisfaction) which certainly bear a pessimistic note, yet they are not indeed in pessimism. Pessimism in Indian Philosophy is initial but not final. These thinkers believe that in the perspective of eternity there remains no evil but a state of perfect peace, bliss and happiness. This state of liberation reveals the nature of good God and thus contradicts evil. How can a pessimistic theory reach such a theistic conclusion? Can pessimism being anti-theistic bear such a message of hope and satisfaction?

The philosophy of Schopenhauer is often described as pessimistic. But this attitude also rests finally on a positive state of bliss and happiness similar to Buddhistic conception of Nirvana. He (Schopenhauer) proclaims pessimism as an "affirmation of the will to live." How can such a will be possible if the life is not worth living, due to the existence of evil? Thus it also indirectly implies something more than mere pessimism.

Finally this may be said that pessimism is not and can never be anti-theistic, though at the outset it appears to be

so. We, for the satisfaction of our spiritual selves believe that beyond all our finite limitations there is a state of complete perfection. Both pessimism and theism approach to that ultimate goal in different ways. Thus though they differ in their starting-point, they do not wholly differ in their ultimate conclusions.

THEORIES OF EVIL

Evil is explained away: Evil is non-existent from the highest point of view. The universe in reality is perfectly good. Evil is non-existence, illusion, negativity.

Spinoza: for instance, identifies reality with perfection. He says that the infinite substance, which is the only reality is beyond good and evil.

Hegel also regards evil as unreal, it exists for a partial point of view, but disappears from the point of view of the whole. Evil is a necessary stage in the dialectic movement from mere innocence to rational self-determined virtue.

Leibnitz's world-view is very different from that of Spinoza and Hegel, since he does not say that evil is unreal. But he too regards evil as ultimately due to privation or defect. He traces back physical and moral, to what he calls 'metaphysical evil', the limitation of being which necessarily belongs to everything less than God and the imperfections which that limitation involves. The evil, which thus from a partial point of view seems to be a discord, to the enlarged outlook seems to be subserving the harmony of the whole.

All these theories are inadequate in as much as they ignore the positive aspect of evil. It is small comfort to the acute sufferer to tell him that his sufferings are nothing but an illusion, or a limitation of being, due to his finiteness.

sin is a terrible reality to him who experiences it, and the higher point of view of philosophical wisdom is untrue to facts if it ignores the experienced reality of pain. The case is all more difficult with respect to moral evil. Moral evil seems to be a final flaw in the scheme of things which no higher point of view can evaluate or transmute into a good, it turn into a mere negativity. The experiences of guilt, repentance are unique—irreducible experiences—and as such testify to the facts that so far from being good in the making, sin is sinful.

Dualistic theory: Evil has an independent reality, co-ordinate and co-eternal with the principle of the good. How can the evil be resolved into the other. It is a view which, in various forms, prevailed among the ancient. We have it in the Religion of Zarathustra, in which there is absolute antagonism between good and evil, symbolised by light and darkness and represented by the two gods Ahura Mazda, and the Ahriman, neither of whom can triumph except at the expense of the other. We have it also in Platonism and in the teaching of the Gnostic and Semi-gnostic Maricon.

All such theories are attempts to relieve God of all responsibility for the evil that is in the world. But they only have God's goodness by surrendering the idea of His omnipotence and omnipresence, and positing, in however disguised a form, the idea of finite God. We cannot deny that there is need of "qualifying the idea of absolute omnipotence by the recognition of limiting conditions". But these conditions must be self-imposed and not imposed by an independent and alien power. The divine limitation must be self-limitation. It is impossible for thought to rest content with the idea of two co-ordinate powers or principles. By no such easy "division of labour" can the problem of evil be solved,

Physical evil: It is a truism amply verified in experience

that pain has great disciplinary and educational value. We do not deny the existence of evil. But we do not think after the manner of the Pessimists that the ideal of existence is purely hedonistic. They assume that the perfect world would be one in which there would be unalloyed happiness. Even judged by that criterion it would seem that the deepest joy is only possible at least for finite beings against the background of some pain. A paradise which is all roses without thorns is too insipid for human beings to enjoy for any length of time. But mere enjoyment is not an adequate end of the creative Purpose, nor is God a 'Santa Claus' whose business is to make his creatures happy. The real question is whether the world, as we know it, is a fit medium for the development of character. As a matter of fact, it is not in the pampered and coddled lives that we find the richest character developed, but in lives that have confronted and come out of fiery furnaces purified. Just as a bird cannot fly except in a resisting medium, so the resistance of a physical environment involving possibilities of pain and defeat are necessary conditions of character.

Moral evil: The possibility of sin is the logical corollary of moral freedom. There can be no real virtue without the possibility of vice. The total exclusion of moral alternatives would mean the reduction of the human to the mechanical. A world of infallible marionettes might be an amusing pantomime for some supra-mundane spectators, but it would certainly not be a moral world and would in no way be an improvement on the world as we know it. It should be always kept in mind that the instincts, appetites, impulses, which are transmitted to us by heredity and the influences which come to us from our environment are but the raw materials of our character. They become moral, in so far as they are welcomed in our personality. Sin is thus the perversion of freedom. The Moral order, from the human side, is conditioned by choice, effort, conflict. The conflict

no mere sham fight, it is the moral equivalent of war. This does not mean that God is a mere idle spectator, taking no part in the conflict, that having endowed man with moral freedom He had divested Himself, of all further responsibility. It is still God, who guides our destiny. This may be the ultimate autonomy of the spiritual life, but we may partly solve it by remembering that God does not work in us by compulsion but by suasion, that His Omnipotence is the omnipotence of Love, not of physical force. The divine self-limitation, again, does not mean withdrawal from the area of human life. God is ever the Captain of our salvation.

PROBLEM OF EVIL

Here a question may naturally crop up: Can there be any Evil in the world created and governed by a perfectly good and omnipotent God.

The presence of Evil over against the reality of God in the world is contradictory.

The question has been disturbing the minds of different thinkers from the ancient period to the present. It is a commonsense belief that God is all-good, omnipotent, creator and sustainer of the world. It is also believed that evil is present in the world. Further it has been proposed by different thinkers that God cannot be made responsible for the evil of the world which is His creation. But the moral attitude to this problem is somewhat critical. According to it, the main factors responsible for evil are:

- (1) The fact of evolution both physical and moral;
- (2) The new adventures of life;
- (3) The possibility of man as an individual.

Spinoza says that evils are due to our narrow outlook on things, and that evil appears as such only because we look at things from the standpoint of particular interest. According to him, "evil is real no doubt but not ultimately real." He identifies reality with perfection and establishes his thesis, *sub specie Aeternitatis*, i.e., every thing is good, or perfect and because it is good or perfect, it is real. Hence reality according to him, is beyond evil. To Hegel, "evil is unreal, existing from a particular point of view but disappearing from the point of view of the whole." Thus we find that both Spinoza and Hegel stand charged with making evils unreal illusion. Here Lotze's remark will be helpful, "evil is not simply a deficiency of good as darkness of light." There are many other theories which seek to explain the mystery of evil by explaining it away, i.e. by denying its real existence.

Among the different kinds of Evil viz., metaphysical, physical and moral—the old theologians of the mediaeval period maintain that moral evil was originated first and natural evil was added as penalty of human transgression. Moral evil or sin according to them is a consequence of the power of self-determination. God has given men the power of self-determination i.e., the power of distinguishing right from wrong and freely choosing one from them. In some cases men choose what is wrong and thereby moral evil arises in the world; therefore, God has not created moral evil in the world, rather it is due to the free will of man. Evil is human creation, a worldly affair having no bearing on God. Similar to this view Leibnitz points out that moral evil is not due to God but it is the necessary corollary of freedom of will of men. He also says, physical evil is not an evil but simply a means to realise some divine plan or purpose and it is necessary as a means to an end. In his theory he puts forward the argument that the imperfection which is inherent in finite things is the source of evil in the

world, though he admits that, "this is the best of possible worlds". Hegel observes that sin is a matter of the will, what seems evil from the finite standpoint is nothing but "good in the making". The attitude of Bradley or Bosanquet in regard to the problem is almost the same. According to them, "evil is good in the wrong place."

There are some other thinkers who describe evil in a more positive and definite way. They connect evil with matter. Matter is the original source of evil. The positivists also hold that good and evil are both real and limited to certain condition of worldly affairs. Goodness is determined by the welfare and badness or evil is determined by the hindrance towards the achievement of welfare.

Thus there are some modern thinkers who maintain that God is the creator of the world He would seem to be responsible for everything in it e.g., sin and sufferings, good and evil etc.

The theories which interpret evil as mere privation of good or as due to a merely partial point of view (and therefore not to be counted in the sum of reality) are inadequate explanations of the experience of the positive aspect of evil. All such theories attempt to relieve God of all responsibilities for the evil of the world but they only saved God's goodness by surrendering the idea of His omnipotence and omnipresence. Though Bradley says, "God must have a certain indirect responsibility for evil and of course a more direct responsibility for moral and physical evil in the world," it may now be ascertained that there is no ground for believing that sin is good in disguise, that its presence in the universe is not inconsistent with an overruling purpose of good (God).

Objectivity of Values and God as their ground : The truth of the religious world-view is largely the question of the objectivity of human values. The objectivity of values is most obvious in the case of Truth. It is almost a univer-

sal conviction that Truth is, in its very nature, objective. In knowledge we pass beyond the world of the particular into a world of universal Truth. To say that a thing is true or false is to pronounce judgment on the particular in the light of the universal, to view the partial in the light of the whole.

Goodness, however seems to be more subjective than objective. For moral distinctions are valid only in reference to human character. Even within human life the standard of morality has often been identified with the pleasurable. But such identification cannot be accepted by the moral law which makes a distinction between what is pleasant and what is right, and demands that we do the right when it is unpleasant as well as when it is pleasant. Nor is it true to say that we approve simply what we desire. The moral consciousness distinguishes between desires that are to be suppressed. This implies the existence of a criterion other than desire by which the desire itself is judged. Thus we are led towards the conception of the moral law which is Supra-Individual, but with which the individual voluntarily identifies himself.

Beauty, however, seems to be unquestionably subjective. Every individual seems to be his own final court of appeal as to what objects are to be called beautiful. But Beauty, like Truth and Goodness involves a criterion which is absolute and imperative, which is above us. Yet it finds a response within us. Artistic beauty is not the arbitrary creation of any individual. It is an interpretation of the soul of reality in terms of sense.

Thus the three supreme values—Truth, Beauty and Goodness are aspects of an inexhaustible reality dynamically and progressively revealed to us and as such they are revelations of God himself.

It may be objected that while these values are supra-individual, they are not supra-human or supra-cosmic. They

are objective and universal only in reference to Humanity. Thus the authority of the Categorical Imperative may be interpreted simply as the apotheosis of social custom, demanding conformity to the individual. But this is unsatisfactory, in as much as it does not explain the possibility of progress. The prophet of a new and higher ethics is not satisfied with the prevalent moral convention but feels within him the challenge of a higher imperative than that of social custom.

Again it may be urged in the manner of Comte, that Humanity as a collective entity is an object of worship in a godless world, and has no relation to the non-human world.

But humanity, isolated from Nature is a mere abstraction. Man is not an alien but a native citizen of the universe, and when we are looking within him we are looking into the universe itself. There is a deep unity between the causal world of science and the world of values.

The belief in the objective validity of value on the one hand and in the ultimate unity of the causal realm and the realm of ends on the other, seem to imply or demand belief in something very much like the God of religious faith. On the one hand Truth, Beauty and Goodness are three converging lines which find their meeting-point in a Being who is their common fountain-head. On the other, God is necessary as the common root of the 'is' and the 'ought', the factual and the valuational.

It may be objected that this whole argument is too anthropomorphic. But in a sense it is impossible for us to think of good except anthropomorphically. To take our richest experiences as a clue to the deepest nature of reality is to think that the best in man is continuous with what is most fundamental nature. This seems to be the right thing of anthropomorphism. Our value-judgments are parts of self-revelation of ultimate Reality pulsating within us.

Freedom and Sin : A theistic theory of the universe which affirms the divine creative activity asserts a responsibility on the part of God for the world He has created. The creator must be responsible for His creation. At the least He had made possible the evil He could have prevented. But if we accept a deterministic conception of the human conduct, we must say that God who is himself ethically perfect, directly willed the existence of moral evil, even though He willed it as a means to good. For, in this case man's actions will proceed necessarily from his original nature, and the development of sin from the character of man as it reacted to the stimulus of experience. In any case we seem forced to face the conclusion that in willing the being of man God also willed the existence of sin.

The word 'freedom' has been used in two different senses. First, it has been used to signify the harmonious realisation of the good in human character. So conceived, it denotes an ideal rather than an accomplished fact. For man in this life, can never reach a perfect and complete self-realisation.

In the next place, freedom signifies freedom of choice. About the fact of choice there is no dispute but there has been much controversy whether the alternatives presented to the will in given case are really open or not, i.e., the individual who has elected to do evil, might have chosen to do good instead.

The determinist or the necessitarian denies the existence of open alternatives. According to the hard necessitarian, a man's deed follows strictly from his motives, and his motives are determined by his nature and environment. Motives act and react upon one another in a more or less mechanical fashion, and in the results, the strongest motive prevails. Everything is strictly determined. If mechanical determinism is true, the individual is no more responsible for his good or evil deeds than he is for his stature, or the colour of his hair.

Criticism : Rigid determinism reduces deliberation to a meaningless superfluity. There can be no meaning of choice or deliberation, if the strongest motive always asserts itself by its own inherent force.

It is a serious error to say that motives and acts are related by a mechanical causality. Only by an entirely wrong abstraction can motives be separated from the self, for both spring from the character of the self and represent its activity. The interaction of motives cannot be understood without a self and accounts for interaction.

Self-determinism accepts the dominant part played by the self in all acts of rational will, and also recognises the fact that motives apart from the self can have no dynamic efficiency. But they argue that in every act of choice man reveals his character as a whole in relation to the specific situation. Freedom just means that man is not determined by anything *ab extra*. The individual determines himself and the individual is not a bare self, but a self with a definite content. Actions are determined by character. Open possibilities do not exist.

Criticism : Merely to act in accordance with character is no pledge of freedom, and does not serve to distinguish the man who is master of himself from the man who is slave of his passions. Consistently with this theory again moral character runs back in a determinate line of development to elements which are non-moral. The inference in that moral character is the issue of natural conditions.

Self-determinism fails to explain facts like regret and repentance. If our act issued necessarily from our character in the given situation, if we could not have willed otherwise than we did, our repentance for it would not be explicable. Repentance does not simply mean our feelings when we sinned ; on the contrary, with keen regret there always goes the feeling that something better was possible.

In the next place, we directly experience freedom in any act of deliberate choice. The active self is directly experienced as a free cause, and to say that character determines conduct, is meaningless unless character denotes the self that wills. We may conceive our actions as a causal series, but in the end we must presuppose a free or uncaused cause, which is the end of his own action. The human will is such a free cause, and its movement cannot be reconstructed and explained by the aid of factors beyond itself.

Self-determinism rests on a defective idea of spiritual development. Spiritual development cannot be explained in terms of a strict causality. There is no question of irrationality here. For, we ourselves are more than intelligent beings. We are active agents and the activity of will cannot be fully stated in terms of Reason. If it be objected that we are sacrificing the principle of causal connection, we reply that causal connection is right enough in its own place, but there is a causality of freedom.

True meaning of freedom : Freedom cannot mean the liberty of indifference. It is not blind and it cannot be divorced from a judgment of value on different possible courses of action. The key to the solution of the problem lies in the relation of the fundamental self to character. The self owns its character rather than is identical with it. Character is ever-growing. So long as it is not a perfect whole, it contains within it certain open possibilities, which make the act of choice a real one. But it is to be noted that : (a) The freedom of open choice belongs to a stage of spiritual evolution. It exists neither in irrational creatures nor in God, it exists only in human individuals.

(b) The openness of choice varies, and freedom is a matter of degree. It is weakened by influence of passions, and the forces of mechanised habit. Then again the scope of choice is often restricted by the situation and the individual has to encounter 'forced options'. Besides, the less plas-

tic character becomes, the greater internal unity and coherence it achieves, the fewer are the variations which it admits.

The ideal is thus perfect self-determinism under the guidance of the good will. But this higher freedom is a goal to which we can slowly approximate. We have to move towards it through that stage of spiritual development where possibilities are more or less open, and there is risk of failure and defeat.

Omnipotence of God and Freedom of Human Will.

The most vital problem that may be raised in this connection is : If God is omnipotent and omniscient, how would you explain man's free will ?

It is generally assumed that God is omnipotent, omniscient and personal being. The main thing that is connected with this problem is how to reconcile man's free will with God's omniscience. But before we discuss the possibility of reconciliation between these two conceptions, it is necessary to consider, what is meant by the freedom of will. Is free will in man a real fact ? If so, what exactly is meant by it ?

By 'freedom of will' we do not mean any of the alternative explanations given in the theories of Determinism and Indeterminism. According to Determinism, mechanical causation is the Universal Law and there is no room for the ideas of man's efficiency and intelligent control over his actions. Indeterminism, on the other hand, goes to the opposite extreme and declares that our volitions have no causes, that they are not determined in any way but they are due to pure chance. Now when we speak of 'freedom' we obviously reject the deterministic theory of mechanical causation applied to our volitions. This 'freedom' does not mean absence of all determination, and the whimsical product of pure chance. Our volitions indeed have their

causes, although these causes are free. Hence a volition, although determined, is not mechanically determined.

This will be clear from the psychological analysis of voluntary action. This shows that at the stage of deliberation there is not a free fight among the competing motives, but that motives are all ends in-and-for self. The motives are not like external forces that move the self but they themselves are self-moving and tending to move. Our volitions are indeed determined but not determined by physical forces, rather they are determined by the self. Hence freedom means self-determination.

The question now arises, how to reconcile the fact of the freedom of the human will with God's omniscience. If man's volitions are determined by himself it is hardly possible for anyone to predict or even know what they will be in future. On the other hand, God's perfection requires that He should possess full knowledge of all events, no matter whether they are in the past or in the future whether mechanically caused or freely determined by finite selves. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the apparent dilemma; of these, we may consider the following—(a) It has been held by some thinkers such as Martineau, Ward and others, that the fact of the freedom of the individual self is something of which we have the clearest testimony of our self-consciousness and we have an indispensable necessity in our moral life. It is also undeniable that there cannot be any foreknowledge of such free actions. Hence God cannot be said to have any knowledge of the free beginnings in the life of the individual self. Thus far God's knowledge is limited, but this is "self-imposed limitation", which implies no imperfection (It is in the interest of our moral perfection that God freely imposed a limitation upon his own knowledge).

The obvious defect of this theory is that a limitation, even if self-imposed, stands against the infinity of God and

this view leads to the conception of a limited God which is unsatisfactory.

(b) Some idealists like Hegel, and his followers, seek to reconcile the dilemma by holding that God has no fore-knowledge but only intuitive knowledge of free-actions of men. Fore-knowledge implies that the volitions are necessary consequences of antecedent conditions. Hence there cannot be any fore-knowledge of free actions of human selves. But God's knowledge is intuitive. All things past, present and future are present to Him in one "Eternal Now". The category of time has application only to the world of human experience but time is merely an appearance from the standpoint of God. Hence Lotze says, "Knowledge, yet nor fore-knowledge of free beginnings is conceivable."

This view attempts a reconciliation by denying the reality of time. It follows that from the stand-point of the absolute, there is no real moral progress from less perfection to greater perfection, and hence it follows that there is no meaning in our ethical and religious experiences.

(c) Royce shows the way to a more satisfactory solution of the above problem. This solution is reached through the psychological analysis of our consciousness of time. Recent psychology has shown that our consciousness of the present is not the apprehension of a single and indivisible mathematical point but a simultaneous presentation of successive parts. This is what James calls "specious present". Now, if we apply this concept of time to the problem under discussion we can understand how it is possible for all facts past, present and future, to be at once present in the divine consciousness.

In the case of God, however, there are no limitations, so that the span of God's consciousness is as wide as the whole of time. Though there is a real temporal world, the whole

of it is present to God's consciousness in the same way as the several notes of music are present to our finite consciousness. This view of the relation of time to divine consciousness thus reconciles the dilemma between free volitions of finite selves and God's consciousness of such volitions. So there can be no controversy between God's omniscience and free will of finite selves.

CHAPTER IX

ANTITHEISTIC THEORIES OF RELIGION :
POSITIVISM

There are certain antitheistic theories in philosophy. These are, Positivism, Naturalism and Agnosticism. The theory of positivism is concerned with positive acts and observable phenomena.

There are mainly two kinds of philosophy, which preach godless religion or religion without God. The godlessness is due to positivism of these systems. These are Religion of Humanity and Buddhism. Comte supports Religion of Humanity and replaces the ordinary form of theistic religion by the worship of Humanity at large. In the scientific age of ours, we cannot believe in the existence of anything which is super-sensible. Before the present scientific age, thinkers tried to explain empirical facts and events with reference to super-sensuous causes. But this explanation will not do to-day. The world of Positive sense-experience is the only reality in modern scientific age. Hence God of ordinary religion, who is essentially a super-sensuous entity, cannot be believed to be real in this age.

But, there is the necessity of Religion, for man is religious by nature. He cannot live without worshipping some complete Being, as he is himself incomplete. God of the scientific man must be something that can be proved by scientific or positive experience. There is nothing in the world of experience worshippable and adorable except human beings, because all the good qualities of head and heart are present only in human beings and not in non-human nature. But we cannot worship a single human being. A man is what he is because of his relationship with others

in society. Through language, emotion, beliefs etc. all human beings are inter-related in a large family. Thus Comte arrives at the conception of great humanity which is a synthesis of all human beings of the world. According to him, religion is the synthetic idealisation of our existence. But actual humanity again is full of defects, so we cannot worship it. Thus there is an ideal humanity which is bereft of all such defects. It is the proper object of adoration and we should try to ennoble actual humanity in the light of ideal humanity. So, according to Comte, our proper object of worship is Ideal Humanity.

The positivist's religion presents to us an object of religion, which obviously cannot satisfy the human intellect and heart. Man cannot sincerely worship fictions of their own minds. Mere ideals cannot evoke that burning enthusiasm and living faith which constitute the essence of religion. As Flint remarked, "Ideals cannot even be idols".

Comte's Absolute is Ideal Humanity. But it is finite absolute, as humanity is finite. We, finite human beings, cannot worship anything which is similar to us. We can worship him who is greater and purer than ourselves or, in other words, we can worship Infinite Being only. True religion is a personal communion with an everliving God, it is not a mere intellectual worship of dead saints and heroes, or of mere baseless ideals. Then Comte's synthesis of human beings is incomplete. Man is not the only being in the world, there is non-human nature also. Man cannot be what he is without this non-human nature. In fact human beings cannot live without this non-human nature. So, we see that there is an inter-relation between them, and no such dualism exists as Comte supposes. Again, Comte says that we cannot believe in the existence of God as this is super-sensible. But can we get any experience of Ideal Humanity beyond sense-organs? It is also super-sensible.

on the same ground, we can also deny the existence of Ideal Humanity. This is why we see that this doctrine is not a valid one—Ideal Humanity cannot replace God—the aim of Comte that the Religion of Humanity as the future religion of mankind has remained unrealised.

Buddhism is also a Godless Religion. According to it, life is full of sorrows and sufferings. Even apparent pleasures are fraught with pain. Suffering, like any other thing, depends on some conditions. The chain of causes and effects leads us to the suffering of the world. The present life is the effect of past life and the cause of future life. But there may be cessation of these sufferings of life. The sufferings must cease if the causes of sufferings can be stopped. But we should try to understand clearly the exact nature of the state called cessation of sufferings. This liberation or *Nirvana* is attainable here in this life, if certain conditions are fulfilled. There is a path-way to the cessation of sufferings, to the state of Liberation. If we follow this path, we shall attain liberation. Firstly, we must have a knowledge of the teachings of Lord Buddha. Our wrong views of life, self and the world are the root causes of sufferings. Secondly, morally good character is necessary to attain it. There are five kinds of principles (*Anushashila*)—(i) *Ahimsa* or Non-violence; we must not be violent to anybody or creature. (ii) *Satya* or truth, *abstention* from falsehood. We must be truthful throughout our life. (iii) Non-stealing—we must not take other's properties. (iv) *Brahmacharyya*, which means complete cessation of the casual appetites and desires. (v) *last*, but not the least, *shila* is *Aparigraha*—this means, 'to accept valuable gifts' which will bring greed and our liberation will be unattainable. The best way to attain liberation is '*Samadhi*'. It is some kind of complete identification with truth as propounded by Lord Buddha. If we live in the above manner, we shall get *Nirvana*.

Buddhism says that if we perform all these moral acts, as stated above, we shall get *Nirvana* or Liberation and there is no need of worshipping any Infinite Being in order to attain it. It is surely a religion as one-third of the population of the world has taken up this Buddhism as the true Religion, and it is a Godless Religion. We cannot go through all these steps without the idea that there is some being who guides us in our moral life. So we see that there is no real Buddhist to-day, as all Buddhists place Buddha in the place of God and worship him as their ideal goal, as their God. So Buddha becomes the Lord. Thus we see that Buddhism is not a Godless Religion to-day, though when it was originally stated, it was so.

Again Buddhism is a kind of morality, in the strict sense and not a religion. Even if we take it as a Religion, it is not Godless Religion, as we have seen, and if it is Godless, it is no Religion but a moral code. Hence we see that there is no Religion which is Godless and Religion without God is not possible at all.

Agnosticism :

The term "agnostic" or agnosticism refers to the philosophical and religious attitude of those, according to whom man can have a real knowledge of phenomena only and that as far as what may be behind phenomena is concerned (God, immortality etc.), there is no evidence entitling us either to deny or affirm anything. The theory is also due to a dislike of anthropomorphism. It is felt that human nature is so poor and so narrow that we cannot use it to any great extent for the purpose of interpreting God. The attitude represented by agnosticism is as old as scepticism, from which it differs only in being a more or less positive doctrine. Scepticism denies all knowledge, while agnosticism confines knowledge to phenomena only. It

asserts that we cannot have any scientific ground for belief regarding the deity.

This means that agnosticism approaches very near to atheism, but the universal distinction between Agnosticism and dogmatic Atheism cannot be denied. Agnosticism does not assert the non-existence of God. It allows that God must exist but asserts that we can never know it for certain.

The sceptics understand 'agnosticism' as the modern phase of scepticism. Hume reduces all the contents of consciousness to perception, and divides perception into 'impressions' and 'ideas'. 'Impressions' include all our sensations, passions and emotions, which present themselves with a peculiar force and liveliness which distinguish them from 'ideas', which are thus nothing but familiar copies of impressions. "All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which they exactly represent". In the language of modern psychology we find here the distinction between presentation and representation. We connect impressions and ideas with another in thinking by means of such conception as reality, substance etc. But where do we get these according to Hume? We derive them from custom "because we are accustomed to see that one thing follows another in time, we conceive the idea that the former must follow the latter", and invariable relation of succession is made a notion of causality. "Necessity", he says, "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects. The idea of substance is explained in a similar way". "The idea of substance is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination and given a particular name enable us to recall that collection". A consequence of this definition of 'substance' is the denial of the reality of an external world and of mind. "What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions."

Obviously there can be no room for a real God in such radical scepticism, for if God were to exist he can only be conceived to exist as substance and cause (e.g., the 'ultimate substance' and 'cause' are mere names, God cannot exist). Hume traces the origin of belief in God to ignorance, superstitions and fear.

Though Kant understood to refute Hume's scepticism by restoring universality and necessity to knowledge, (by holding that the combining principles of knowledge are not due to custom, but contributed by the mind), he himself became sceptical regarding the ultimate reality, when he argued that the categories are inapplicable beyond phenomena. This sceptical element appears more prominently in Kant's treatment of three Ideas of Reason (the Ideas of the soul, the Universe and God) which, though assumed by the mind to give rational unity to our experience, are admitted by him as only regulating principles, not constitutive. Ultimate reality is thus for ever concealed behind experience and inaccessible to knowledge. Thus he "became not the conqueror but the successor of Hume". His success in making a division between phenomenal and noumenal worlds will prevent us from having any accurate knowledge of God. He allows a practical theory. Human nature cannot be divided into two separate compartments. Kant is right in saying that God cannot be known with the help of certain categories, but he is wrong in saying that God cannot be known at all in a theoretical manner.

Though it was Hume and Kant who laid the foundations of agnosticism, on a critical study of the history of the philosophical thought the root cause of agnosticism can be traced to Descartes' dualism between the knowing mind and the known world, thought and extension. It is the metaphysical dualism, which is the original seat

of modern agnosticism. The essential defect in this dualism lies in the unconscious assumption that man as a knowing subject, as a thinking being, is an alien in this world. What we know, we know only as it is mirrored in the glass of mental categories through which we look at it. We start with the assumption of the world as something set up against us, a counter-reality to ourselves; the dog crossing the streams took its shadow as a rival of itself; so long as this assumption continues, separation of knowledge from reality is inevitable and consequently the reality will forever remain unknown and unknowable. But when we take the more modern evolutionary view of 'man as organic to the world', we find that the categories of thought are not created by the mind and imposed upon an alien world. On the contrary these categories are inherent in the world itself becoming articulate in the mind of man in the process of man's adapting himself to his environment. From this point of view, which is more reasonable than the Cartesian dualism of thought and extension and the Cartesian dualism of form of thought and matter of thought, thought is not absolutely shut out from nature, they have developed *pari passu* as correlatives. It is because of man's affinity with nature that man is capable of reading the secrets of nature. Of course, man cannot claim to have an absolute knowledge of reality, because human thought is too inadequate to grasp the complete meaning of ultimate reality, just as it is not possible for the eyes to look at the sun itself. But this is far from admitting that objective reality is uncertain and unknowable. We do not know the whole; our knowledge is valid as far as it goes. We are in constant contact with an objective reality which is being gradually revealed to us through our ever-progressive knowledge.

In the last century, the agnostic view received an impetus in England by the efforts of Hamilton, Mansel, Huxley,

Spencer etc. Their general standpoint is that knowledge implies relations; to know a thing is to know how it is revealed to other things. Hence knowledge is confined to finite things only (the doctrine of relativity of knowledge). Consequently, the knowledge of the Absolute is impossible for it involves self-contradiction. To know the Absolute would mean to condition the Unconditioned. Hence the absolute Reality is unknown and unknowable. Principal Caird has given an effective reply to this criticism by pointing out that our consciousness of finite things as finite implies our knowledge of the Infinite as well. If we had no knowledge of the Infinite, it would not be possible for us to know the finite as finite (Beasts cannot be said to have the knowledge of the Infinite, because though they know the finite, they do not know the finite as finite). Spencer differs from Hamilton and Mansel in acknowledging that we have an indefinite knowledge of the Absolute, while according to Hamilton and Mansel the idea of the Infinite is only a negative one. But even an indefinite vague consciousness of the Absolute which is admitted by Spencer is a more or less positive knowledge of it, and if we have this minimum knowledge of the Absolute, the whole theory of reality on which agnosticism is based, falls to the ground. The truth is that the Absolute, as the agnostic conceives it, is a false abstraction. Rightly viewed the Absolute is not unrelated to the finite. There is a correlativity between the two like the centre and circumference of the circle. Each is known through the other. The Absolute is therefore not an unknowable entity; it is known in and through the system of finite things. As our knowledge of the system of finite things develops with the progress of our knowledge, the Absolute gradually unfolds itself. Nature is the content of the Absolute and through Nature the Absolute is known.

Positivism and Agnosticism :

Positivism is right in emphasising that man possesses really adorable and lovable qualities. But Positivism loses sight of the real source from which man springs, the whole of which he is a part, and from which he cannot be severed. We must believe in the existence of a reality,—whether we call it God or absolute,—which is manifested both in nature and man, more fully in man than in nature. The process must be looked upon as the progressive self-revelation of the absolute. The truth is whole, the end *plus* the process. Pringle-Pattison warns against laying too much stress on the time-process and forgetting that the absolute exists in a way beyond or out of time also. If we regard the Absolute as wholly permanent in the time-process as living entirely in time, then it would be non-moral, changing and growing into moral. This means what Bergson understands by the term Creative Evolution, i. e., creation of something really new at every stage of evolution. This would mean the coming of something out of nothing,—which is absurd. Though something may be a new manifestation of the absolute, yet it cannot have been previously non-existent in the absolute. For example, before the appearance of living things on earth, there must have been life in the Absolute; it could not have been lifeless before the emergence of moral qualities of man, for it must be eternally moral. The Absolute is both immanent in the world-process and transcending it; it is both in time and out of time, its phenomena or manifestations are growing in time, but it is eternally complete. Hence, if man is good and great it is because the Absolute, (his origin and ground) is eternally good and great. This is precisely the fact that Comte missed when he made 'man' his God. By defying God, Comte indirectly supported the truth underlying the Christian doctrine of incarnation, namely, that man is the shining presence of God, that in the highest human life we

have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of God. Man is God manifested in flesh. All this is excellent; but Comtism errs in denying God and in taking the manifestation itself as God.

Comte discards the transcendental divine being of popular theism. Never the less his Ideal Humanity is as transcendent and mystical as God. For Ideal Humanity is not man that has been, and is, but it is the best that man can be. He also fails to note that just as individual men are the organs of humanity, so also humanity in its turn is the organ of higher organism i.e., God and therefore dependent upon Him.

While positivism holds that God, i.e., Humanity is positively known, Agnosticism maintains that God is unknown and unknowable. Agnosticism forgets that in knowing the manifestation of God we know God, and that God can be known only through manifestations. The attempt to know God, apart from His attributes or manifestations, constitutes a false ideal of knowledge. Locke and Kant committed exactly this fallacy when distinguishing between substance and quality, phenomena and noumena essence and appearance, which are the two sides of the same thing and thought of them as separate entities. It is wrongly supposed that the substance ought to be known somehow directly without the help of the attribute, and the noumenon ought to be known somehow directly without the help of phenomena. Thus we have Kant's despair of ever knowing the thing-in-itself and Spencer's despair of knowing the Absolute.

Spencer's inconsistencies are well known. While declaring that the Absolute is unknown and unknowable, he declares in the same breath that the Absolute is the power manifested through-out the universe, distinguished as material, is the same power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness. We know then so much of the Absolute,

even according to Spencer's own admission. The right view, then, is that we do know the Absolute through its manifestations or phenomena; but as the possible manifestations of the Absolute are unlimited, we can never exhaustively know it. In other words, the Absolute is not unknowable but is fathomable.

The Comtist is wrong in regarding Humanity as a self-contained fact and Spencer is wrong in forgetting that God is known or revealed in human character at its best. They, however, maintain two complementary half-truths which, when combined, give us the true object of worship, namely, the Absolute as revealed specially in man.

"Religion Is Nothing But Wish-Fulfilment."

The view that 'religion is nothing but wishfulfilment' has puzzled the different thinkers of the different ages. Freud, the father of Psycho-analysis, supports this view. According to him, "Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory world, in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world, which we have developed inside us as a result of biological and psychological necessities."

If we follow the Freudian psychology, we will find that the 'unconscious' plays an important role in the philosophy of Religion. The "unconscious" as the term is used by Freud means that dark region of the mind wherein are buried those elements of experience which have been repressed, and which can only re-enter into consciousness indirectly and in disguised forms. But they do not cease to function. It may find a way of escape from its 'prison-house', and may express itself specially in dreams. Dreams are *unfulfilled wishes* which we have tried to banish from our minds, but which regain entrance in a disguised form when the 'censor' is asleep. For Freud, every wish is sexual.

Jung, in his "Psychology of the Unconscious" says that all religious beliefs are "eroto-genetic", i.e., sexual in their origin and are produced by the unconscious activity of the libido. The libido uses as its material the unconscious memories of childhood with its utter dependence on father and mother, and projects the primitive Father-image and the tender emotions associated with it upon an objectified father-God. The God-myth is nothing but a repressed wish of the race, finding compensation in a symbolic form. Freud's psycho analysis has traced the origin of religion to the helplessness of childhood, and its content to the persistence of the wishes and needs of childhood into maturity.

If one wishes to form a true estimate of the full grandeur of religion, one must keep in mind that religion fulfils some desires or wishes of men. In the first place, it (religion) satisfies man's desire for knowledge, it gives them (men) information about the source and origin of the universe. Everybody wants pleasure and happiness and religion assures them of protection and final happiness amid the fluctuating vicissitudes of fortune. It also guides their thoughts and actions. For our psychology, God is but a function of the unconscious.

Now, the question is: Whether the religious man is holding commerce with a real 'other-than-himself', or, whether he is naively worshipping a mere projection of his own unconscious animal impulses, i.e., communing with his subliminal self,—is surely a supremely important matter for religion. In spite of Jung's creative phantasy and 'the psychology of unconscious' 'we cannot dwell in a fools' paradise once we have discovered it to be such. Religion takes itself far too seriously to be content with the camouflage of day-dreams, which are nothing but the libido in disguise.

To have religious ideas of symbols of subconscious desires is not to prove them illusory, for it leaves the question

still open whether the universe does or does not correspond with our desires. Instead of denying the objective truth of religion on the ground that it is a case of the "wish being father to the thought", it is possible for us, on the contrary, to build up a somewhat strong argument in favour of the ontological significance of human instincts and desires as expressed in the world of behaviour and response. But it should not mean that every capricious wish must harmonize with reality, such as the child's desire for the moon as a toy to play with. Experience allows those desires to survive which are useful for working purposes. So far, the appetite or demand for God has stood the test.

Bosanquet, an idealistic thinker, says, 'The instinctive appetite or demand for God is a proof of the reality of deity in the same sense in which hunger is a proof of the existence of food. But an instinct implies an object, and if you find a special emotional impulse, such as that of religion and worship, which pervades all sorts of particular experiences, you can hardly help recognizing the object of this emotion.'

But in spite of all these, no one can doubt the supreme importance of the work of Freud in this connection. It may well prove to be epoch-making, in the sense at least of opening out new fields and new methods of psychological research. Freud's view contains at least some amount, though not the whole amount of truth.

Naturalism :

Naturalism accepts nature as the central fact. 'Nature' is a name for the ultimate reality of things both human and supra-human, organic and inorganic. Consciousness is an accident of the universe. Naturalism emphasises the continuity between man and non-human nature. It denies the central significance of human life in the play of the cosmic forces.

There are two types of naturalism—Lower and Higher. The lower Naturalism seeks to merge man in the sub-human nature, from which he draws his origin. The Higher Naturalism recognises the emergence of real differences between one stage of nature's processes and another. The fundamental problem of Naturalism lies with the problem of the continuous manifestation of a single power, whose full nature cannot be identified with the initial stage of the evolutionary process. The nature of the power at work in any process is only revealed in the process as a whole, and the world is not complete without man and his knowledge. The idea of nature as a complete system and of man as a spectator *abextra* is essentially false. The intelligent being is rather to be regarded as the *organ through which the universe beholds and enjoys itself*. This view delivers us from the difficulties of the modern philosophical relativity, subjectivity or phenomenality of knowledge and the possibility of knowing things as they really are. Popular science and popular philosophy take the philosophical scheme of moving particles as the reality of nature as an objective system. Naturalism interprets this universe in terms and categories of the natural sciences, specially Physics and Chemistry.

Naturalism has many forms such as—dogmatic naturalism or materialism, agnostic naturalism or naturalism and so on.

According to dogmatic naturalism, matter is the one and only one ultimate reality. It reduces matter, life and mind as by-products of nature. It advocates a physico-chemical conception of the world, and hence it is anti-teleological; moreover, it is anti-idealistic in the sense, that mind and its experiences are to be understood in terms of Nature. Modern naturalists hold that the mind is a natural phenomenon and not something above nature.

According to scientific naturalism, matter can be analysed

into atoms. Each atom is a miniature solar system. Thus naturalism stands for scientific naturalism. The constituents of matter are not small particles, but centres of force or energy. In short, Naturalism holds that things are not what they appear to common sense, but they are essentially of the nature of force or energy. According to James Ward, naturalism is "materialism without matter", because it emphasises upon the law of conservation of energy.

Naturalism rejects the operation of dis-embodied forces, existence of an immaterial spirit, the survival of personality after the destruction of the body.

In relying exclusively on the physico-chemical method of modern science for establishing cognitive claims, naturalists are in effect shuffling the cards in their own favour.

According to Prof. Wallace, the faults of naturalism spring from a creditable motive. It is the desire to be honest and consistent in the whole realm of accepted truth, which implies the defects of naturalism. It is a re-action from the follies of super-naturalism i.e., it is a protest against a conception which separated God from the world, as a potter from his clay.

Naturalism excludes meanings, values, purposes and ideals which are essential features of the world of experience. It fails absolutely in the realm of valuation. "The method of naturalism is", according to Pringle-Pattison, "interpretation of the higher by the lower or interpretation by reduction of the higher to the lower. The world's wealth of meaning is lost in the dance of atoms; life's variegated landscapes become one arid desert; and whatever delight is enjoyed passes into a starless night in which all cows are black".

The naturalistic thinkers regard mind as an epi-phenomenon, an important appendage to the human organism, it is utterly useless and it has no part to play in the economy

of things. But it is a fundamental tenet of the naturalist that nature eliminates everything unnecessary through Natural Selection. Yet we find this very repetition of the emergence of mind. The entire logic of life goes against the naturalistic presupposition. Man's spiritual endeavour is in the 'conscious automaton' theory turned into superfluous images in an impalpable mirror. We cannot stand this.

Our religious consciousness proceeds on the assumption that the supreme values of life are not mere conversions pitted against the natural things, but the ultimate ground of things, as revealed to us in the universe, is akin to what we recognise as the highest and the best in our experience. But naturalism depicts a nature which is coldly neutral and indifferent to the highest and the best of our experience. The automatically working laws of nature seem to recognise no distinction between a saint and a sinner, between a man of genius and an imbecile, and so on. The mechanism of natural law seems to be thus very cruel, "Not with the ferocity of a tiger but with the dull insensibility of a cart-wheel which will roll over a man's neck as easily as over a flint".

CHAPTER X

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

In some sense, the belief that death is not the cessation of existence is the common characteristic of almost all religions of mankind.

Here we shall discuss the following questions. (a) "What is the immortality of the soul?" (b) What are the grounds for the belief in the soul's immortality?" (c) Is the belief in the immortality of soul necessary for man's religious life?

(a) It is believed that death is not the cessation of existence. Body is destroyed after death. But the soul is never destroyed. Plato affords the philosophical appreciation of the significance of the idea of the survival of the soul after death. Kant regards it as essential to religion and defines, "the immortality of the soul means the infinitely prolonged existence and personality of one and the same rational being". Kant, however, distinguishes immortality from survival, since survival of death need not be infinitely prolonged. Broad has suggested that just as the body remains for a while after death before its final disintegration, so may it be with the spirit—since 'messages' seem to come more frequently from those who have recently died than from those who have been dead for a long while. Thus it serves as a proof that survival and immortality are not the same thing.

(b) There are other different arguments which attempt to justify the ground for the belief in the immortality of the soul.

(i) Arguments on the analogy of the conservation of energy: The physical science postulates that the quantity of the physical energy in the universe is conserved matter

and motion in which the physical universe manifests itself is constant. The result is that nothing in the physical universe is lost beyond recovery and so the soul is immortal. We know that this being an analogical argument it cannot justify any thing beyond doubt.

(ii) Arguments on the revelation of the intellect : Man's intellectual life relates that thinking, remembering and imagination are carried on beyond any limit of space and time. To think is to apply universal or general notions. Thought is not limited to here and now. And the higher is the life of thought, the more independent does the self feel of limiting conditions. Memory is another instance of the self's independence of percepts. These suggest the possibility of the self to have a life of its own beyond limitation of the physical world and the self can have existence even after the death of its physical vehicle (instrument).

But a closer consideration points to the fact that this argument puts more in the conclusion than is warranted by the premises.

(iii) Arguments from Values : Values like Truth, Beauty and Goodness exist only for mind and an idealist points to the Supreme Mind in which they are completely realised. The world is here for the actualisation of the ideal, the realisation of the spirit. Humanity is the only agency for such realisation.

(iv) Metaphysical arguments : Historically, the proofs go back as far as Plato. Plato believes that the soul is not only uncreated and indestructible but also capable of surviving bodily death and transmigration. Plato conceives of the soul as a substantial reality, simple in nature. It is the divine essence and therefore immortal. He distinguishes being from becoming and holds that the eternal world of ideas is different from the changing world of phenomena. The soul has a relation with the eternal world of Ideas,

because it has a rational nature. But, it has also a relation with the world of time and change, because it is a concrete existence with body as its vehicle. In short, his main conception is that since soul is a simple substance without parts and since all that is composed of part is subject to dissolution ; therefore, the soul as partless, simple substance is free from dissolution and death. Advocates like Plato maintain that the soul is a substance, the essence of which is pure consciousness. Consciousness can never perish because it is the very essence of simple substance. Criticising him, Leibnitz, points out that the argument of Plato can never prove personal immortality. "I, after my death", says Leibnitz, "become changed into a completely different personality, what is it to me whether I survived death or not" ? To Leibnitz the 'monad' is imperishable and its distinctive character of perception and appetite can never die out, for it will involve a break in the continuity of reality. According to Leibnitz, death is only apparent and not real. The Naiyayikas also hold that the soul is an immaterial substance and therefore immortal.

Critically speaking, the soul is not a substance. It is only the transcendental unity of apperception, a logical identity.

(v) Moral argument : The most convincing argument in favour of the immortality of the soul is the facthood of moral life. Kant suggests that virtue and goodness should be rewarded and justice should be established. But in this life the moral law often seems to be the reverse in its application. Yet its absolute character seems to demand that such indication cannot be permanently withheld and since it is not given in this life, will be given hereafter. But to speak of the moral law surviving death, where no person is surviving actually, is absurd ; because such a law exists and has meaning only for persons.

Only reasons cannot give us religious conviction in any

satisfactory view of the immortality of the soul. The notion of mortality is firmly established in the structure of man's religious belief and reason, whereas the idea of immortality remains the object of belief rather than reason.

(i) The most convincing argument in favour of immortality is the facthood of moral life. Kant says that a faith in immortality is necessary for moral endeavour, though it cannot be demonstrated scientifically. It is a necessary postulate of moral life. "Justice demands immortality, virtue must be rewarded and vice punished, otherwise the world is non-moral, because in this life the virtuous are not always rewarded and the vicious are not always punished." It requires therefore a further life in which inequalities may be adjusted. Unless we assume that there is an after-life, where rewards and punishment will be distributed in a just manner, we could not lead a moral life.

(ii) Further, moral life is a struggle for the attainment of an ideal of complete and perfect goodness that can never be attained in this life. The moral goal is an ever-expanding ideal and cannot be completely realised in the narrow span of our life. The ideal personality is always a distant goal to man to be achieved by his moral and spiritual endeavour. The essential incompleteness of our attainment in the life forces us to believe in immortality i. e., unless we have other lives in which there will be fuller and more concrete realisation of our ideal, our moral endeavour becomes absolutely meaningless.

(iii) If the ideal personality is real, if the highest moral value is objectively valid, if our spiritual life has any significance, immortality is a fact. This moral argument of immortality is mainly sponsored by Indian thinkers. It is said in the Bhagavad-Gita "the soul is indestructible; it cannot be pierced by the sword, fire cannot burn it, air cannot dry it, water cannot moisten it."

(iv) The enjoyment and sufferings of the consequences

of our actions bring us again and again into this world, and the doctrine of 'transmigration of soul' goes hand in hand with the 'doctrine of Karma.' Now it may be said that belief in immortality of soul is necessary for the religious life. In the Bhagavad-Gita it is said, "as during our lifetime we survive the death of the baby-body, the young-body and the mature-body successively and retain our individuality, so after the death of the old body we shall survive, live, retain our individuality and continue to exist through eternity."

(c) The belief in the Immortality of soul is necessary for man's religious life.

The problem of immortality of soul is very much controversial in both Eastern and Western philosophy. Immortality or survival after death cannot be verified in experience. In Indian philosophy belief in immortality is explained by the doctrine of *Karma*. In Western philosophy, all the great idealistic thinkers have admitted immortality in some form or other. Primitive people believed in ghosts and spirits which reflected their faith in a temporary survival after death. The question, then, arises whether the belief in immortality is rational or not.

Various answers have been given to this question; metaphysics, philosophy, science and religion have tried to solve this problem. From ancient times there have been atheistic and agnostic thinkers in India who denied the existence of the soul after the death of the body. They are known as Carvakas. They believe that the body is the soul, and that the soul does not exist outside of the body, and that when the body dies, the soul is also dead and gone.

Modern physiologists, anatomists, pathologists and a host of other materialistic and agnostic thinkers, however, hold that the body or the combination of matter produces thought, intelligence, mind or soul. They are nothing but the functions of the brain. If the brain-functions stop, the mind and

all the mental phenomena will instantaneously stop. There is no such thing as soul ; consequently there can be no such question as its existence after death.

Mr. Spencer identifies the soul with the brain and compares it to the piano. Another materialistic thinker W. K. Clifford does not believe in a soul as separate from the brain or independent of the physical body.

Criticism : When Mr. Spencer identifies the soul with the brain and compares it to the piano, he forgets that the piano needs a performer to produce musical sounds.

Hume was also wrong in saying that soul is nothing but a bundle of impressions and ideas. But ideas and perceptions do not, by themselves, combine with one another. Memory is not possible without recognition, and recognition is possible only when there is a sense of personal identity.

McTaggart nicely says, "if we hear millions of times "there is no soul," still we cannot entirely be convinced that we shall cease to exist after death ; we cannot think of our annihilation, we cannot believe that our individuality will be lost forever. Such solutions do not appear to our reason."

In India, similar theories were advanced by the Buddhists who did not believe in the existence of a soul as separate from the gross body. The Buddhists maintain that the body is the cause of mind and intelligence. They used the illustration of a lamp and the light. This body is just like a lamp, and the intelligence or consciousness is like the light produced by the burning of the candle.

David Hume, like some of the Buddhistic philosophers in India believes that the human soul is nothing but a bundle of impressions and ideas. There are other agnostic thinkers who say, "the conception of a soul as a substantive thing is a mere figment of imagination." Kant says that the soul is the simplest substance behind and beyond the empirical

experiences and only be assumed but cannot be proved. Many eminent thinkers and scientists like Sir Oliver Lodge, William James etc., have claimed to produce empirical evidences of the continuation of soul after the death of the body. But these empirical evidences are of doubtful value.

Vedanta philosophers refuted all the materialistic theories pointing out the fallacy of their principal arguments. In Vedanta, it is said that matter or object is only one half of the universe, and the other half is mind or subject or soul. It is the mind or soul which knows the matter and objects. From the time of Plato at least three important theories have been put forward for the necessity of belief in immortality : (i) the survival theory ; (ii) theory of continuity and (iii) theory of eternal life. Plato believes that the soul is a simple spiritual substance and the rational soul is independent of the body. The soul being simple is indestructible and indissoluble. All knowledge, Plato argues, that is gained after birth is empirical, but apart from sense-experiences, we get certain empirical knowledge viz., knowledge of ideals, universals and forms which transcend the empirical subject, and the pre-existence of the soul. In modern philosophy and that Descartes and Berkeley believe that the soul is unitary, non-extended, spiritual substance and hence immortal.

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